

MONARCHY

A S S E R T E D

OR

~~20420~~

The STATE OF
MONARCHICALL & POPULAR

Government

I N

Vindication of the Considerations Upon

Mr HARRINGTON'S

OCEANA.

2-15-3

By M. WREN.



Scinditur incertum studia in contraria vulgus.


OXFORD,

Printed by W. HALL, for F. BOWMAN,
to be sold by J. Martin, J. Allestree, T. Dicus.
at the Bell in St Pauls Ch. yard.
Anno Domini M. DC. LIX.

50-4-05



823:98



To The
R E V E R E N D
D^R WILKINS
W A R D E N O F
Wadham College
IN
O X F O R D.



*H E Present I
am about to
make You is like
the Legacy, of
that old Græcian, who be-
A 2 queath'd*

THE EPISTLE

queath'd his Friend, a Widow
without a Foynture, and a
Daughter without a Portion:
These Papers come to live
upon You, and to put You to
charges to maintain them.
My first Application to you
in the Considerations on the
Commonwealth of Oce-
ana, having made the Au-
thor of that Book look upon
you as one averse from his
Principles and Designes, It
is very likely that these Dis-
courses which now address
themselves to you, (being
augmented in their Offence to
Him

DEDICATORY.

Him as well as their Bulke)
will excite the utmost rage of
that Passionate Gentleman.
But this being a matter Sir, I
have so often seen you laugh
at, takes up no part of my
Cares. But I must profess my
self deeply afflicted, that I
have been used as an Occasion
of throwing so disingenious a
Contumely upon your Uni-
versity, as M^R Harrington
in his last Book goes about to
fasten upon it. Though I ne-
ver was a Member of your
Body, I have alwaies had
thoughts of the highest Vene-
ration

THE EPISTLE

ration for you, And my inclinations are thus far founded upon Gratitude, that I have for some yeares breathed your Aire, and been admitted to a Familiarity with your greatest, both Dead and Living Treasuries of Learning. Though I have no confidence that these Discourses beare Testimony of my profiting by that Converse, I must alwaies own my obligation for it, both to the University in Common, and to those particular Persons with whose Friendship I have been honoured: That
you

DEDICATORY.

*you are one of these, Sir, it is
my Glory to declare, and to be
known for*

Your most constant

Humble Servant.

M. WREN.

DEDICATORY.


You are one of these, Sir, it is
my glory to declare, and to be
known for

Your most obedient

servant

DAVID

THE PREFACE



THE PREFACE
To The
READER



HAT Mr Harrington *In Epist.*
who undertakes to vindicate the reason of Popular Government and I who have professed my selfe a Friend to Monarchy, should from the observation of the same Naturall Causes, and of the same Actions in Historie, forme different Judgements, is no more a wonder then that two Men viewing the same Object by various lights, should judge it to be of various Colours. But it seems a little strange that even in such things where We both make use of the same light, and where it is my interest to be of his Opinion, our Judgements

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Jugements should not be reconcilable. I speak this in reference to the Apologie He makes for Private Mens dealing in State Affaires, and obtruding Models of Government upon the World, or teaching new arts of Policy to those Men whose Experience has rendred them Masters of that Trade : Which though I alwaies reputed a great Vanity, I conclude more blamable since I have seen the Excuses he is able to make for it. For though it is not to be denied that Aristotle, Machiavel, and Sr Thomas More are great Persons, and may by their Authority give Protection to any man who is admitted into their Train, yet the Question still remains, Whether this Privilege can be extended to every little Writer that puts himself into their Livery. The workes of those Persons have met with an applause in the World equall to their merit, because keeping themselves within generall Terms, They have preserved the Freedome of Philosophers ; Or if at any time They have descended to particulars, it has been without any reflection upon a particular Time or Place ; This can be no justification to a Book which professes to have nothing of Fiction or Romance, but to be adapted to the Occasions or Necessities of a particular Juncture, And is not proposed with the Temper and Moderation becoming a Philosophicall Opinion, but with the heat and passion belonging to a Design. Which way of writing has no more affinity with the other, then a Libell has with a serious Tract, or a Pas-

To the READER.

Pasquin with History; Those men indeed who can be perswaded that Christoph. Columbus made a Card in his Cabinet that found out the Indies may perhaps believe also that Mr Harrington may frame a good Commonwealth without any Experience in State Affaires; But they who understand that Columbus must first have been at the Indies before he could make a Card to teach other Men the way thither, will goe neere to suspect Mr Harrington's Abilities in Modelling a Commonwealth, till he has spent some yeares in the Ministry of State. I must therefore acknowledge that I doe not lay claim to Pardon for having thrust my self into a Dispute of Government, by any part of the Apologie Mr Harrington has made for it: But I do not despaire of doing it by representing, That what I have said is all by way of Universall Position, without any private Aime or Design; That I was not without reluctancy at first drawn to it by the Authority of some Friends, from whom Mr Harrington did by all imaginable Importunity endeavour to extort something by way of Objection; That afterward I was willing to preserve the Freedome of my own and other Mens Opinions, and not suffer that They who pretend so much to Liberty, should with insupportable Tyranny bring a slavery upon our Discourse and Reason.

I wish that this could have been effected by some other Method then by managing a Controversie; For that way of writing has a suspicion

Prefat.

The PREFACE.

tion of ill Nature upon it, and looks more like an improvement of Contention, then an inquiry into Truth. It is by a very happy Metaphore called drawing the Saw, For the Noise We make teares the Eares of such as stand by, And the Dust We raise puts out their Eies. Besides when one Book is shackled to another (like Spaniels in Couples) It is impossible by ranging to spring new Matter, or to give the Reader any thing of Delight or Diversion.

But I am more then ordinarily unfortunate by having to deale with an Adversary who multiplies upon Me all the inconveniencies of Controversie, by having banished from it that Calmness of which it is Capable, and that Sincerity with which it ought to be managed; For to speak modestly, Mr Harrington's Arguments are not alwaies Demonstrations nor his Expressions Complements. But for my part I intend not to enter into Competition with him for being either an able Sophister or Calumniator; but I will preserve that Temper which belongs to a Man who disliking Passion in other People, ought to detest it in himself; And notwithstanding all his provocations, I will more consider what it is fit for Me to speake then Him to heare. In my present Answer to his Reply to the Considerations on Oceana, I have not been curious of any other Method then his own, but have made twelve Chapters confronting his, in discussion of the twelve Questions he has propounded; And in the Margin I have by the letter

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leter H. cited such Passages of his Book to which my Answers are particularly applyed.

To confess a secret, I am so much gratified by something in Mr Harrington's Booke, that I know not how to be offended with Him. In severall places he insinuates as if the Considerations on his Commonwealth of Oceana were not my own, but had been composed by the University, or at least by some eminent Persons in it: This is beyond measure obliging, For with those men who are persuaded by him that the Considerations had not much of sence in them, the Discreed it slides off from me upon other People; But if any man shall still retain a good Opinion of that Pamphlet, It must need be infinitely advanced by the thought, That so renowned an University should in any measure concur to it.

Yet I could have been well contented He would have afforded me his Belief, when I assured him I had no relation to the University: That would I am sure have saved him a great deale of unnecessary Paines, And He should not need so vainly to have pursued Me through the various shapes of a Divine, a Doctor, an Head of a Colledg, a Professor, a Prevaricator, a Mathematician. He might also by that have concealed the Pique He has so unjustly taken up against Universities and Mathematicques, and some particular persons who have an interest in both. One passage of his referring to this Head, is a little less intelligible then so fine a piece ought to be, and therefore I will
do

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do Him and the World the right to make a short Comment upon it. He has said in his Epistle Dedicatory, That the University Wits or good Companies, are good at two things, at diminishing a Commonwealth and at Multiplying a Louse. In the first place it must be known that the thing he alludes to is a limbe of Mathematiques, and therefore it is not to be expected that Mr Harrington, who holds no understanding either with Mathematiques or Mathematicians, should take care for expressing himself properly about it ; What he calls Multiplying a Louse ought to have been Magnifying, for the thing is done by a Microscope or Magnifying Glass ; But about this no man need be troubled. We are then to understand That a Gentleman in the University who is both a Divine, a Doctor, an head of a College, and a Mathematician, has the Satisfaction to see frequently at his Lodging an assembly of Men who are known both at home and abroad to be of the most learned persons of this Age ; The imployment of this Company is by making Experiments and by communicating their Observations to carry on a discovery of Nature, in order to which They have sometimes had occasion to inquire, by the help of a Microscope, into the Figure and position of those smaller parts of which all Bodies are composed ; At other times applying the Microscope to some little Animals, as a Flea, a Louse, or a Mite, They have been convinced that the Fabrik of them

To the READER.

them is Artificiall to wonder, and that the
 Wisedome of the great Architect of Nature is
 not more conspicuous in the larger Bulks of an
 Elephant or Camel, then in these little Creatures.
 The pictures of these Animals in that enlarged
 proportion which the Glass represents them in
 are drawn by a Mathematician a member of this
 Assembly, who has invented a way to measure
 the apparent magnitude of them, and are seen
 with Delight and Instruction by all Stran-
 gers; And not only so, but have been received
 with applause by Foreign Princes. This is that
 multiplying a Louse, for which Mr Harring-
 ton laughs at the University wits, though he
 might have made a more serious and profitable
 use of it; As it is said Monsieur Peiresk did,
 who having put a Louse and a Flea into a
 Microscope, He observed that the Louse grow- *Gassend. in*
 ing angry, his blood ran up and down from *vita Peresk.*
 head to foot, and from foot to head again; *lib. 6.*
 Whence he gathered how great a Commoti-
 on of Humours and Spirits, and what a dis-
 turbance of all the Faculties, Anger must
 needs make, And what harme that man a-
 voides who shuns passion. I know not whether
 this sight would have had the same operation
 upon Mr Harrington, in freeing him from his
 Choler, But I am sure it inclines me to no un-
 pleasant thoughts, by putting me in mind of a
 certain Auhor, who estuates and torments him-
 self, and yet an haire is enough to hold
 him.

The

THE PREFACE.

The only Complement I have for the Reader remains; which is to assure him That this is the last time He shall receive a Trouble from Me in this Controversie, I doe not expect that Mr Harrington should give over, but I promise my selfe He can not reply any thing to which an Answer may not be easily fitted out of those Reasons and Maximes which I have already laid down. I have cause to think by his last Book, that his stores of Reason and Arguments are brought very low, but withall I believe his Treasures of Reproaches are inexhaustible: And to silence such a person is as impossible as to disarm that Man who can use the next Dung-hill for a Magazin.

MONARCHY.

MONARCHY

ASSERTED.

O. R.

THE STATE OF MONARCHICALL AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

CHAP. I.

*Whether Prudence be well distinguished
into Antient and Moderne.*

F Or the Vindicating the Considerations on the Commonwealth of Oceana, I shall not need to do much more then give a true and accurate state of the Points that fell in question between Mr Harrington and Me; for He being equally carelesse of what I have said, and what He himselfe saies, does almost alwaies fly from the true subject of the debate between us. And I do not know any more proper Method of reclaiming such Extravagant Writers, then what men take with starting Horses, To bring them close up to take a View of that at which before they

B

boggled

boggled. In effecting which if Mr *Harrington* be sometimes put to feele the Rebukes both of the Spur and Bit, no blame can justly befall Me, who am necessitated to so rough a Manage.

Mr *Harrington* at the very beginning of his Common-wealth of Oceana, had laid downe a division of Government (pretended to be taken out of *Giannotti*) into Antient and Moderne Prudence, the Antient unanimously followed by the Greeks and Romans ending with Cæsar, the Moderne introduced by the Barbarous Nations: Now knowing that Antiquity is considered with Veneration by almost all Men, and that even They who profess to slight it, make great Advantage of it when they imagine it is on their side, He intitles to Antient Prudence that way of Poplar Government which his Book applauds, and fastens upon Modern Prudence that Monarchicall Government which it Decries. And that He is not wronged by this Interpretation of his Designe, appeares manifestly by his subsequent Definitions of Government. Against this Partition of Prudence into Antient and Modern, and the Application of it that way, the Author of the Considerations advanced these objections.

Oceana p. 2.

1. That though the Greeks and Romans despised all the World but themselves, We had no Reason to do so, it being in them no better then Pride, Pedantry, and slavery to narrow thoughts.

2. That the Examples of the Assyrian, Persian, and Egyptian Monarchies would not consist with this Division, all of which were more antient then the Greeks and Romans.

3 That

3. That Macedon one of the Noblest parts of Greece it selfe, had alwaies been under the Power of Monarchs.

4. That in the rest of Greece Regall Government was more Antient then Popular; for which (to avoid the uselesse Prolixity of particular Proofs, which are almost infinite) one Generall Authority was produced out of Thucydides.

5. That in Rome also Popular Government must give the precedence of Time to Monarchy.

He that after all this, will maintaine Prudence to have been well distinguisht into Antient & Modern, and that by Antient Prudence is to be understood the Policy of a Common-wealth, gives us great Occasion to expect from him Evident and Satisfactory Answers to every one of these Objections.

But to the first of them Mr *Harrington's* Answer (when all the Foame is wiped away) comes only to this, that the Greeks and Romans who were such Jealous Conservators of Liberty, and Masters of such excellent parts of knowledge can not with any Truth or Sence be charged with Pedantry, or slavery to narrow Principles. To which it may be replied in short (for the dispute taken thus is become very remote from the Principall matter) that both Romans and Greeks were indeed a brave and a wise People, and such as put a great Value upon themselves, which when done upon just grounds is an effect of Magnanimity; But they have withall been ever Responsible to the learned part of the World, for their Arrogance in not acknowledging how much they profited by the Eastern Nations, from whom it is demonstrable

H. p. 52

They borrowed the greatest part of what they had of Arts and Sciences. The Greeks and Romans possess Much, yet what they wanted was More; But they taking the Much to be All, were in that Slaves to their owne thoughts which were much Narrower then the Nature of things.

ibid. To the second Objection, Mr *Harrington* gives somewhat an unexpected Answer; *That having opened the Policy of Turky, He has not neglected that of the Babylonians and Persians, which are summed up in the other.* The Controversie is about the Antiquity of Regall and Popular Government, And because it is manifest that many Commonwealths are more Antient then the Turkish Monarchy, which is of about three or foure hundred yeares, Must it therefore be concluded also that they are Antienter then the Assyrian and Persian Monarchies, which are of three or foure thousand yeares standing? We are not more beholding to Mr *Harrington* for his Discovery of the Ballance, then for the Invention of this excellent forme of Arguing.

The third Instance is by Mr *Harrington* passed over in wise silence.

As little Answer is returned to the Fourth. But upon occasion of a Citation out of *Thucydides*, Mr *Harrington* pleases himselfe that He has found something in that Author that makes for the Ballance, which (slipping from the subject in hand) He runs away with, and prosecutes at large. But this Discourse being somewhat unfortunately scattered in this Place, with Mr *Harrington's* Permission it shall be transplanted to the Chapter of the Ballance; a soile more proper for it. And well

well we can part so; For it is to be doubted whether the Considerer is like to get so well off another place of the same Author; Never, saies Mr Harrington, did man make a more unlucky Choice for himselfe then the Considerer has of *Thucydides*, seeing what He affirmeth to have been Antient Prudence, is deposed by his own Witness to have been the Imbecility of Antient Times. *Thucyd. lib. 1. pag. 3.* Truly the Considerer is a very unhappy Man, but his unhappiness lies not in the mistaking of *Thucydides*, but of Mr Harrington, from whom he expected to have seen some Probation, that the Prudence which was Antient belonged not to Monarchies; But He finds the Question fraudulently transferred from the Antiquity, to the Prudence of Monarchicall Government, which in this Place came never before into Debate, and was supposed by Mr Harrington himselfe both in his Division and Definitions of Government. The Considerer will thank any man to tell him, Who is the Prevaricator now?

H. p. 3.

Having thus detected the Cheat which was out of *Thucydides* put upon us concerning the Antiquity of Monarchicall Government among the Græcians, I shall not need to do more then admonish, That (in answer to the fifth Objection) the same is indeavoured out of *Florus* in Reference to the Romans.

I make no Doubt there is enough said for my own Vindication; but it were a criminall Injustice to the memory of the excellent Giannotti, if I should not extend this Vindication

to Him also, and bring him off from that share of the Absurdity into which Mr Harrington has drawn him, by making him Author of the Division of Prudence into Antient and Modern. It is no longer a Wonder to Me that Mr Harrington's Adversaries are used with so little Civility, when I see his Friends meet with so little Honesty; The injury he does Giannotti is very apparent, seeing the two Limits or Epocha's of time which Giannotti fixes have no reference to Prudence, or Monarchicall and Popular Government, but respect only the afflicted Condition of Italy; *One of these*, saies He, *in which was the beginning of the ruine of Italy and the Roman Empire, was when Rome was oppressed by the Arms of Caesar: The other, in which was the height of the Italian misery, was when Italy was overrunne and sackt by the Hunnes, &c.* This surely has nothing to do with the Government of King and People, or Antient and Modern Prudence; That Distinction is Mr Harrington's own, & Giannotti is not at all Responsible for the Impropriety of it, then which nothing can be greater.

Gi. n. p. 7.

There is besides these Answers to my Objections something in Mr Harrington's first Chapter relating to the University (for which He had not from Me the least shadow of an Occasion) which approaches very neere to Raving, and gives Me cause to suspect I have fallen into a wrong Course of curing his Politicall distemper, For whereas I think to do it by giving him more Light, knowing men are of Opinion, that

that I ought to have closed up the Windowes, and admitted no Light at all.

Now then after all, I resolve to joine issue with Mr Harrington, and let the Reader know He need look no farther then this Chapter to see what Answer has been made to the Considerations on the Common-wealth of Oceana.

CHAP. II.

Whether a Common-wealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws, and not of Men, And a Monarchy to be the Government of some Man or few Men, and not of Laws.

IN the very Entrance of this Chapter I am charged by Mr Harrington with an Habitual Falshood and Fraudulence in reciting his Words, for which I am thankfull to him, as for a seasonable Discovery of his good Nature. The only Evidence to make good this Accusation will be found to be, that instead of the Word Art, as it was in his Book, A&t is twice printed in the Considerations. That this is an Error of the Presse, I might appeale to my own Copie, if it were not sufficient to appeale to the Indifferent Reader, whether there can be any fraudulence in such a Variation, of which I make no Use, and which is not in the least conducing to my Design. I envy Mr Harrington this handsome Confidence, that having been himselfe so miserably handled by Printers, He should

think fit to make Me responsible for all the finnes of the Press. But though I praise his Confidence, I cannot Initiate his slender Ingenuity, by laying at his Doore the Nonsense and Mistakes in this last Book, though order be there taken, that they should be imputed unto the Author himselfe, In as much as the Printer pretends (upon the last Page) to have corrected the Errors of his Press.

The Question under Debate in this Chapter is little more then a Controversie about Words and Names, yet cannot be safely omitted because by the use of those Names the People have been alwaies deluded, and have (taking a Cloud for Juno) embraced them as Substantiall Goods: Lawes and Liberty being the only True Charms, that I know of, in Nature, which by the meere sound of Words produce Great and Reall Effects.

H. p. 7.

That Law proceeds from the Will of Man, I have Mr Harrington's owne Confession, and consequently am justified for having said, That Government is not in the Law, but in the Person whose Will gave a being to that Law. But I am complained of for wanting Honesty to Consider that this Will must have a Mover, and that this Mover is Interest. I never knew, that to be Honest, it was necessary to see more in another Man's businesse then He sees himself: I was at that time only concerned to find somewhat in Government beyond Lawes, and such was the Will of the Person which creates those Lawes; If Mr Harrington does now think fit to consider

consider that this Will must be moved by Interest, I neither need nor meane to oppose him in it. I can be not only Honest but Liberall to Mr Harrington, yet not to that Excess as to give him an Almes, when he begs no less then the whole Question; For so much it amounts to where he saies, *That the Interest of the whole People coming up to the Publique Interest may be truly called the Empire of Lawes and not of Men,* in order to this, let Me demand of him Whether the Commands imposed upon the Publique by One or a few Men are to be accounted Lawes? He has already taught Us they are to be so accounted where he saies *That Law equally proceeds from Will, whither of the whole People as in a Common-wealth, of one Man, as in an Absolute, of few Men as in a Regulated Monarchy.* If so, what pretence of Reason can there be, That an Absolute or Regulated Monarchy should be esteemed less a Government of Lawes then is a Common-wealth? On the other side let Me aske Him, Whether though one single Person, or Ten or an Hundred Persons making Lawes are to be lookt on as Men, yet if they amount to Ten or an hundred thousand Persons, or include the whole People, They shall then cease to be Men? Unless He will affirm this, How is it possible that a Common-wealth should be less a Government of Men, then either an Absolute or a Regulated Monarchy? To be plaine, If the Declared Will of the Supream Power be considered as the Immediate Cause of Government, then a Monarchy is as much

ibid.

ibid.

as

as a Common-wealth an Empire of Lawes and not of men: If we look further back, and consider the Persons whose Will is received as Law, a Common-wealth is as much as a Monarchy an Empire of Men and not of Lawes. This is so manifest, and yet Mr *Harrington* so firmly resolved not to understand it, that considering his Temper I must needs applaud his Resolution of having nothing to do with the Mathematiques, For halfe this Obstinacy would be enough to keep him from apprehending, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equall to two Right Angles.

Though I have said more then enough in Answer to this double Question, Whether a Common-wealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Lawes, and not of Men, And a Monarchy to be the Government of some Man or few Men, and not of Lawes; Yet I may seeme to have said too little, unlesse I take notice of an Argument which by Occasion of this Dispute has been started against Monarchy. Let it be admitted, may some Democratique say, that Monarchy is as much as a Commonwealth an Empire of Lawes, yet a Common-wealth must necessarily be an Empire of better Lawes then a Monarchy; *For in a Monarchy the Lawes being made according to the Interest of one Man or a few Men, must needs be more private and Partiall then suites with the Nature of Justice, Whereas in a Common-wealth Lawes being made by the whole People, They come up to the Publique Interest, which is Common Right and Justice.* This Proposition has indeed Sence in it, which
the

ibid.

the other wanted, but not any more Truth, as will be apparent if We examine the Differing Tempers of a single Person, and of a Multitude enacting Lawes.

When a single Person or Monarch begins to think of establishing any Law, He must in all Reason be then most sensible of those Vast Cares which are never so pressing as at the undertaking an Action which drawes after it a long Traine of Consequences; For upon the Establishment and Execution of Good Lawes depends that Justice which preserves every Man in his owne; The fruits of Justice are the Satisfaction and Welfare of the People, and from these flow Publique Peace and Security, which are a Princes first and Greatest Interest: Hence it is evident that when a Monarch acts the Legislator's part, He ought to be so farre from Partiality or respecting his owne private Interest, that He is then chiefly to Direct his Thoughts to the Common Good, and take the largest Prospect of Publique Utility, in which his owne is so eminently included. Nor do I believe there can be many Examples produced of Princes who in enacting Lawes have considered their owne private Personall Interest, since almost every where We see that in buying and selling, and other private Contracts, Princes are Content to tye themselves up to the same Rules which they prescribe to others. And even in those Cases where the Lawes made by Princes seeme most directed to their owne Interest, before We condemne them, It ought to

to be examined, Whether such Lawes be not Requisite to the attaining the Ends of Government, And Whether the Advantages in Power which Princes gaine by them be not absolutely Necessary for the Conservation of Publique Peace and Tranquillity; For then the Private Interest of the Prince, and the Publique Interest do no longer differ, but are one and the same thing.

On the other side there cannot be a fonder Imagination then to think That when a Multitude is assembled to enact Lawes, is necessary their Resolutions should be consonant to Publique Justice, and the Universall Interest; For a great Part will not for want of Capacity comprehend what this Justice and Interest is; The abler sort will presently be divided into factions and Iuntas, and under Pretence of Publique Interest will prosecute their own Designs. I cannot understand how it is the Publique Interest of the whole People to Govern and make Lawes, but indeed to be so Governed and live under such Lawes, that Justice may be impartially administered, and Every Man preserved in the Injoyment of his Own, which I have shown to be a Monarch's chiefe Care. It is to be remembred also that the greatest Part of Lawes concern such Matters as are the continuall Occasion of Controversie between the People of a Nation; Such are the Lawes which respect the Regulation of all Contracts and Bargains, the Privileges of Companies and Corporations, the Encouragements and Limitations of Manufactures, the Licences

cences and Prohibitions of Traffique, with many more of the same Nature, by all which some Part of the People being Gainers, and another Part Loosers, They cannot where their Interests are thus divided be so fitly qualified for Legislators, as is a Prince who having no private Concernment going, can have no aime but the Common good. After all, it being essentiall to Popular Assemblies that the Plurality of Votes should oblige the whole Body, those Lawes which lay claime to the Consent of all, are very often the Resolutions of but a little more then halfe, And must consequently go lesse in their Pretensions to Publique Interest.

Let Us see how these Things have been carried in Experience: And We shall every where find, That those Lawes which are reputed the People's greatest Security against Injustice and Oppression have been establish'd by the Authority of some Prince; Thus *Alfred, Edward, Lewis, Alfonso*, in their severall Ages and Dominions, haue been excellent Legislators; But above all, Severall of the Roman Emperours, and chiefly *Justinian*, have (by the Advice of a few private Men whose Assistance they voluntarily thought fit to make use of) fabricated those Lawes so much admired for their Reason and Equity, which have stretcht themselves further then ever the Roman Legions were able to march, and which are still embraced by those People who have long since ceased to acknowledge the Roman Empire.

But on the other side, Those Commonwealths which

which have been most celebrated for their Lawes, have received them from the hands of a sole Legislator, as Athens and Sparta; Or else the People conscious of their owne Incapacity that way, have invested some few Men with a Supreme Power for the Constitution of Lawes, as the Romans did the *Decem viri*. And therefore it may well be doubted, whether these People thought so well of themselves as Mr Harrington seems to do of all Popular Assemblies, while He with such repeated Confidence asserts that the People never faile to judge truly of the Publique Interest where the Senate discharge their Duty; If the Senate divide well He undertakes for the People they shall be sure, to make a good Choice. For my part I confesse that this is too hard for my Faith, and that I rather think if *Anacharsis* were againe in the World, He would meet with Occasion to renew the Observation He made of the *Græcian* Popular Assemblies, *That wise Men propounded Matters, and Fooles decided them.*

Oceana p.
183.

*Plut. in
Solon.*

To discover all the weak Arguments and false Inferences of Mr Harrington is a Work, to Others of so small Profit, and to my selfe of so little Glory, that I resolve to passe very slightly over that Paragraph where He tells us, That it is not the Declaration of the Will of the Sovereigne Power which constitutes and revokes Lawes, but that it is with Lawes as with a Bond, which continues in force till all the Parties agree to repeal or Cancell it: He foresaw the objection against this Example, *That it is a private One*, And therefore

therefore puts the Case between severall Princes States, or Governments, or between severall States of the same Principality or Government. But though it may sute very well with Mr Harrington's Occasions to Put this Case, it will not become Us to admit of it, who ought to understand that the Leagues and Confederacies between severall Princes or States have nothing of the Nature of a Bond in them; For when either Party thinks fit to recede from them (though in it selfe it may be an Act of Injustice) there is no superiour Tribunall to appeale to, by which the Party can be constrained to stand to the Obligation, but the Businesse must be determined by a War. Much lesse have they any thing of the Nature of Law in them, unlesse, as Mr Harrington seems to be of Opinion, Princes or States may make Lawes not only for themselves but for their Neighbours too; Which *Maxime* agreeing so well with his Legislative humour, may one day serve to produce as fine Models of Government for France or Spaine, as he has given us for England. Nor is the Case altered by putting it betweene the severall States of the same Principality or Government, For if any one of these States have, in Case of Difference, a just Power to force the obedience of the Other, it is all one as if they were private Persons; But if no One of them be acknowledged to have such Power over the Rest, Then in case of their Disagreement, there remains no knowne Sovereigne Power, but that Nation is reduced to the State

of

ibid.

of War; From whence it is evident That they were not at first to have been considered as severall States of the same Government, but as equall Independent Ones which were only joyned together by some League or Union.

Before I finish this Chapter I must retract an Error of which Hr *Harrington* has convinced Me: He had affirmed That for Mr *Hobs* to say *Aristotle* and *Cicero* wrote not the Rules of their Politiques from the Principles of Nature but transcribed them into their Books out of the Practise of their own Common-wealths, was as if a Man should say of famous *Harvey* that He transcribed his Circulation of the Blood, not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that Body: To which I replied, That the whole force of the Objection amounted but to this, That because *Harvey* in his Circulation hath followed the Principles of Nature, therefore *Aristotle* and *Cicero* have done so in their Discourses of Government. I confesse, The Affirmation not being of it selfe manifest, and I ignorant of any Obligation to take it upon Mr *Harrington's* Word, I thought the Probation of it must lye in the Resemblance of *Aristotle's* and *Livie's* Books of Government with *Harveys* of Circulation: But this was an Error in Me, and an Injury to Mr *Harrington*, For in his last book He has assured Me, that He produced it only as a *Similitude*, and never intended that any Man should look for Reason or Argument in it. I heartily crave his Pardon, and by way of Reparation to him,

make here a solemn Declaration, That for the future He shall have no Cause to accuse Me for expecting Reason or Argument in any of his Discourses.

CHAP. III.

Whether the Ballance of Dominion in Land be the Naturall Cause of Empire.

I Shall lye under a very great Discouragement in the Prosecution of this Contest with Mr Harrington, unless some such Rules may be establish't between Us, as are observed by the Champions at a Country Wake; That He who gets a Croken Head is for that Time *Hors du jeu*, and must not take up the Cudgels any more. For if Mr Harrington may continue the Liberty of repeating (notwithstanding my Answers) whole Pages of his *Oceana* without any Addition of Argument, It will be easy for him every Month to impregnate the Press with a New great Book. Of this his Repitition I give Notice once for all, being unwilling to be so frequent in the Admonition as He is in the Practise of it.

Yet We are not to think that there is nothing New in his last Book, for though his Reasons stand at a stay, his Confidence improves hugely, and He now tels Us, that (in Despight of *Mathematiques*) by the Doctrine of the Ballance He has made the *Politiques* the most Demonstrable of any Art whatsoever. I am sorry I have so little Credit with Him, else I should soberly advise

H. P. II.

him to obtain from this Word Demonstration; for though it fills his Mouth admirably, some have taken Occasion to doubt it has left a great deale of empty roome in his Head.

The Invention of the Ballance He jealously asserts to be his own; Though in another place he begins to doubt that *Phaleas* the Chalcedonian may dispute it with Him; And that with great Reason, seeing it is evident out of *Aristotle* (though it be rejected by him, as I shall hereafter discover) that *Phaleas* did many Ages since light upon the same Phansie, I feare also that He will in another Respect prove of the younger house, for many Months before the Publication of his *Oceana*, there came forth a Letter, pretended to be sent from an Officer of the Army in Ireland to his Highness the L O R D P R O T E C T O R, concerning his changing of the Government, in which the Doctrine of the Ballance, was not obscurely hinted. But this last will (it may be) trouble Mr *Harrington* but little, since it is not unlikely the Author of that Letter goes a share in the Commonwealth of *Oceana*. However, I shall not make my selfe Judge of this Controversie, but rather, being Mr *Harrington* has thought fit to walk over the same Ground again in this Chapter of the Ballance, take that Occasion to apply my selfe to a more accurate Discussion of the whole Question, then I before thought Necessary. Which will be best performed by these Graduall Assertions.

First, That Dominion in Land is a meere Effect

Effect of Empire, and therefore cannot be the Cause of it, unless to be the Cause and the Effect be but one and the same thing. Originally every man had Right to every thing, and no One Man had more Title to one Piece of Land, then He had to any other Piece, and then Every Man had to the same Piece: Or if this Assertion be thought too large, at least There was no settled Propriety before the Establishment of Empire, nor could any Man be said to have the Dominion of that Land, from whence He might be immediatly ejected by the Violence of the next Invader. But after the Establishment of Empire, when the United Force of those who became Subject to One Sovereign Power was grown greater then could be resisted by Particular Men, Then and not before was Propriety and Dominion in Land fixed according to such Rule and Proportion as the Sovereign Power thought Requisite. As for those two waies of *Naturall and Violent Revolution* by which Mr. Harrington imagines Propriety may come to have a being before Empire, they are not to be admitted further then in Reference to this or that particular Empire, and so indeed Propriety may be said to be before Empire, as the Propriety of the Families of *Nassau* or *Brederode* to their Lands, was before the Empire of the States of *Holland*: But then this Propriety depended upon some former Empire, and would no longer continue to be Propriety if the succeeding Empire (be it either by *Naturall* or *Violent Revolution*) did not allow and Authorize it.

Wherefore it is evident, That seeing Dominion in Land depends meerly upon Empire, it must needs be a gross Absurdity to say, *That the Ballance of Dominion in Land is the Naturall Cause of Empire.* If notwithstanding this it can be made out, that there is such a Complication of Empire with the Ballance in Land that the Conformity of the Ballance is necessary to the health and long Life of Empire, To fit Empire to the Ballance is to set the Sun by the Clock, The Dominion in Land being in that Case to be reduced to such a Ballance as best suites with the Empire: Which inverts the Aime, and at once overthrows the whole Modell of the Commowealth of *Oceana*.

But in the second Place, This Illation need not be persued, because I think it may with very good Reason be asserted That Justice is that by which all Empires subsist, and come to be (as far as humane Instability permits) Eternall. It is an Error to think (as has been already touched) that the Generality of a People are infected with a Desire of Sovereign Power, and will not be satisfied with Protection in their present Possessions, and Incouragement in Acquiring more by the way of a Regular Industrie. The Multitude, saies *Aristotle*, are not disgusted at being excluded from the Government, but rather are very well pleased to sit Quiet and be at leasure to follow their own Business, unless they are oppressed and see their Governours make havock of the Publique. If a Prince be carefull of the Administration of Justice, and do not by any Publique,

Arist. Polit.
lib. 4. cap.
13. & lib.
4. cap. 8.

Publique, or signall private Violation of it exasperate his Subjects, He need not fear the want of their Assistance for the Defence of his Throne, All Popular Commotions that happen in a Nation being grounded upon Pretence, at least, of some Injustice in the Governour. And though this Prince be overballanced in Land by any Part of the People, it does not therefore follow, That they will refuse to continue under his Government, as long as it is administred with Justice: For it is a chief Part of the Function of the Supream Magistrate to be as it were a Publique Arbitrator, to whom the Decision of all Controversies among his Subjects is referred, and We know that in an Arbitrator, it is not Riches but Integrity and Ability that Men look after; Nor have I heard any reason why a Poore Man, if known to be honest, may not be trusted to keep stakes in a Wager for more then his Estate comes to.

Yet because the Actions of a Prince though in themselves just, may through Mistake or Malice not be considered as such by a People, I do not meane that a Prince should be devested of all Power but what He gains by the Opinion of his Justice and Innocence; And therefore in the third Place I descend to examine how far Riches conduce to Sovereign Power, and Whether an Estate in Land is naturally Productive of Empire more then any other Revenue.

The Reparation of our Substance by continual

nuall Supplies of Meat and Drink, And the Defence of our Bodies (in cold Countreys especially) from the Injuries of the Weather by Garments and Habitations ; are the first and most Naturall Cares of Mankind; We did not long continue satisfied with what was purely necessary of this Sort , but soon grew up to desire Convenience and the Reall pleasing our Senses. And at last came to seek after things of Luxurie and Vanity, which depend altogether upon Opinion. And because no Man by his single Power could be secure in the Possession of any of these Things, there was an early Willingness in Men to submit to Empire , that by their United Force (which is that We call Sovereign Power) They might be maintained (upon such Terms as the Sovereign Power pleased to establish) in the Acquiring and Possessing such Things as tended to the Ends already mentioned : This was the Introduction of Propriety. At first this consisted only in the Fruits of the Earth and Cattle, And He who had Land enough to bring forth more of these than He could consume, was a Rich Man, and might with the Superfluy drive some little Commerce by way of Exchange with the Neighbourhood. But after that Men had found out a way of Entercourse with People far remote, and a more considerable Traffique began to be set on foot , Something was fixed upon by generall Consent which might be the Common Measure of the Value of all Things needfull to Man; This is called Mony, which
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by its Portability and Currentness having a great Advantage in the Use of it, a Value came also to be put upon That, known by the Name of Usury or Interest. And now He that abounds with Money, need not be in want of such Things as are Usefull to him, because other Men will for his Money be glad to let him have part of their Superfluity.

Out of this We may infer, That since the Establishment of Propriety by the Sovereign Power has rendred it neither Free nor Safe for particular Men to make Use of Force in gaining such Things as they stand in need of, Riches do highly conduce to Power; For Men that are unprovided of other meanes of acquiring such Things as They can not want, are faine to apply themselves to the Rich for obtaining of them, Who do not use to part with them, but in Exchange of some Service or Subjection by which they grow Powerfull. Yet this Power gained by Riches is alwaies dependant upon the Sovereign Power which Institutes and preserves Propriety; For against a Force strong enough (such as are Conquests and succesfull Rebelions) to overthrow the settled Propriety by the Subversion of the Sovereign Power, Riches are not of any Defence, but rather matter of Invitation to an Enemy by the greatness of the Booty.

We may also infer That where there is no Traffique or Money, as in new Plantations, the Riches which conduce to Power consist in Dominion of Land able to produce such Things as

are necessary or Convenient to Subsistence; But in other Places where the Estimate and Purchase of all usefull things is reduced to Mony, there the Influence which Riches have upon Power flows not from an Estate in Land only, but principally and immediatly from ready Mony; Or to make use of Mr *Harrington's* Words, The Ballance of Dominion in Land is not the Naturall Cause of Empire.

This was of old known to Aristotle, who having related the Project of *Phaleas* the Chaldeonian to settle a Government by reducing Estates to an Equality, with the expedient invented by him to bring it to pass; At last He rejects it for this Reason chiefly; That He had not considered aright of this equality, having only indeavoured to introduce it in Land, (What is this but Mr *Harrington's* Ballance in Land?) Whereas Riches consisted as well in Slaves, and Cattle, and Mony, and Furniture, in all of which He ought to have settled the same Equality or Moderate Proportion, or else altogether to have omitted that Phansie.

In this Particular also Mr *Harrington* seems to have lost ground to the Considerer; for whereas He at first maintained that the Ballance in Mony can be equall to that of Land only in Places of great Trade and little or no Land as *Holland* and *Genoa*, He is now faine to confess that in *Israel* and *Lacedamon* too, the Countreys being narrow and the Lots at a low

Arist. Polit.
lib.2. cap.7.

Oceana p. 5.

H. p. 14.

low scantling, if Usury in the One and in the other Mony had not been forbid, Mony would have eaten out the Ballance of Land. This is upon the Matter to surrender the whole Question, and to Allow that in all Places where there is mony enough to hold any considerable Proportion to the Land (And the Considerer was not so senseless to think there could be weight in empty Bags) There the Ballance in Mony does concur to Empire as much as that in Land.

So then Mr. Harrington's Assertion is not a little streightned, and He that undertook to make good in the Generall that Empire rests upon the Ballance in Land, is content it should prove so only in a Territory of such extent as Spain or England, where the Land can not be overballanced by Mony. For this He offers three Arguments, the first of which belongs not it seems to the Matter but the Man. The Considerer had said that to make Wisedome or Riches the first Principle of Government, were as unjust as it would be to oblige Mr Harrington to give his Cloths or Mony to the next Man he meets Wiser or Richer then himself. If he had said stronger, saies Mr Harrington, he had spoiled all. Tis very true, the Considerer knew that, and therefore did not say so. Is that a Crime? He has in more then one place of the Considerations made appeare what Influence He thinks force had Originally upon Government, and therefore there is no Reason to take it ill that

H. P. 15.

ibid.

H. p. 16.

that He did not in this place contradict his own Opinion: But, Mr Harrington continues to urge, *The Richer as to the Case in Debate is the stronger, and if the People have Riches, that is Clothes or Money of their own, they must rise out of the Propriety or Cultivation of Land, and so the Ballance of Land must of Necessity be in the People themselves, who having that will never give their Clothes or Money or Obedience unto a single Person or a Nobility, though these should be the richer in Money, whence it is evident that in such a Territory as England or Spain, Money can never come to overballance Land.* A fine Modest Argument this, which though it be called a Demonstration, I should never suspected to have been meant for a Mathematical One, but that I find it going upon certain Data or Postulata, two of which by Misfortune happen to be the very things which were to be proved, As first, that if the People have Riches they must rise out of the Propriety or Cultivation of Land, And then that Ready Money though in never so great a Quantity cannot outweigh the Ballance in Land. To speak freely, This whole Passage has so little Affinity with sense, that I must believe Mr Harrington was in Choler, and intended it as a Piece of Revenge against the Considerer, for having dared to put a Supposition that any Man could be Wiser then the Author of *Oceana*.

ibid.

His second Argument (and that's called a Demonstration too) is that Henry the seventh, though the richest in Money of English Princes did
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by making Farms of a Standard, and cutting of Retainers begin that Breach in the Ballance of Land, which hath since ruin'd the Government. But did that Ruine swallow up the Government while that ready money was in being? Or did not his Son *Henry* the eight by his Pleasures and unprofitable Wars exhaust all that Treasure in a few of the first years of his Reign? I may with Modesty and Truth enough let Mr *Harrington* know that if the Exchequer had eighteen years agoe been as well furnisht as *Henry* the seventh left it, He might now probably have wanted the Occasion of shewing his Skill in Modelling a Commonwealth.

The third Argument is, That the Monarchy of Spain since that King had the Indies, stands upon the same Ballance in the Lands of the Nobility, on which it alwaies stood. This it seems We must believe for Mr *Harrington's* sake without any further Proof, though the Opposite Assertion, That it does not stand upon the same Ballance, was profered as an Instance against him by the Consider; Who can now fortify his Side by this Observation, That from the Discovery of the American Mines to the yeare 1640 (a Tract of time of more then 120 years) the Crown of Spain has not been disturbed by any Domestick sedition of the Nobility, for which there cannot any so Probable Reason be assigned, as the Increase of the King's Revenue in ready Money by which he is enabled to maintain a Force that overballances their Estates in Land.

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Mr *Harrington's* Arguments being thus fitted with Replies, it will be expedient to resume the Consideration of those waies by which a Revenue both Private and Publique may be raised, that so We may the better judge, Whether in such a Territory as Spain or England Mony may not come to overballance Land: But I do not think it belongs to Me to do this with the Accurateness either of a Philosopher who discourses (as *Aristotle* does in the second of his *Oeconomicks*) of all the severall possible waies of managing an Estate, Or of a *Financier* who makes a Proposition for the raising a present summe of Ready Mony. It will be enough to observe in generall the most ready and Naturall Methods by which a Considerable Revenue may be obtained.

The First of these is by the Propriety and Cultivation of Lands, which is a very generall Way, and the sole Considerable One in such Places where the Methods hereafter exprest are not practicable. Out of this, in some Places, a certain Tax or Proportion is payable to the Sovereign Power, by which the Owner looses no part of his Propriety, yet has as it were a Rent Charge laid upon his Estate.

The second is taken from the Bowels of the Earth, which in some Parts are fertile of those Metals that need only the stroke of an Hammer to make them Current Mony; These are either belonging solely to the Supream Power though taken out of other Men's Ground, as
here

here in England; Or at least a great share of them belongs to the Prince, as it is with the King of Spain in respect of all the Gold and Silver of *America*.

The third is by Traffique and Commerce; And that either Private and Domestick, as carrying the Commodities of a Man's own Growth to Market, and Mean *Artisans* selling their Work to the Neighbourhood, which are often charged by the Publique with some Excise or Gabell; Or else Publique and Foreign, when by Publique Authority Companies are formed for the better Exportation and Importation of Goods and Manufactures. And out of these some considerable Duties and Customs, do almost every where issue to the Publique Revenue.

The fourth and last is from the Profit of Money by Usury, And that also either Private, when every Man puts out his own Money, upon which some Assessement, payable by the Lender, to the Publique ought in all Reason to be imposed, Usurers being otherwise very unprofitable Members of a State, and the only Men who contribute nothing to the Publique Charge: Or else Publique under the Inspection and Security of the Supreme Power, commonly known by the name of Banks, by which no small Revenue uses to accrue to the Publique.

Now to shew that in Spain or England the three last waies of raising a Revenue may be

be more considerable then the first, Or, which is all One, that Mony may overballance Land, will not be difficult, if We consider that Spain (And if *Henry* the seventh had given eare to *Columbus* his Profer England had been Mistress of the same Treasures) is posses of all the Bullion of the West Indies amounting annually (not to mention greater Summes gained at the first Discovery of those Countries) to 3. or 4 millions of our Mony, which is by Mr *Harrington's* Calculation a full third of all the Land in England. Next, Spain or England are either of them by Nature endowed with all Advantages for taking the whole Traffique of the World into their Hands, and are inferiour to the Dutch who injoy it, in nothing but Industrie: What the Importance of this is or might be, the Dutch will best help Us to Understand, Who by that alone without any considerable Land, have been able to baffle Spain, and contest with England. And if Spain or England have on may have such a Traffique, They may also when they please erect a Bank for any the Greatest summe of Mony.

H. p. 17.

Against this Mr *Harrington* has but One Objection in store, which is, *That the Purse of a Prince never yet made a Banque, nor till Spending and Trading Mony be all one, ever shall. Where there is a Bank, Ten to One there is a Commonwealth.* This does Us no hurt, For if England or Spain were a Commonwealth, their Balance in Mony might then out weigh that in Land, which is the Thing contended for. But

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He will be in Danger to loose his Wager, and his Credit to boot; For some Monarchs have been as great Traders as any Commonwealths; The example of the *Medices* he yields Me, to that I will adde the Crown of Portugall, which presently after the Discovery of the Cape of good Hope did manage that mighty *Lucrative* Traffique which now the Dutch and English share with them: The Examples of the *Mogor* and other Eastern Princes may also be alledged, who though Monarchs are very great Traders. And where there is a Traffique, it is undeniable but that, if it be found expedient, there may be a Bank; Or is *Antwerp* a Commonwealth, or the *Monti* at *Rome* planted in a Popular Government?

It would not be unfit also that before We consent to resolve that in such a Territory as *England* Money can never overballance Land, We did a little reflect upon the Successes of our last Wars, and inquire Whether it was not the Monny of the City of *London* which turned the Scales.

Having thus examined what the Influence of Riches is upon Empire, What the Importance of Propriety in Land, and What that of ready Money, in such a Territory particularly as *Spain* or *England*, I may with reason expect not to be thought to have strained very much at the Doctrine of the Ballance, much less, to have been choaked with it. I confess I cannot swallow it so fast as Mr *Herrington*, but that, it may be, does not hinder Me from digesting it better.

H. p. 18.

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At least I have leisure to observe that while He attributes so much to the Ballance, He commits an Error in making an Army depend meerly upon the Riches of those who have the Disposing of it: For though it be true *That an Army is a Beast with a great Belly which subsisteth not without very large Pastures*, It is as true that this Beast is none of those tame Ones that are kept within Fences, or imprisoned in a Severall: When an Army is once on foot, the Inclosure of the Law is too weak to hold it in, And Propriety is no better then an Hedge of rotten Sticks. It was the Observation of Him who had Wit and Experience enough to be the Founder of the Roman Monarchy, *That Men and Mony are the two Things by which Power is acquired and preserved, And that these two do mutually support One another; For as by Mony an Army is brought together, So He that has Arms in his hand need not want Mony.* Thus even after the Settlement of Propriety by Government and Lawes, Force goes a share with Riches, and is not wholly excluded from concurring to the Establishment of Empire.

Dion. Cass.
lib. 42.

Nay further, If there comes to be a Contest between Gold and Iron, the Advantage generally remains with the harder Metall, And He that has Arms in his Hand, may when He pleases both command the Mony in his Neighbours Pocket, and also gather the Rents of his Lands: As it of old fell out among the *Thurians*, Where the Nobility had ingrossed all Offices and Magistracy into their own Hands, and had bought
(though

(though against the Law) the Lands of the whole Country; Yet the People being exercised & inured to the Wars, proved too hard for the Nobility and their Guard, And dismissed them of their Power and excessive Possessions in Land. From which Example these two Corollaries are evidently deduceable, That an Agrarian Law is not a sufficient Provision for fixing the Ballance; And that the Conformity of the Ballance to the establish'd Government does not necessarily secure a State from Changes and Revolutions.

One thing more remains to dispatch this Question of the Ballance, And that is to produce Examples of such Governments as have been settled contrary to the Ballance in Land; But I find by the whole Course of Mr *Harrington's* Reply to Me, that this way of arguing is of no great Efficacy with Him, For either He takes no Notice of such Examples, or by some pitifull unmanly Cavill seeks to elude them. Wherefore I am put to make use of another Method, that is to bring him as a Witness against himself, and to prove this Point by the Authority of his own Assertions. In the 73 page of his Discourse concerning Ordination against Dr *Hamond*, He has imparted this Lesson to Us; *The People of Egypt till having sold their Lands they came to loose their Popular Ballance, were not servants unto Pharaoh, wherefore when Joseph was made Governour over all Egypt they were Free.* D And

H. p. 56.

And in Consequence to this We are told by him in another Place, That the Ballance of absolute Monarchy or of a Nobility came into Egypt by the Purchase of *Joseph*. But it is evident that the Exercise of Sovereign Power was before belonging to the Kings of Egypt in a most Absolute manner, seeing the People when not only their whole Fortunes, and Estates, but their very Lives also lay at stake by the Extremity of the Famine, had not force enough to break open the Granaries and take out Corne for their sustenance, but were faine to buy it of the King at his own Price. And if the People of Egypt had not in the Case of extreame hunger (which uses to inrage the most abject and slavish People of the whole World) Power enough to serve themselves when there was enough of Corne in the Land, It is ridiculous to think they could retain any Power or Liberty in reference to the Government. Wherefore the Ballance of Egypt being Popular, and the Government Absolute Monarchy, Mr *Harrington* himself has furnished Us with a cleare Example of a Government that has been settled contrary to the Ballance in Land.

I might by this time lawfully hope for a Release from this Dispute of the Ballance, if I were not engaged by my Promise in the first Chapter, to examine that place of *Thucydides*, which by diverting the Discourse gave Mr *Harrington* the Opportunity of saying something upon a Subject in which He must otherwise have been silent. But what He has there said is so extravagant

vagant and wandering from the true meaning of *Thucydides*, that I must needs think either He has parted with his own Understanding, or believes his Readers willing to part with theirs. Let the first 12 or 14 Pages of *Thucydides*, which serve as an Introduction to his Historie, be considerably perused, And it will be found to be the Author's aime to make it appear, That the Actions he goes about to describe were more great and considerable then any had formerly been performed by the *Græcians*. To this end He relates, That of old, Greece was not constantly inhabited, but that at first there were often Removals, every One easily leaving the place of his Abode to the Violence of some greater Number. Every Man so husbanded the Ground, as but barely to live upon it without any stock of Riches, and planted Nothing, but made account to be Masters in any Place of such necessary Sustenance, as might serve from day to day. And for this Cause they were of no Ability at all, either for greatneſs of Cities, or other Provision. And the Imbecillity of Antient Times is not a little demonstrated also by this, That before the Trojan War nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in Common. This then is Manifest to have been the oldest Condition of Greece, That though the People were not absolutely destitute of Civill Society, yet those Societies being of very small Numbers were too weak to improve by Plantation or Traffique, but were forced to abandon their Habitations to the Violence of such whom the fatness of the Soile invited thither. And as

Thucyd. p. 2.

Id. p. 3.

Id. p. 4.

Id. p. 5.
or 6.

Id. p. 8.

these Societies of Men were of themselves weak and inconsiderable, so were they without any League or Union in Common, by which this their Imbecillity might have received a Cure. Sutable to their Condition was their manner of living, *To weare Iron, or be alwaies in Arms, and to count Theeving the best means of their living, being a Matter at that time no where in Disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of Glory.* But Minos having built a Navy, Navigators had the Sea more free, For He expelled the Malefactors out of the Islands, and in most of them planted Colonies of his own. By which meanes They who inhabited the Sea coasts, becoming more addicied to Riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; Of whom some grown now Rich compassed their Towns about with Walls. For out of desire of gaine, the meaner sort underwent Servitude with the Mighty; And the Mighty with their Wealth brought the lesser Cities into Subjection. It appears by this that the first considerable increment of Greece was by King Minos, who having suppressd the Pirates, and render'd Navigation safe, the Maritime Cities by their Traffique soon began to grow Rich, and for their Security fortified themselves, and by these Advantages (People in want flocking to their Service) they prevailed over the lesser Cities, and grew up to some indifferent Force, with which the War of Troy was undertaken: *Which Enterprize though of greater Name then any before it was through want of Mony but weake, and in fact beneath the Fame and report which, by*
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meanes of the Poets, now goeth of it. After the Trojan War also the Græcians continued still their Shiftings and Transplantations, insomuch as never resting they improved not their Power. But after a long time Greece had constant Rest, and shifiting their seats no longer at length sent Colonies abroad. When the Power of Greece was now improved, and the desire of Mony withall, their Revenues being enlarged in most of the Cities there were erected Tyrannies. (For before that time Kingdomes with Honours limited were Hereditary.) And the Græcians built Navies, and became more seriously addicted to the Affaires of the Sea. Yet was not their Navall force very great, for having spoken of such Fleets as had been brought together either by Tyrants or Cities, and of the Actions performed by them, He concludes, That if Men consider of the War he describes by the Acts done in the same, It will manifest it self to be greater then any of those before mentioned. These are the Passages of Thucydides out of which Mr Harrington goes about, by an unheard of Chymistry, to extract the Doctrine of the Ballance; But He must give Me leave to observe these Errors and False Consequences in his Operation.

First He saies that *When out of desire of gain the Meaner Sort underwent Servitude with the Mighty, It caused Hereditary Kingdomes with Honours limited; As happened also with Us since the times of the Goths and Vandals.* Good! So We will be content to acknowledge this ima-

Id. p. 9.

Id. p. 13.

H. p. 2.

ginary Force of the Ballance, that Prudence which He himself calls Modern, and will have to be first introduced into the World after the breaking of the Roman Empire, shall be allowed to be more ancient then the most ancient Republicques. But I beseech him Where does He find that the Servitude the meaner Sort underwent with the Mighty caused Hereditary Kingdomes? *Thucydides* owns no such Causality, Nor do those two passages of His thus joyned together by Mr *Harrington* appear to have any Reference to one another. Nay on the contrary it is manifest that Hereditary Kingdomes were before that Servitude, seeing that Servitude happened not till after *Minos*, who was a King, had by scouring the Seas of Pirates and destroying their Nests, given Security to Traffique, by which and not by the Ballance of Land these Cities grew Potent.

In the second Place, He attributes the Power of *Pelops* to the Ballance in Land, Whereas *Thucydides* saies expressly, He obtained this Power by the abundance of Wealth He brought with him out of Asia, to Men in want. Did He transport his Land with Him? Or is not this a cleare Instance of the Prevalence of Mony against the Ballance in Land?

But then thirdly, He at the same time supposes no Propriety in Land till after the Trojan War, And yet makes before that War the Overballancing of the Mighty to be the Cause of Hereditary Kingdomes. This has the aspect of a Contradiction, into which it is likely he slippt,
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by not having a true apprehension of *Thucydides*, who does not affirm there was in those remote Ages He treats of, a time when there was no Propriety, but only that Men being not yet united into great Nations, but living in small Clans, there joynt Force was not sufficient to defend them against the Violence of such who had any small oddes in Number, which was the Cause of so frequent Transmigrations.

Fourthly, He will have the Revenues of Greece which were enlarged about the Time of erecting the Tyrannies, to consist only in Land, unless forsooth We can shew there was Usurie at that Time: He must pardon Me for this also, It is enough that there then began to be great Trading, which is plainly testified by *Thucydides* where He saies *That the Grecians became more seriously addicted to the Affaires of the Sea.*

Fifthly, He imagines the difference between the old Hereditary Monarchies and the new created Tyrannies to have been only in the Peoples Apprehension of them, who being grown Rich called that Government Tyrannie, which before during their Poverty, They had been content to own for a lawfull Monarchy. This is indeed to be a true Servant to his own Supposition, but not to be a faithfull Historian of the Actions of other Men; For in some of these Tyrannies the change from Monarchy must be attributed to the Princes themselves, Who upon the increase of Wealth having put off the Sobriety and Moderation of their Predecessors, and

Arist. Polit.
lib. 3. cap.
15. & lib.
5. cap. 10.

Arist. Polit.
lib. 3. cap.
14. & lib.
5. cap. 5.

addicted themselves to *Avarice* and *Luxuries*, or as *Thucydides* expresses it, *Their desire of Money being improved with their Power*, governed their People with all manner of Insolence and Oppression. But most of the Tyrannies were then at that time first erected, for the old Monarchies having by the failing of the Royall Lines, or by the remisseness of the Princes been changed into Commonwealths, the Supream Power was afterward usurped by such Persons who having no just Claim, were forced to secure themselves by Violent and Tyrannicall Courses.

Last of all, Because *Thucydides* comparing only the Actions of the old Græcians with those He is about to describe, gives the Advantage to the latter, calling the other *the Imbecillity of Antient Times*, He would therefore have it thought, that the Considerer has made an unlucky choise of *Thucydides* his Testimony. But it is easy for Me to convince him, that though I had on my side no other Testimony (which by the way is untrue, the matter being attested by all the Greek Histories of those remote Ages) but this of *Thucydides* I were upon Terms secure enough : For first *Thucydides* mentions this Imbecillity only in reference to the times before the *Trojan War*, and not the whole time that *Greece* was governed by Hereditary Monarchs; And then again, this Imbecillity is no diminution of the Antiquity of that Government, (which was the sole thing at that time in Debate between

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Us) nor yet any Imputation to the Prudence of it; For it is not to be understood of any Morall or Politicall Imbecillity radicated in the Nature of that Government, but of a Naturall one equally attending the Infancy of all Governments; Arms, Shipping, Mony and the other Provision by which a Nation frees it self from this Imbecillity, being not originall or essentiall Members of any Government, but like Haire the Productions of Age and Growth.

I could not at a less Expence of Time and Pains, satisfie my Promise to consider these Passages of *Thucydides*; To some Readers it will not, possibly, be unacceptable to have been rescued from an Erroneous Apprehension of of that excellent Author; For my own part I gain by it the satisfaction of observing that I am not the only Person who suffer by Mr *Harrington*.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Whether the Ballance of Empire be well divided into Nationall and Provinciall; And whether these two, or Nations that are of distinct Ballance, coming to depend upon one and the same Head, such a mixture create a New Ballance?

TO make recompence for the length of the last Chapter, this shall be a very short one. The Question was put by the Considerer, Whether there may not be a Mixture of the Nationall and Provinciall Ballance, so that the severall Parts of an Empire may come to poise one another, and by that produce a New Ballance? To this Mr Harrington gives a Solution in the Negative, by saying that *No one Government whatsoever hath any more then One of two Ballances; That of Land which is Nationall, or that of Arms which is Provinciall.* I might without Prejudice to my Cause abstain from any further Discussion of this Question, for coming just now from digging up the Roots of the Doctrine of the Ballance, these Branches of it must of themselves wither and fall off. Yet to show that I did not at first without Reason propose the Question, this shall be added in Explication of it.

There is scarce any one of the Considerable Dominions of Europe which is not (like a rich Fur composed of Tips of Sables) made up of severall

everall Pieces; Spain consists of the Crowns of Castile, Arragon, Navarre and Granada, besides divers Kingdomes Islands and Provinces in distant Parts of the World: France, though it looks like an entire Piece, is constituted by severall Provinces which have by various Occasions come to be united in that Potent Kingdom: In Spain the power of the Castilian Kings was more absolute then that of the Aragonese; In France some of the Provinces retain Priviledges not injoyed by the rest, as the Liberty of Assembling their particular Estates, and the like. The Considerer, to prove the Mixture of the Ballance, made Instance in the Kingdom of Arragon, where since the Union with Castile, the Regall Power is very much advanced, And yet without reducing it to a Provinciall Ballance, seeing Arragon is still, as to the maine, governed by their own Lawes, and by their own Officers, and not by an Army. This Instance is rejected by Mr Harrington, because the Ballance both in Castile and Aragon being that of a Nobility, They both, saies He, continue Nationall. I am desirous of giving him all faire Satisfaction, and therefore am Content to lay aside this Instance, and instead of it fix upon One in France which is not liable to the same Objection, And this shall be the Imperiall Cities of Metz, Thoul, and Verdun. These Cities were free Members of the Empire, governed in the way of a Republique by their own Citizens, as Strasbourg and other Imperiall Cities are at this day, and by Consequence their
Ballance

Ballance must necessarily have been Popular; They were somewhat more then an hundred yeares agoe surprized by the French, who have since incorporated them into the Crown, the Ballance of which is by a Nobility; And the last King of *France* erected a Parliament there, after the manner of the other Members of that Crown.

Now I am to demand of Mr *Harrington* Whether the Ballance in these Cities be changed from Popular, to that by a Nobility? If He affirms it to be changed, We shall not be obliged to believe him unless He brings Proofs strong enough to overthrow the Vehement Presumption that We may have for the Contrary, by observing that these Cities continue still to be of great Traffique, which must of Necessity keep the Wealth in the People's hands. If He replies that the Ballance of them is Provinciall, It will be very difficult to apprehend the Truth of that Answer, seeing the Inhabitants of them injoy all the Privileges of French Subjects, and are governed by the same Lawes, and the same Forme of Administration of Justice with the rest of France. Tis true indeed they live under the Power of a Governour, but in that They differ not from *Picardie*, *Champagne*, *Languedoc* and all other Parts of that Kingdome, whose Ballance notwithstanding is not therefore Provinciall; Nor can it be denied that they have a Garrison upon them, but in this their Case is the same with all the Frontire Towns in France, which are secured with Garrisons,

isons, not so much out of Jealousie of the People, as of a Forreign Enemy.

If then the Ballance of these Cities can neither be said to be the Nationall One of the Crown they live under, nor yet Provinciaall, I had Reason to put the Question, Whether there might not be a Mixture of the Nationall and Provinciaall Ballance, or a poising of one another by the severall Parts of an Empire. Of which We may with facility obtain this farther Conception, That as the pretended force of the Ballance in any one Countrey, secures the Power in the Hands of such Persons on whose side the Ballance is, So in the Union of severall Countreys under One Empire, the Power remains with those to whom the Ballance resulting from the whole belongs: And as in one Single Countrey, Men are necessitated to submit to the Ballance, because they despaire of Power to Oppose it, So in the Union of Severall Countreys, Some one of them may be obliged to live under a Government different from their own Ballance, as knowing themselves to be outweighed by the Ballance of the Rest.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Whether there be any Common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the Parts taken severally; And how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguished from private Interest.

H. p. 9.

Chap. 2.

IF I had not been taught by Mr Harrington himself that many Passages of his are to be understood by way of *Similitude* only, not of Argument or Probation, I should have been very much at a loss how to answer this Chapter: But now by the help of that Instruction I perceive this is intended for a Chapter of *Similitudes*. And it would be too unkind a Part to oppose a Gentleman in the choice of such *Similes* as He thinks fit to make use of for the adorning his style. I am sensible of my having already erred in this Point, and justly incurred Mr Harrington's Anger, by thinking his *Similitudes* included somewhat of Reason in them, Therefore I shall imploy my Care in this Chapter to impart that Caution to the Reader which I myself have received, lest He should do these *Similitudes* or their Author so much wrong as to mistake them for Reasons.

The first Place where this Care may be seasonably imploy'd, is about a *Similitude* which, though it be taken from Beasts, We are not to expect should have four Feet. Divers of the Beasts (it is *Grotius* who has observed it) abstain

tain from their owne Profit, either in regard of *Oceana* p. 5.
those of the same kind, or at least of their Young.
Mankind then (infers Mr Harrington) must ei-
ther be less just then the Creature, or acknowledg
also his Common Interest to be Common Right.
To go about upon this Occasion to discover the
Causes of that Affection which Brute Crea-
tures beare to their Fœtus, And how a Part
separated from an Animal to which it had been
long united may by the Perpetuall stream of Ef-
fluviums emitted from it, continue to have an
Operation upon that Animall, would be a Dis-
quisition too remote from our present Subject.
I will rather make Mr Harrington a Gift of the
whole Inference; and allow That Men have the
same Affections with the Creatures, And do
deny themselves their own Profit for the Ad-
vantage of their Familie: But what will He
gaine by this Concession? This will at most
serve to prove something of a Common Interest
of every Familie within it self, but fals infinite-
ly short of making out a Common Interest of all
Mankind; And I do justly suspect He will not
be much gratified with any Instances taken from
Paternity, or the naturall Administration or
Interests of Families, seeing there is not in that
whole Oeconomy one Particular, which does
not largely disfavoure the Pretensions of Popular
Government.

And therefore He calls in another Similitude
to the Rescue, and tels Us out of Hooker, That
even stones or heavy things forsake their ordinary
wom or Center, and fly upwards, to relieve the
Distress

H. p. 24.

Distress of Nature in Common. If I should now take this Hint to discourse of *Vacuum Dissentiatum*, of Magneticall Motion, of the Gravitation and Impulsion of Aire, of the Protruſion of leſſe heavy Bodies by thoſe that are more Heavy, and of ſeverall other Principles belonging to this Subject, Mr *Harrington* would think Me very Fond of my Naturall Philoſophie, and more then ordinarily Covetous of an Occaſion to divulge it. It is enough that this is but a *Similitude*, and as ſuch did very well become Mr *Hooker* in a Rhetoricall Exaggeration, Nor ſhall Mr *Harrington* be denied the ſame Liberty while He appeares either as Poet or Orator, but when He acts the Legiſlator's Part, and pretends to fix the Principles of Government, He muſt not wonder if We remain unſatisfied with ſuch thin Diſcourſes.

H. p. 23.

Indeed He himſelf ſeems to place no great Confidence in them, but has thought fit to give Us this farther Demonſtration: *All Civill Lawes acknowledge that there is a Common Inter-eſt of Mankind, and all Civill Lawes proceed from the Nature of Man, therefore it is in the Nature of Man to acknowledge that there is a Common Inter-eſt of Mankind.* How? Do all Civill Lawes proceed from the Nature of Man? This New Maxime will make ſtrange Havock among the pore *School-men* and Authors *de Legibus*, and quite Ruine all their Diviſions and Definitions of *Jus Naturale*, *Jus Gentium*, and *Jus Civile*; But of all Men honeſt *Uſſian* will be in the worſt Condition who has had the ill Fortune

tune to give us this Account of Civill Lawes;

*Jus Civile est quod neque in totum à Naturali Digest. de
vel Gentium recedit, nec per omnia ei servit: Just. & Jur.
Itaque cum aliquid addimus vel detrahimus juri leg. 6.
communi, Jus proprium, id est Civile efficimus.*

Which is beyond Dispute thus far true, That the Obligation of Civill Lawes consists properly in such Things to which Men were not bound by Nature, nor by any other Argument but their Subjection to the Power which constitutes those Lawes; For otherwise the same Civill Lawes must obtain through the whole World, seeing all Men are equally bound to what proceeds from Nature: But though Mr Harrington's Assertion were true, the Considerer were not at all concerned in it, For He at first denying there was any Common Interest of Mankind, only with Reference to Mankind before they had voluntarily listd themselves into Societies, and so rendred themselves Subject to Civill Lawes, is not now with any Equity to be oppugned by any Observations taken from the Condition of Mankind after it was become Subject to the Power of Civill Lawes. I must alwaies assert, That though Originally in the State of Nature, and Antecedently to all Society, there was no Common Interest of Mankind distinct from the Parts taken severally; (the Obligation laid upon Families by Paternall Power only excepted) but that every particular Man had Right to prosecute his own Advantage, though to the Ruine of other Men, yet since the Instituti-

on of Government, Men are obliged besides, nay in many Cases above, their own Private Interest, to advance the Publique or Common One: The reason of which is taken from hence, That unless Every private Man does devest himself of his private Interest as well as his private Power, and contribute it to the Publique, the Sovereign Power will be disabled from effecting the Design and Aime of Government; And Particular Men will in vain expect from that Power, which has by themselves been so unwisely limited, Protection and the Benefit of Lawes: By this Protection and Benefit of Lawes, Every Man's Power and Interest which He had parted with, comes home to him again with Increase, the Observation of such Lawes as the Sovereign Power finds usefull for the Preservation of Society being in an Eminent Manner the Interest of every private Man: For Instance, *A man that Steales is put to Death*; This is not only the Publique Interest, but the Private Interest of every Particular Man, who by the Terrour of such a Punishment is in some Measure secured from an Invasion on his Propriety. This Assertion is I confesse contradictory to Mr Harrington's, *That a Man who steales is not put to Death for any Man's private Interest*, in which, as in this whole Thing called Demonstration, I meet with so little Reason, that it pities Me there is nothing in it which might make it pass for a *Similitude*.

H. p. 25.

Seeing then the Addresses of Reason have been so unsuccessfull, I do not wonder to find

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The other Potent Rivall Passion, has obtained so far upon Mr Harrington's Soule. He pretends That the whole Philosophie of the Soule which concerns Policy is demonstrated throughout the Commonwealth of Oceana, And that it consists in disposing Passion and advancing Reason unto the Throne of Empire. But it will not be Rationall to believe this of a Commonwealth whose Author and Legislator is himself a slave of Passion, and not a Subject of Reason; And I make my Appeale to all uninteressed Persons, Whether through his whole Reply Reason or Passion beare the greatest sway with Mr Harrington, And in reference to this particular Chapter, I desire them to Judge, Whether it be not an heap of very Pitifull Petulancies and Calumnies. Yet it is not to be thought but that in this Anger He has Wit, of which if any Man be unconvinced, He is to be remitted to that admirable Oration He makes to the two Girles, which being a Treasury of such Rare Conceits, ought in all Prudence to be inserted with the other Speeches into the following Editions of Oceana. *Ibid.*

But though his Wit be admirable, his Discretion still has the upper hand; To repeat 40 or 50 lines out of his Commonwealth of Oceana, was not very troublesome, but to examine the Reasons alledged by the Considerer to prove that the Case of the two Girles dividing and choosing their Cake was not applicable to the Institution of a Commonwealth, was too stubborn a Matter to be wrought to his Pur-

pose, and is therefore silently past over. It is but Justice that I should have leave to repeat too, and put Mr *Harrington* in mind that He goes upon a false Supposition; For unless the two Girles lived under some Power greater then their own, (And if so they were Members of some Society, and obliged in Disposing of their Cake to behave themselves according to the establisht Lawes of it) They would never have divided the Cake, but the stronger of the two Girles would have taken the whole, or at least so much of it as She thought usefull to her.

In like Manner, If some One Person or Persons who have acquired the Supream Power (by what Method or Artifice is not as to this purpose Materiall) shall think fit to frame a Government where the whole People shall be divided into two Assemblies, with one of which shall be the right of dividing or Debating, and with the other that of choosing or Resolving, there is no great Reason to doubt but that this Temper may be effectuell to the attaining the Ends of Government: Yet even in this Case, it will be a Necessary Caution, That by mixing the Function of the severall Members of the Government, it be not rendered disputable in which of them the Sovereign Power resides, For this destroyes the Design of Government, and must frequently reduce things to the State of War. But all this while this is nothing to Mr *Harrington's* Purpose, and serves not at all to make out the
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the Naturall Right of a Commonwealth, seeing this Frame of a Commonwealth depended upon some former Sovereign Power; And to imagine that without the Influence of such a Power, Men unreduced or broken to the Rules of Society, should of themselves contrive themselves into two Assemblies, One of which should divide and the other choose, And that the strongest would not rather engross the whole Right both of dividing and choosing, Is to suppose that which can never be granted, And for which I do not believe there can ever be any stronger Reason produced then Mr *Harrington's* bare Affirmation.

For as for that Notion of a *Naturall Democracy and a Naturall Aristocracy*, Or that among twenty Men there will be some few (perhaps Six) excelling the Fourteen in greatness of Parts, It is altogether Arbitrary and destitute of any good ground in Experience; Among the twenty perhaps there will be but One, perhaps Sixteen, who excell the Rest in Parts: Or if this Proportion of about a third be allowed him, it will not be enough to help him over the stile; For though among twenty Men (not related to one another, nor as yet united in any Society) Six be apparently Wiser then the Fourteen, Must the Fourteen therefore necessarily intrust the Six with the Debate of such things as concern their Interest? Is it not much more Naturall to every Man to think himself Wise enough to advise about his own

H. p. 27.

Affaires, and to suspect all Persons of a greater Reach than himself? Indeed upon a Supposition that there were any known Common Interest of these *twenty* Men, it were not improbable that such of them as by Experience were known to be the Wisest, might be intrusted by the Rest with their Common Affaires; But it has been already demonstrated that there can be no such Common Interest. (I adde now also, Nor no such Experience of one another's Abilities) unless those *twenty* Men had been before united in some Society, that is, reduced under some Government. Wherefore Mr *Har-rington* stands Convict of Obstinacy in this Paralogisme, That He by Supposition puts the *twenty* Men into a Condition that of Necessity infers them to be already reduced to some Government, And yet at the same time Imagines them free to dispose of themselves as if They lived under no Government, and did but then begin to think of Constituting One.

To go yet a little farther with him, Admit that at first by some strange Accident a People should happen thus to distribute themselves into two Assemblies, a dividing One, or *Senate*, and a choosing One or *Popular Assembly*: Is this Foundation firm enough to sustain the whole Weight of a Commonwealth? May not either of these Assemblies repent of the Bargain, and endeavour to draw the whole Power both of the Debate and Result to themselves? That the *Senate* may do it by deluding the *People*, and confounding their Judgments in the Choice or Result,

Result seems not improbable; Nor is it Antidote enough to say that *The People in a Commonwealth are their own Army*, unless it were also Certain that a more subtle Party never had nor could dispossess a simple and ignorant One of the Power of the Sword. But that on the other side the *People* should not invade the Function of the *Senate* and take upon themselves the Right of Debate as well as of the Result, can not without some shame be denied by him who has complained of the *Athenian, Carthaginian, and Roman People* for this very thing. It is true None of these *People* did go about to take away the *Senate* wholly, but the difference is not great between dissolving an Assembly, and rendring it altogether Insignificant by robbing it of that Employment for which it was at first Instituted. When the Lion is to choose, the Fox knows his Division must be such as gives all to One side and leaves nothing to the other; If a *People* be once enraged, the *Senate* will find themselves concerned to please them in the Division as well as in the Choice. And this was the Condition of the *Senate* of *Capua* after the Fright they were put into by *Pacuvius*, *Jam verò nihil in Senatu actum aliter, quàm si Plebis ibi esset Consilium.* That whole Scene was laid by *Pacuvius* with a Design to preserve the *Senators* and satisfy the *People*, and by that at once bring them both into a Dependence upon himself. His surprize of the *People* was indeed very Ingenious, but had He given them time to consider, They would without

Liv.

H. p. 133.

doubt have found out some among themselves whom They would have thought Wise enough to make a Senate: If not, It must have been for want of Instruction in Mr Harrington's new Doctrine, That the pretended Depth and Difficulty in Matter of State is a meere Cheat. From the beginning of the World unto this day, you never found a Commonwealth, where the Leaders having Honesty enough, wanted skill enough to lead her unto her true Interest at home or abroad.

By this it appears, That there is no Common Right or Interest of Mankind (except that of Families arising from Paternall Power) antecedent to the Reduction of Mankind under Government; As also, That the Office of Dividing, or debating, and Choosing or Resolving, Or the different Functions of the Senate and People in a Commonwealth, are not founded upon any Naturall Right, but meerly upon an Artificiall One proceeding from the Designation of some preceding Sovereign Power. And this being the true Case of a Commonwealth, the two distinct Assemblies of the Senate and People have not as to this any more advantage then is between any Parties who give and take Counsell; Counsell is nothing but Ratiocination about the Affaires of another Man, and Ratiocination is the Addition or Subtraction of Propositions; The Operation belongs to the Person who gives Counsell, and the Proof or Examen of it remains in his hand who receives the Counsell: This Mr Harrington is pleased to call dividing and choosing, which in this Sence be-
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longs to a *Monarchy* as much as to a *Commonwealth*; For when a Prince asks any Man his Advice (and I think there never was Prince who advised not with some Body) that Man divides, and the Prince makes the Choise; Only here is the Difference, an able Prince if his Counsell has committed an Error in the Operation knows both how to detect and Rectifie it, but a *Popular Assembly* being of themselves unfit for a Debate, are forced to acquiesce in the Division or Debate of the *Senate*.

And what if after all the *Popular Assembly*, fixes upon the wrong Member of the Division? To judge of the Utility or Disutility of a Proposition in matter of State, is I hope another thing from discerning which is the biggest or least Piece of a Cake, And a Discourse about which much of understanding and Experience must be employed, is not of so easy and certain Dispatch, as a Matter which is submitted to the Determination of sense. In one respect, the Choise or Result is an Action of greater Difficulty then the Division or Debate; For an Active Fancie which suddenly Ranges over a great deal of ground, may easily find out the various Methods of which any Business is Capable, but to discern which of them is the most conducing, is the Work of an exact and well-poised Judgment. To affirm *That because every Man hath an Interest what to choose, therefore that which suites with every Man's Interest, cometh up to the Publique Interest*, Is in the first Place not true; For it most frequently fals out that Particular Men have a Private Interest

Interest of their own differing from if not contrary to the Publique One, by which they are more potently inclined then by their Affection to the Publique; But secondly if it were alwaies true the Difficulty is left still remaining; For to suppose that every Man in a Popular Assembly should in a matter of State be able to discern his true Interest, is to suppose the Meanest and most unqualified of the People infallible in those things, where the most Consummate Politicians do often mistake, And is besides repugnant to the Experience of all *Commonwealths*, whose Histories are full of Examples of pernicious Councils which have been embraced by the *People*.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, it must be confessed that a *Commonwealth* gaines one great Advantage by the Debate of the *Senate*; For the *People* being composed of Ignorance, Obstinacy, and Tumult would certainly in a Moment teare to pieces any Business that should be thrown among them; Whereas by reserving the Debate to the *Senate*, the *People* have no other imployment but to let fall a little piece of Linnen at all Adventures into one of two Boxes; So that being thus brought within a Disjunction of the Matter, It can be but an even lay against them that they do Miscarry.

CHAP. VI.

Whether the Senatusconsulta, or Decrees of the Roman Senate had the Power of Lawes?

IN discussing this Question it will in the first Place be necessary to make known what is to be understood by the Word *Lawes*. And though it be easy to take up severall Definitions of *Law*, none is so appropriate to the present Subject as that of *Justinian*. *Lex est quæ Populus Romanus Senatorio Magistratu interrogante (veluti Consule) constituebat.* This Definition puts a difference between *Leges* and *Plebiscita*, which having not been attended to by *Ateius Capita* in *Gellius*, He involves himself; For the *Plebiscita* were such Constitutions as without the Senate or the Intervention of any Senatorian Magistrate were framed by the Common People under the Authority of their *Tribunes*. At first Obedience was due from the Romans only to such Lawes as were establish'd by the Votes of the People (including the Senate,) and had been propos'd by some of the greater Magistrates: But after that the *Plebs* or Common People had by their Seditions gain'd ground so far upon the Senate, as to obtain the *Tribunes* a Magistracy elected out of their own Body, They soon began to frame Orders call'd *Plebiscita*, which at the beginning oblig'd only their own Order, and concern'd not the Nobility, but were

*Instit. de jur.
nat. Parag. 3
4.*

were after a while improved to the full Authority of *Lawes*. whether this were enacted by the *Lex Horatia*, the *Lex Publilia*, or the *Lex Hortensia*, as is by various Authors variously reported, Or Whether the later of these *Lawes* were any more then a reviving of the former, We shall not be concerned to inquire; It will be enough to take notice that the *Plebiscita* having attained the Power of *Lawes*, Pomponius had very good Reason to observe *Quod inter Plebiscita & Legem species constituendi interessent, Potestas eadem esset.*

*Digest. de
Orig. Juris
leg. 9.*

*Instit. de jur.
nat. Parag.
5.*

As the *Plebiscita* or Decrees of the Common People were not *Lawes*, nor ever so called, and yet had the whole Power of *Lawes*, So the *Senatusconsulta* or Decrees of the Senate had the same Power. *Senatusconsultum est quod Senatus jubet atque constituit. Nam cum auctus esset Populus Romanus in eum modum; ut difficile esset in unum eum convocari, Legis sanciente causa; equum visum est, Senatum vice Populi consuli.* And least Justinian should be thought to have lived in too remote an Age, to be a Witness in this Case, We have a much earlier Testimony of Pomponius to the same Purpose. *Quia difficile Plebs convenire cepit, Populus multo difficilius in tantâ turbâ hominum, Necessitas ipsa curam Republicæ ad Senatum deduxit. Ita cepit Senatus se interponere: & quicquid instituisset observabatur. Idque jus appellabatur Senatusconsultum.* With which agrees that of Ulpian, *Non ambigitur Senatum jus facere posse.*

*Digest. sup.
eod.*

*Digest. inf.
de Leg. &
SC.*

To determine at what time the *Senatusconsulta*

Senatusconsulta attained to the Power of *Laws*, is more than I will undertake; It is very probable that this was not establish'd at Once, but grew on by insensible Degrees. But for Mr *Harrington* without the least profer of any Probation to affirm, That the *Senatusconsulta* were not *Laws* in that they were *Senatusconsula*, or proposed by the Senate, but in that They were allowed by *Justinian* or the Prince, in whom was now the Right of the People, is to take to himself greater Authority then ever was given to the Dictator. For in the first Place it is manifest by the order of the Discourse both in the *Institutions* and the *Digests*, That the *Senatusconsulta* had attained the Power there affirmed to belong to them before the time of the Emperors. And then the Occasion by which the *Senatusconsulta* are said to have grown into that Power, was the Difficulty of Assembling the People for making of *Laws*, by which it is necessarily inferred, That the People had not then passed away the Right of making *Laws*, nor by the *Lex Regia* invested the Emperour with it.

I need not conceal that Mr *Harrington* in this Point walkes in a Path traced out for him by *Hotoman*; Who indeed accuses *Tribonian* of Error or Assentation, And saies that the *Senatusconsulta* had not the Power of *Laws* before it was given them by the Emperours, who by that thought to fortifie the Power they had usurped over the People. But We must be cautious in admitting *Hotoman's* Judgment in these Matters; For He was
not

H. p. 31.

not only a professed Condemner of *Tribonian's* Labours in compiling that Body of Civill Law which is at present extant in the World, but having been during the Civill Wars of France engaged in a Popular Faction, He acquired there some Bitterness of Spirit against Kings, which He frequently discovers in his Writings. If it be *Hotoman's* Authority which must beare Me down in this Point, I shall cover my self with the Authority of *Cujacius*, *Connanus*, *Rivallius*, *Tbolosanus*, *Gothofred*, *Calvin*, *Schardius*, and the whole stream of Interpreters who run on the other side: If *Hotoman's* Arguments are thought strong enough to carry it, I must desire they may be examined, and then they will appear to prove no more then this, That whereas *Cesar* had left the Election of halfe the Magistrates, with some other small Remaines of Power in the *Peoples* hands, *Tiberius* transferred all to the *Senate*: Which is so far from making good his Assertion, that it is a strong Presumption of the Contrary, Seeing it is not likely that by such an Innovation in Favour of the *Senate*, *Tiberius* would have incurred the Discontent of the *People*, if they had not been habituated in other Cases to see such Power in the *Senate's* Possession.

It was not then by any new Power conferred by the *Emperours*, but only by their Permission to retain an Antient One, that the Decrees of the *Roman Senate* had the Power of *Laws*, and as such found place in the Complement of the *Roman Lawes* by *Justinian*. That the

S. C. *Macedonianum* (which I wonder so great a Master, as Mr *Harrington* should call *Macedonicum*, and not have skill enough to distinguish the Adjective derived of *Macedonia*, One of the Noblest Provinces in *Greece*, from that other which sprang of *Macedo* an infamous Usurer at *Rome* in the time of *Vespasian*) is of a younger Date then the first Roman Emperour I willingly allow, and make no difficulty in confessing as much of almost all the S. C. mentioned in the Body of the Law : For the more ancient Ones having from time to time been wholly repealed, or in part reformed by succeeding Constitutions, they were omitted by *Justinian* in his Compiement, whose Design it was to cut off all antiquated and useles Lawes, and leave only such new Ones as continued in Force. We are deprived of the accurate knowledge of these Antient *Senatusconsulta* by the loss of that Instrument into which both They and the *Plebiscita*, from the time of their first Institution, were collected by *Vespasian* : Yet it is not very hard to pick out considerable Footsteps of them, As the two *Senatusconsulta* against the passing of *Rubicon* by any Roman Generall with an Army, still extant upon old Marbles; The S. C. *Antonianum*, *Fannianum*, and others mentioned by *Gellius* ; The Form of the S. C. *Summum* or *Supremum*, by which the whole Commonwealth was put into the Hands of One or both the *Consuls*, from whom after that lay no Appeal to the People; The severall *Senatusconsulta* so frequently spoken of by *Cicero*, both

Aymar. Rivall. Hist. Jur. Civ. lib. 3.

both in his Epistles and Orations; And finally in the Body of the *Law* it self (not to hunt after other Places) *Digest. de Colleg. & Corp. l. 3.* The *Senatusconsulta* there referred to were One of them made *A. U. C. 685.* *L. Cæcilio & Q. Marcio COSS.* And the other *A. U. C. 697. Lentulo & Metello COSS.* (both before *Cæsar's* second Consulate from which the Roman Empire beares Date) as is out of *Cicero* and *Asconius* proved by the learned *Grotius*.

The Solution of this Question may give Birth to a New One, Whether Mr *Harrington* be the better *Civill Lawyer* or *Mathematician*?

CHAP. VII.

Whether the Ten Commandments were proposed by God or Moses, and Voted by the People of Israel?

THIS Chapter is a Peculiar, and claims an Exemption from the Ordinary Rules by which Politicall Disputes are Governed; For though God has declared Universally *That by Him Kings reign*, yet in reference to the People of *Israel* He was pleased to own a more particular Concernment, And did by an express Declaration of his Will to and by *Moses*, both at first enact their Lawes and Modell their Government, and reserve to himself the Result of their most important Affaires. So that whereas an

Error

Error concerning the Frame of any other Government amounts at most but to a Deficiency of Understanding or Diligence, a Mistake in that of *Israel* may easily become an Impiety, in as much as it may imply a false or Scandalous Conception of God's Actions. The Consideration of this begat in Me at first a Tenderneſs in Reference to this Subject, and preſently after a Reſolution to leave it in the hands of the Clergy, upon whom it had alſo been obtruded by Mr *Harrington*. At preſent I muſt go on to profeſs that his having in his laſt Book ſingled out ſo weighty a new Adverſary, can be no Temptation to Me to change that Reſolution, or undertake any part of this Diſpute.

CHAP. VIII.

Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the Perfection of the Kind, come up to the Perfection of Government, and have no flaw in it.

I Am not ignorant of the Advantage Mr *Harrington* may ſeem to gaine in this and the two next Chapters, by having inverted the Order of his own Assertions and my Replies; For paſſing by the firſt and ſecond, He ſals here upon his third Assertion, and in that fixes upon the fourth and fiſt Branches. But I am not willing to contend about a Matter of no
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greater

greater Consequence, but will rather embrace his own new Method, and take the Question as He has stated it, first examining the fourth Branch or matter of Fact, concerning *Lacedæmon* and *Venice*, And then giving my Opinion about the Fifth, That a Commonwealth notwithstanding all its pretensions to equality, is not secure from being infested with *Sedition*.

Mr *Harrington* was told by the Considerer, That if there appears to have been a more then Ordinary Calm in the state of *Lacedæmon*, this was not so much to be attributed to the Form of their Government, as to their severe Education and affected Poverty, by which all things that served as Baits to Sedition, were driven out of the Country: So that it can not be Rationall to expect the same Effects from the same Government, where the same Education and manner of Life is wanting. Since He has been content to spare himself the Pains of taking Notice of this, I shall suppose it does not stand in need of any farther Elucidation, unless perhaps in the Discovery of the *Lacedæmonian Agrarian* it prove convenient to insist a little upon it.

To descend then to his Answer to what I had objected about the frequent Insurrections of the *Helots*; He saies that *Lacedæmon* is either to be considered as not taking in the *Helots*, and then she was an equall Commonwealth, or taking them in, and so she was unequall. This is just the Man in the Fable who inquired of the

the Oracle, Whether the Sparrow in his Fist would come out Dead or alive, when it was in his own Power to make the choise; So Mr Harrington will have the Power, according as it futes with his Occasions, to make *Lacedæmon* an equall or an unequall Commonwealth. But to make short, If she were an equall Commonwealth, What has He to say to the Seditions of the *Helots*? If she were unequal, Why did he play the Mountebanck in using her as the Example of an Equall One?

A second sort of Instances alledged by Me to prove *Lacedæmon* not to have been free from Seditions, were the Conteſts which have happened about the Succeſſion to the Crown. Theſe, ſaies Mr Harrington, being determined by the *Ephori*, that is by a Court of Juſtice, and not by the Sword, it is moſt ridiculous to infer from thence that the Government is Seditions. Hold a little; Can thoſe Controversies be ſaid to be determined by a Court of Juſtice, when the Interreſſed Parties make their Appeale to their own Sword, And are able to perſwade a Forreign Prince to draw his alſo in their Quarrell? If any Member of a Commonwealth being diſcontented have Interreſt and Power enough to fill his Countrey with Forreign Armies, I think that Man would not ſeem very Sober who ſhould at that time go about to applaud that Countrey for not being Subject to Seditions.

But this was after *Lyſander* and the Spoiles of *Athens* had broken the *Agurrian* and ſo ruined

H. p. 412

Ibid.

Lacedæmon. When I first made use of these Examples, I could not foresee that Mr *Harrington* would be so easy in parting with those Advantages which He pretended to draw from the *Agrarian* of *Lacedæmon*. But now that He is willing to allow the *Agrarian* of *Lacedæmon* was not sufficient to preserve that Commonwealth, but was it self overballanced by the ready Money brought in by *Lysander*, I have no reason but to be content also, and to remit him for my farther Thoughts in this Particular to the Chapters of the *Ballance* and *Agrarian*. Only I must desire Him that when among his Profelytes (whether it be in the *Circle* or the *Ruelle*) he Plumes himself over the Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon*, He would be so Ingenuous as to strike all the time after *Athens* was taken, which is a matter of 200 years, out of the Account, And shut up the Glories of that Commonwealth with the Actions of *Lysander*, from which by a Common mistake of Historie, they have hitherto been thought to beare Date,

The Considerer brought Instances of a third sort of Seditions in *Lacedæmon*, which it seems prove not for Mr *Harrington's* Convenience to remember; There is no scarcity in Historie of such Instances, and it will not be unseasonable to commend a few more of them to his Forgetfulness. First the Sedition of those young Men who (Because their Mothers were unmarried Women, such as the state had for greater Population enjoyned to make use of a Promiscuous Propagation) were called

called *Parthenia*, and after they were suppress^d *Arist. Polit. lib. 5. c. 7.*
 were sent to inhabit *Tarentum* in *Italie*. Then the Sedition of them who during the *Masseniæ*
 War demanded a new Division of the Lands. After that the Attempt of King *Pausanias* to
 make himself absolute Master of the Commonwealth. And then the two dangerous Conspi-
 racies in the Neck of one another during the *Theban* Invasion, in the first of which about 200
 discontented Persons had seized upon the Temple of *Diana*, one of the strongest and most de-
 fensible Quarters of the City, from whence it would have been very difficult to drive them
 out, had not *Agefilæus* by a sudden Fetch of Wit cheated them out of their Post and Resolution;
 The second consisted of a Caball of *Spartans* of good Quality who had their secret Assemblies
 for the Innovating Publique Affaires, And when they were detected, the Senate durst not bring
 them to an open Triall, but they were privately executed by the Authority of *Agefilæus* and the
Ephores, whereas before that time no *Spartan* had ever been put to Death without the due
 form of Justice. These Instances being all either older then *Lyfander*, or immediately upon his
 time, are not liable to any of Mr *Harrington's* exceptions, but serve abundantly to evince, that
Lacedæmon has not been exempted from the Fate of all other Commonwealths, but has had
 her Portion of seditions.

*Plut. in
Ages.*

As for the City of *Venice*, though she be
 possess^d of severall Advantages by her situation,
 yet she is not at all beholden to that, if we be-

lieve Mr Harrington, for her tranquillity within Doores; For saies he, *she is like a man in a Citadel who thereby may be the safer from his Enemies, but here a whit the safer from Diseases.* But before we can allow of this similitude, We must desire him to remember, That as in the Body of man; so in a Commonwealth, some Diseases are like Feavors caused by a Disorder in the Blood or Humors, others like Plagues are communicated by an Externall Contagion; From the first indeed the situation of *Venice* gives her not any security, but against the last it is a sovereign Antidote, And of this Familie are the Diseases most frequently incident to a State. Of old the *Lacedæmonian* & *Cretan* Republicques scarce differed in their Constitution, the *Lacedæmonian* being but a Copy wrought by *Lycurgus* after the *Cretan* Original; yet the *Cretans* were never molested with any insurrections of their slaves, from which the *Lacedæmonians*, in any the least Publique Adversity, were rarely free; And the cause of this Diversity assigned by *Aristotle* is, That the *Argives*, *Messenians* and *Arcadians*, all neighbouring States, did continually foment the Discontents of the *Lacedæmonian* slaves; But *Crete* being an Island, no Enemy was neare enough to tempt their slaves to a Defection. In like manner the *Venetian* Republicque being comprehended within her Islands, she by that situation is secured from those Practises by which her Enemies might indeavour to excite seditions among her subjects.

Though

Though the City of *Venice* it self is seated out of the reach of all Enemies, her Frontire extends to two very dangerous Ones, the great *Turk*, and the House of *Austria*, whose known Rapacity obliges her to a great deale of Modesty and Reservedness at home; And though the Frontires of all states are bounded by the Territories of other Princes, Yet all have not such Potent Neighbours, against whom their whole Care and Power is alwaies necessary: Those who have, will in all Probability think themselves concerned not to weaken their Force by any Domestick Tumults, there being nothing more Naturall then That the Feare of a Common Enemy should preserve Union and Agreement between Friends. This Truth is observed to have been very Operative with the *Romans*, who were not overrun with the Seditions of the Nobility and People, before that by the Destruction of the emulous Power of *Carthage*, They were freed from the Feare and Danger of any Common Enemy.

If I produced Examples of Seditions at *Venice*, which are older then the last Reiglement (this Word was thought no bad English by the Lord *Bacon*) in the time of *Piera Gradenigo*, I made Use of my just Liberty, Mr *Harrington* having not any where put in a Bar against such Examples: Yet now that He has restrained the Inquiry within the Compass of that Reformation, I am willing to omit the Mutiny upon Occasion of the new Impositions in Duke *Kiniera* *Zeno's* time, with all other examples which

H. p. 47

might be added of Seditions before the Reign of *Gradenigo*. And if the Matter be thus stated, What hurt if We grant him all that He demands? That in the whole World, through the course of all Ages, there may be found one Commonwealth, which by the help of those concurring causes already mentioned, has for something above 300 yeares been free from *Seditions*. Is this that Giant Argument which must extirpate Monarchicall Government out of the World, and in spite of Fate reduce Us all to a Commonwealth?

Yet even this Liberality is more then Mr *Harrington* can with Honesty receive, as long as the Actions of *Bocconi*, *Tiepoli*, and *Faliero*, manifest that *Venice* has been disturbed with Seditions even since her last Reformation. He indeavours indeed to perswade that those Actions do not imply any Sedition in the Government; For saies He, *Bocconi would have killed the Duke and was hanged before he could do it, Felton did kill a Duke and was hanged afterwards*. Under favour the Cases are not at all alike; *Felton* (though perhaps animated by zeale) killed the Duke upon a private Revenge; *Bocconi* went about to kill the Duke that he might afterward change the Government; *Felton* made use of no other assistance but his own Arm, *Bocconi* engaged many Complices. If We would find a Parallel in the *Venetian* storie for *Felton's* Assassinate, We must not take *Bocconi*, but *Andrea Contarini*, who being repulsed in his sute for an Employment, grew into that

Vindi-

Vindicative Passion against Duke *Foscari*, that He attempted his Life, and had undoubtedly taken it away, if the blow had not been diverted by the next Person from *Foscari's* Breast to his Face. But this being only the Issue of a private Quarrell, He does not find Me making any Advantage of it, *Faliero and his Complices*, continueth He, *would have destroyed the great Councell, but were hanged before they could do it, Vaux and his Accomplises would have blown up the Parliament but were hanged before they could do it; Therefore England was in this Relation a Seditious Government, else why was Venice?* I do not know that the Considerer ever undertook to prove that the Government of England was alwaies free from Seditions; If He had, that One Instance of the *Powder Treason* had been enough to confute Him. Such attempts, as they are of a more dangerous Nature, so they deserve a Name of more Horror, then Seditions: For Seditions, like storms gathered a far off, give some warning before They fall, There is Roome for Prudence to seek some way to divert them, The Interposition of Moderate and Acceptable Persons does often prevent or soon pacifie them, At worst their Fury may be avoided by a speedy Retreat; But these secret Conspiracies, like violent subterraneous Eruptions, in a Moment destroy all, And if they be not discovered before the Execution (which no state be it either a Monarchy or Republique can by

Sabell. Dec.
3. lib. 1.

by it's Orders have any Security to do) the Publique is involved in an inevitable Ruine.

H. p. 42.

The Conspiracy of *Ficcoli* Mr Harrington confesses came to blowes, yet can not Venice be called a *Seditious Commonwealth*. You find no man accusing Rome of Sedition in that she had a *Manlius* or a *Melius* who dangerously affected Monarchie, &c. Yet *Florus* has placed the Account of *Manlius* his attempt under the Title *de Seditio nibus*, and *Livy* in relating the same Action imployes the word *Seditio* five or six times: But to let that pass. It would have been fairely done and might have prevented many mistakes, if where He interprets the Words of his *Lexicon*, He had told Us what He understands by this Word *Seditio*: In this Place He seems to limit it very odly, allowing it only to signify, in a *Commonwealth* the Dissension of the People and Senate, in a *Monarchy* by a Nobility that of the King and Nobles, in a *Monarchy* by Arms that of the Prince and Souldiery, because these only can be derived from the Orders of the Government. By this Rule the Contest of the *Fregosi* and *Adorni* at *Genova*, not being between the People and the Senate, but between two Factions of the Nobility, was no *Sedition*; Nor by the same Rule are the late Insurrections at *Naples* and *Moscow* to be reputed *Seditions*. For they were not excited by the Nobility or Souldiery, but by the Common People. This is a very poore Evasion, for there was incumbent upon Mr Harrington an Obligation to prove

H. p. 84.

proves, That an equall Commonwealth (of which he produced *Venice* as an Example) had no flaw in it, and was such as No Man could have the Interest or Power to disturb with Sedition. Of this He has not performed the least part, but indeavours to put Us off with an impertinent Nicety about the Notation of the Word Sedition. Now for what Purpose serves this Pretension to shut the great Gate of Sedition, if so many back Doores of Disorder be left open by which Miserie and Destruction may enter into a Commonwealth? As if it were not all One, if a Man must necessarily receive a Mortall Wound, Whether it be given him with a Scimitar or a Penknife. Besides all this Mr *Harrington* bestows a large Fallacie upon Us in the Application of this Example: For if the Freedom of *Venice* from Seditions be only to be understood in reference to the Agreement of the Senate and People, the Commonwealth of *Oceana* is like to gain very little Credit or Security from it; In *Venice* the People (as We are often told) are the Grand Counsell, all of them Men of Noble Extraction and Excellent education, not actually armed, constantly residing under the view of the Magistrates, in number not exceeding three thousand; so that the Publique Employments being very many make swift Returns as they circulate through them. In *Oceana* the People are no lesse then two hundred thousand, having Arms in their hand, made up of Men of all Ranks and Conditions, inhabiting the face of a wide-spread Countrey,

Countrey, and few of them having Rationall hopes to attain any Considerable Magistracy. Let any Man weigh the Oppositions in the Temper of these Commonwealths, and then judge whether there can be any good Inference made from the Quietness of the One to the stability of the other. To Me the Consequence lookes like that of the Young Gentleman, who because he had never seen a storm upon his Father's Fish-pond, concluded there could not be any upon the *Cassian* Sea.

But though all what has been said concerning *Lacedæmon* and *Venice* should be admitted, Mr *Harrington* is still secure; At most He can but loose a brace of Examples, and be put to say (as He does of *Florence* and *Genua* in a like Case) that if *Lacedæmon* and *Venice* have been disturbed with *Seditions*, then they also must have been unequall Commonwealths; For in generall it is most certain, That a Government which attains to perfect equality hath such a Libration in the Frame of it, that No man in or under it can contract such Interest or Power, as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition. And the whole Commonwealth of *Oceana* being the Exemplification of such an equall Government, If Men are still to seek for a Commonwealth that has been free from *Seditions*, the Fault is their own that they make no more hast to come under so happy a Government. This then is a state of the Question which ought to be determin'd by Experiment rather then Argument; But the Ingredients to the Experiment

H. p. 46.

H. p. 36.

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periment (the safety of three Nations) being of two great Expence, We are obliged to better Husbandry, and must be content to make our Judgment of the future Successes of this Government by the Paper Modell of it which has been given Us, And examine Whether that contains any Security, that this Government has no Possibility of being disturbed with *Sedition*: The Truth or Falschood of which Proposition will best be discovered, by referring the particular Frame of the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, to the Generall Idea of Government.

The Apprehension of a Disability in every particular Man (or at least in every particular Familie) of preserving by his own single Power either his Life or any thing usefull to life, was the first inducement of Mankind to come under Government; Now it was impossible to establish any Government without a *Sovereign* Power vested in some One Man or Assembly of Men, For without that Every particular Man must still have been left to the Protection of his own strength, and must have continued to do all other Men whatsoever Mischief did any way conduce to his own Profit or Preservation, the avoiding the Inconveniences of which Life was that which Men intended by submitting themselves to Government; And therefore every Particular Man was necessitated to part with his Native Power and intrust it with the *Sovereign*, whose Actions He did thereby Authorise and make his own. The Sovereignty being thus

thus fixt, The next work was to enact Lawes, or prescribe Rules of behaviour both in Reference of the Service to himself which the *Sovereign* thought fit to require, and the Inter-
course or Commerce between every Particular Man united under him. But here it soon began to appear how irregular the Passions of Man are, and how infirm and Erroneous his Discourse, For Men presently indeavoured to resume the Liberty which They had so lately parted with, and violated those Lawes which had been newly Authorised by themselves. Yet the Inconvenience was not great, as long as this Irregularity exceeded not a few Persons, such as were apparently too weak to resist the *Sovereign* Power; For then these Offences, as Murder, Theft, and the like, were presently attended by the Punishments ordained for them by the *Sovereign*, and the Facinorous Persons being made Examples of Justice; served to contain other Men within the Bounds of their Duty.

But if the Number of those who were Desirous to resume the Power they had parted with, or who otherwise by reason of their Crimes were concerned that the Course of Justice should be intercepted, did at any time prove great enough to beare up against the *Sovereign* Power, Then were Matters reduced again to a Condition of War, and Government with all the Paets on which it had been founded trampled under Foot. It may seem contrary to Reason that the Motives which were at

first

first strong enough to make Men submit to Government and Lawes, should afterward prove too weak to enforce their Obedience to them; And without doubt if Men did in all their Actions govern themselves by Calm and solid Reason, They would never hearken so far either to the stimulations of their own Passions, or to the Incitements of other Men, as to be engaged in a Design of reversing the *Sovereign Power*, For the greatest Mischiefs that can be suffered by any *Government*, are not comparable to those Occasioned by the Absence of *Government* when Men live in the Wild and Lawless condition of War; Nor can it be any thing but Madness voluntarily to expose ones self to Misery for the taking away a Power, in room of which another equall Power must of Necessity be substituted. Yet Experience teaches Us that this is too little to make the World Wise, at which We ought no more to wonder, then that the Certainty of Punishment should not be enough to make men abstain from violating Lawes, Nor the Feare of Hell Torments (even to those who are sufficiently perswaded of the Certitude of them) to keep Men from sinning. So that the Wisdom of those Men is a little to be suspected, who think any Governours can be secured, by the unreasonableness that would be in their Subjects Disobedience; For there ever were and will eternally be some Men who will mistake in this Point, and think it their Interest to subvert the *Sovereign Power*.

This False Opinion has been very much helpt forward

forward by the Sense of those Pressures which are sometimes sustain'd under *Government*; For whilst Men considering only their private Utility expect to live free from all Incommodity, They usually charge the *Government* with those Grievances which are inseperable from the infirm Condition of Humanity, or perhaps are Consequences of their own Inconformity to the true and Necessary temper of Subjection; There being nothing which Men more Naturally forget, Then that the Exercise of *Sovereign Power* requires a large Expence, toward which it is necessary for every particular Man to contribute a Part, thereby to secure the Rest to Himself.

Yet it can not be denied That sometimes there has been much of Iniquity in the Manage of *Sovereign Power*; At first, it is likely, the Person or Assembly trusted with it were known to be of just and Generous Principles, but by Succession the *Power* being devolved upon Men Weak or Vicious, They have frequently trifled away the Lives, Honours, and Fortunes of their Subjects, which They ought not to have employed but upon just and Probable Occasions. The Desire to prevent this Inconvenience brought forth an Expedient into the World, commonly known under the Name of mixt Government, in which, Though there seem to be a *Sovereign* Instituted, the *People* do not part with their whole Power to him, but retain some Part of it in their own Hands; So as to some Actions in which the Lives and Fortunes

Fortunes of every particular Man seem most concerned (such are the making Lawes and raising Mony, and the like) the *Sovereign* in appearance can do nothing by himself, but the Consent of the *People* by their Collective or Representative Body is still necessary. But this Expedient (though in some Places it might be for a while by reason of some externall Accidents not unprosperous) fell short of effecting the thing desired, And had besides this irreparable Breach in it, That while the Persons to whom the severall Parts of *Sovereign Power* were thus committed, fell into little Jealousies and Contests about their severall Respective Rights and Privileges, the Government was weakened, and left as it were without Legs or Arms; And when these little Jealousies came to be improved into open Dissensions, the severall Parties assuming to themselves the Exercise of the whole *Sovereign Power*, and the Advantages remaining with either not being conspicuous enough to determine the Matter otherwaies, the Nation which happened to be the Seat of so unfortunate a Controversie was necessarily reduced into a State of War; From which it has seldom been known to have been redeemed, but by destroying that Mixture which was pretended to, and rendring one of the Parties absolute in their Power.

Beyond this I know but of One Artefice to which Humane Invention has pretended, and that is to contrive a way how the People may govern themselves without Instituting any *Sovereign*

vereign, so that the Ends of *Government* may be attained and yet no Man devest himself of his Native Power and Liberty. It is confest by those Men who endeavour to introduce this kind of *Government*, that the *People* in their diffused condition are incapable of all *Government*; ignorant of such Counsels as are necessary to their Preservation, and unable to put the least part of them in Execution: Therefore it is of Necessity that the *People* should be assembled together, that there should be a *Senate* to consult, and *Magistrates* to Execute. But the advantage of this *Government* is pretended to consist in this, That the *People* not parting with their Power, but reserving to themselves the last Result in all Business, They are secured from all Injurie and Oppression, seeing the *People* can not be supposed to agree to do themselves Hurt: And as for the *Magistrates* and *Senate* they can not be Authors of any Violence, because they shall have only a very limited Power, the Exercise of which also is terminated within the Compass of a few Months, after which they are againe to be melted down into the Mass of the *People*, from which They were at first separated. In Fabricating this great Engine, and contriving all the Movements and Refforts belonging to it consists the whole Myserie of *Popular Government*; Of which the most perfect Modell, that ever was produced Mr *Harrington* assures Us is his *Commonwealth of Oceana*. So that we need only to examine that *Commonwealth* by the Notions & Maximes already laid down,

down, to know Whether Popular Government has that advantage over all other Governments, as to have no Flaw in it, and not to be exposed to a Possibility of being disturbed with Sedition.

In the first Place it is manifest that Popular Government is equally with any other Government exposed to this Inconvenience; That Particular Men will have an Interest to disturb it with Sedition; For it being impossible there should be any Government without Lawes, and all Lawes consisting either in a Prohibition of doing somewhat which before it was free to do, or in a Command of doing somewhat which before might have been omitted, Men must under Popular Government also needs regret the loss of that Liberty which was Naturall to them. If it be objected that under Popular Government Men give their Consent to the enacting of all Lawes, and therefore can not be rationally thought averse from what was their own Act, It must be remembred that in all other Government also, every Man did by that One Generall Act of resigning his Power and Authorising the Actions of the Sovereign, give his Consent to all the establisht Lawes, which notwithstanding is known to be insufficient for enforcing a Plenary Obedience to Lawes. And it is little less then ridiculous to think, That when under Popular Government Men have committed such Crimes as by the Lawes of it deserve Death, They should not apprehend it to be their Interest, by disturbing the Government with Sedition to secure, if it be possible,

their own Lives. Whensoever therefore under Popular Government, the number of those whose offences have rendered them lyable to the severity of Laws, is considerable enough to qualify them for the Attempt, Popular Government has no more security than any other of being free from *Seditions*. Of this Originall and Extraction as to the main, was *Catalines* Attempt upon the *Roman* Commonwealth.

Secondly, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of *Oceana* supposing a *Senate* and a *Representative* of the *People* called the *Prerogative Tribe*, consisting of about thirteen hundred Men, I aske Whether that *Representative* (taking the *Senate* and present *Magistrates* with it) be indued with the *Sovereign* Power, that is such as cannot be resisted by any Man or Men within the Commonwealth of *Oceana*? If they have such Power, Then it is manifest They may whensoever they think it their Interest, perpetuate this power, and by repealing the Orders of *Rotation*, render themselves a standing *Assembly*, which dashes to peeces the whole frame of popular Government, and puts the publique Affaires (which is contrary to the Designe and supposition of a free Commonwealth) into the hands of a *Sovereign Assembly*. Now that the *Representative* may come to think this their Interest is manifest also; For the Desire of *Power* being Naturall to man, a far greater share of *Power* remains with every particular Man, when the *Sovereign Power* is divided among thirteen hundred, then when the same *Power*

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is divided among two hundred thousand men. It is very true, as Mr Harrington has observed *That the Power or Effect of a greater People is proportionably greater then the Power or Effect of a lesser people*; But that is not to be brought to account under this Head, For it is not now inquired, Whether the *Power* of thirteen hundred or two hundred thousand Men be greater, but Whether if the same *Power* belong to thirteen hundred or two hundred thousand men, Every particular person of the thirteen hundred will not have more *Power* than every particular person of the two hundred thousand men. And what has been said of *Power* the same is to be understood of *Riches*. So that in the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, the *Magistrates*, *Senate*, and *Prerogative Tribe* for the time being, have both power and Interest to dissolve the Frame of the Government. And that a *Representative* is not incapable of making such an attempt as this, will, (it is not improbable) easily find Belief with those who are acquainted with the Actions of these last eighteen yeares.

. But now let us resume the other member of the Disjunction, and suppose that the *Magistrate*, *Senate* and *Prerogative Tribe*, have not the *Sovereign* power, but that it remains still with the Body of the *People in Oceana*. Hence it must follow that in the Commonwealth of *Oceana* there is no *Sovereign* power at all, And that the *People* of it are either in a Condition of *Warr*, or ready to fall into it. For the *people of Oceana* being too numerous and too much

dispersed to Assemble Personally in one place, They cannot concur to any Act but by their *Representative*; But that *Representative* not having the *Sovereign* power, there is not any such Power constituted, and consequently every Particular Man is left to the Protection of his own Power and strength, which is the Condition of *War*, and implies the Absence of all *Government*.

It will, perhaps, be replied that the *Sovereign* Power resides in the lesser Assemblies, as the Parish, Hundred, or Tribe, where the People personally concur to the Election of their Deputies: But this is not to make One but a great many *Sovereign* Powers, and to shatter One great Commonwealth, into as many little Ones as there are Parishes in *Oceana*. Nor is the Difficulty removed by it, For these lesser *Sovereign* Assemblies being not put into any Method of concurring in any Common Opinion, but by the Deputies they send to the *Representative* or *Prerogative Tribe*, If those Deputies be sent with *Sovereign* Power, the Commonwealth relapses into the Danger before insisted on of being supplanted by that *Representative*.

But if these Deputies be not sent to the *Prerogative Tribe* with *Sovereign* Power, then the *Prerogative Tribe* has no such Power and by Consequence can not make Lawes, or impose any other Resolution upon the Commonwealth; If notwithstanding this the *Prerogative Tribe* does *de facto* make Lawes, the Authority with which they are armed, is not that of the *Representative* it self, but of the lesser *Sovereign* Assem-

Assemblies, who in that They do not declare their Dissent, are presumed to allow of such things as have been resolved on by their Deputies. So that upon the Matter, *Oceana*, is not a Single Commonwealth, but a Compounded One made up by a tacite League of so many Commonwealths as there are lesser *Sovereign* Assemblies in *Oceana*. Now the Leagues between *Sovereigns* are of no longer Duration then their Common Interest, which whensoever it happens to be divided, such Leagues Vanish; And therefore whensoever the lesser *Sovereign* Assemblies in *Oceana* come to be divided in their Interest, the Commonwealth must fall in Pieces. But that They may come to be so divided is probable, if not necessary; Antiently They were divided both in respect of the *Saxon Heptarchie*, and the *Welch* Princes under the *Norman* Kings; The difference of Language (One of the greatest separators of Men's Affections) is not quite worn out; The inhabiting the same Island is not a sufficient Argument of Union, for then *Scotland* and We should make but One Nation; In fine, there can be no cause assigned of the Union of this Nation under One Government but the Power of former Princes, which by the Institution of this new Commonwealth is quite obliterated. More then all this, The Concernments of the Severall Parts of this Nation are very different in Reference to Propriety and Riches; some Parts subsist upon Mines and Cole, Others upon Manufacture, Some upon Corne, Others upon the Profits of Cattle,

London and the Sea Ports upon Exportation and Importation; And it is not possible but that when those severall things come to be regulated by Lawes, the Different Parts of the Nation must necessarily espouse very Different Interests.

This is also very conformable to Experience; Greece was a Country much less then England, The People of it (with an inconsiderable variety of Dialect) spoke the same Language, They had the same Common Enemy the *Persian*, and were united in many other particular Interests: Yet all this was not enough to reduce them into one great Commonwealth, but We find among them almost as many Republicques, as Cities. The Condition of *Sicilie*, *Magna Græcia*, and the Coasts of *Asia* serve also to make good the same Observation. Nay in *Israel* (which Mr *Harrington* will have pass for a Commonwealth) though the Countrey was so Narrow, the People all descended of one Familie, and cemented together by a Million of common Concernments and Obligations, this Thing is very apparent also; For though it did not produce a totall Dissolution of the *Government*, yet It for some time suspended it, and threw the People into a Civill War, as in the Case of *Jephthah* between the Men of *Ephraim* and *Gilead*, and in that of the Levites Concubine, between the Tribe of *Benjamin* and the rest of *Israel*.

There is but One imaginable case more to be put concerning the *Sovereign Power* in the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, Which is, That though the People have parted with their Power, They have

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have not intrusted it all in One hand, but have so equally divided it among the *Magistrates*, *Senate*, and *Prerogative Tribe*, that No publique Action can be performed without the Concurrency of all; Now there is nothing more improbable then that all these should concur to the Oppressing the *People*, changing the *Government*, or disturbing it with *Sedition*; Then which greater Security is not attainable in Matter of *Government*. But all this rises no higher then the Case of mixt *Government*. For the Power being wholly past from the *People*, and divided equally among these severall Persons, This equality of Power must upon their Disagreement reduce the Commonwealth to a *Civill War*, seeing it is not otherwaies to be judged which of them has the *Sovereign Power*, and by that a Right to the Obedience of the Rest. Now that they cannot long Agree, is a Consequence of that Desire of Power which is confest to dwell with Man, and will not permit him to rest satisfied with Part of that *Sovereign Power*, which He may fairely hope to possess Intire. And if there are any Examples of Persons thus Possess of equall Power, who have for a while maintained a good Correspondence with one another, and so preserved the Commonwealth in Peace, This must not be attributed to the Frame or Temper of the *Government*, but to some externall Cause, such as the Apprehension of some Common Impending danger, Or an over high Estimation of one another's strength, by which there is generated in them a mutuall Fear of one another:

another: As two Armies when neither of them has any Visible Advantage of strength, do very often forbear engaging out of a mutuall doubt of the Success, which notwithstanding is not a state of Peace, seeing both are intent upon the Opportunities of procuring one anothers Ruine.

It having been thus Proved, That the Commonwealth of *Oceana*, which was given us as the Example of a most equall Commonwealth, is which way soever the Case be stated, liable not only to Sedition, but which is more, to a totall Dissolution, It is at the same time evinced, That a Commonwealth coming up to the Perfection of the kind, comes not up to the Perfection of Government, but has a Flaw in it. I do not suspect that after this Mr Harrington will any longer think fit to accuse Me of *huddling things together or neglecting of Principles*; It is true I can not admit of his *Principles*, because, as I have often told him, They are meerly Effects & Consequences of Government, that is no *Principles* at all. And while He thus goes astray in the *Principles*, His Labour must needs be unprofitable, both in examining the Models of Former Commonwealth's, and in proposing New Ones of his own; For at this Rate New Models of Government may be contrived with as much ease, as a French Tayler invents new Fashions. It is the Foundation of Government upon undeniable *Principles*, and the Diductions from them, which render Politiques a Compleat Science, without which the greatest Conversation with particular Commonwealths can but at most make Men *Empiricks* in Policy.

H. P. 40.

CHAP. IX.

Whether Monarchy coming up to the Perfection of the Kind, come short of the Perfection of Government, and have some Flaw in it?

IT can not be with Reason expected that I should assert *Monarchie* to be so far Privileged as not to have a Flaw in it; For having in the preceding Discourse laid it down for a Maxim, *That Men will eternally mistake the Point of Government, and think it their Interest to Subvert the Supream Power*, I should now contradict my self by affirming that of *Monarchical Government* in particular, which I before denied of all *Government* in Generall. Yet does not Mr Harrington gaine any Advantage by this, For though I confess that *Monarchie* comes not up to the imaginary Perfection of *Government* which He dreams of, but is indeed neither in a *Monarchie* nor a *Commonwealth*, nor yet in Nature, I am not at all diffident of making Good, That a *Supream Hereditary Monarchie* attaines to a greater Degree of Perfection, and has fewer Flaws in it then a *Commonwealth* or any other kind of *Government*.

I do not think it needfull to repeat either the Principles or Conclusions of the last Chapter, Only it will be usefull to examine somewhat more at large the Causes or Reasons why Men are not content with the *Government* they live under,

under, but do by a continuall Indeavour to subvert the *Sovereign Power*, disturb it with *Sedition*. Of which in Generall three Reasons may be assigned.

The first is a Desire of Immunity from Punishment in such Persons as have by their Crimes render'd themselves obnoxious to the Lawes; For it being impossible as long as Men are subject to Passions, but that such Faults will be committed as the *Sovereign Power* has thought fit to punish with Death or the loss of Estate, The Persons who have committed those Faults will indubitably seek to avoid the Punishment, which can not be done but by raising a Party able to resist the *Sovereign Power*. And as Criminall Persons seek to avoid Punishment for Crimes already committed, So Persons extremely in Debt or Indigent, who being destitute of that Industrie which might procure them a Subsistence in a Regular Way, know not how to live but by Rapine and Invading other Men's Propriety, desire to disturb the Government that they may find Security in those Crimes which for the Future they resolve to Commit.

The second is a Want of Judgment to discern the Miseries which attend War; For when a People have so long injoyed Peace that the Memory of the wretched Effects of a Civill War is defaced, They are very Frequently deafe to the Admonitions of Wiser Men, to the Histories of former times, and to the Example of other Nations, And so out of meer Wantoness throw away their own Happiness, by suffering themselves to be

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be engaged in a War against the *Sovereign*, the Consequences of which they had never taken the least pains to Consider. And to this they are very easily brought, whensoever those Men who are by some other Motive engaged to seek the subversion of the *Government*, have Credit enough with the People to impose a Cheat upon them, by making Use of the Names of Religion or Liberty, or some other like specious Pretence.

The third is that Desire of Power which Men commonly understand by the Name of Ambition; This seems so twisted with the being of Man that it is thought naturall to him, and no more separable then his Affections or Passions. Yet if any Ambitious Man should take himself to a strict Account, and demand a Reason of his own Thoughts and Actions, If He should contemplate Power with all the Dangers, Cares, and Inquietudes intayled upon it, And strip it of that gawdy Dress with which the Deluded World has adorned it, He would find his Pursuit of Power extreamly Irrationall, unless so far as it did necessarily conduce to his own Preservation. The Desire of self Preservation was (as I said formerly) the first step to *Government*, and the Institution of *Sovereign Power* was the Caution that every Man had of every other Man for his Preservation; Yet this did not satisfy, because it quickly appeared that though good Laws were ordained for every Man's Protection, yet they could not alwaies come in time enough to prevent particular Mischiefs, So that Men judged it Rationall, besides the generall Protection they enjoyed

injoyed from the *Sovereign*, to arme themselves with a particular Power against particular Dangers. Nor did Men stop here, but out of their incurable Suspicion of all other Men, They became as much afraid of the *Sovereign Power* as they were before of one another, And so continually endeavoured to acquire such Power as might even defend them from the *Sovereign*, which Design could never be thought fully attained by them untill the *Sovereign Power* it self was in their Possession.

The Desire then of such a Power as may preserve a Man, in such Cases where the Laws are not sufficient to do it, from other private Men, implying a Submission to the *Sovereign*, and acting in a Method not prohibited by him, can never bring danger to *Government*. But the Desire of a Power able to defend them from the *Sovereign*, is properly that Ambition which is the Fountaine from whence flow the chiefest Dangers that threaten *Government*, And is alwaies unjust though more or less condemnable according to the Temper of those who injoy the *Sovereign Power*; For if They are just and Vertuous Persons, and use not to make any Invasions on the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects, this Ambition is the more Criminall because the first Motive to it was false and Irrational; But if they are known Oppressors of the People, and such who consider not that They injure themselves by trampling upon the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects, It is a little more excusable, being an indeavour (though
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by an unjust Method) of preserving such Things as deserve not to be wilfully thrown away.

I have studiously abstained from reckoning the Desire of Riches among the Causes of *Sedition*; For if it be a Desire of Moderate Riches such as are subservient to the Necessities or Conveniences of Man's Life, or to the attaining Innocent and Honest Pleasures, They may with far greater ease and Probability be acquired by private and Legall Industrie then by disturbing the *Government*; And it is in Experience that those Men who are most taken up with this Design, are of all People the least turbulent, and do most abominate Commotions. But if it be a Desire of excessive Riches, such Riches can not be desirable in themselves but only as They are the Instruments of Power; And so this Desire is to be reduced to the Desire of Power.

If Revenge, Love, or any other Passion has sometimes given the first Impulse to the Dissolution of *Government*, these Accidents are so Particular and Infrequent, that they can not deserve to have Place in a Generall Discourse.

Having thus in generall discovered the first Causes of *Sedition* in all *Government*, the next Work must be to show by what Art or Providence the *Sovereign* may prevent the Mischief, and suspend the Effects in their Causes. And for obviating the first Cause of *Sedition*, many particular Cares are necessary; As the diligent Execution of Lawes, that so every Offence may be overtaken by the Punishment; then the Encouragement

couragement of Manufactures and Traffique which fetching Wealth from abroad, cure the Subject of Want and Necessity at home; After that a Prohibition of Excess in such things (as Gaming, Clothes, and the like) by which Men go in Chace of Poverty; And last of all, When notwithstanding all these Cares, Criminal and Indigent Persons grow Numerous, A seasonable Dreyning of them away by a Foreign War or Plantations.

The Prevention of the second Cause of *Seditions* consists in having the People sufficiently instructed in the Sad and Miserable Consequences of a Civill War, in Comparison of which the greatest Pressures under the worst of *Governments* are no Evils. But it must be confessed that this is a Text upon which the Wise part of the World has used in vaine to Preach to the Fooles, And therefore there is a mixture of Fortune in it, which very much secures those Princes who come in just upon the last Act of a Civill War; For there being no Man then alive in whom there is not a fresh Memoirie of the Calamities of War, They have them in such Detestation, as that They are willing to suffer any thing rather then be a second time plunged into that miserable Condition.

Against the third Cause of *Seditions*, the Virtue and Innocence of the Prince is a Grand Remedy; for if his Subjects find Protection from him against all other Men, and have no just ground to suspect any Prejudice from him in their Lives or Fortunes, It would be desperately

rationally unreasonable to enter into any Diffidence of Him, or out of an Ambitious Desire of Power, to seek to subvert the *Government*. Yet because all Mankind are not Philosophers, And a great part of those over whom *Sovereign Power* is to be exercised, are not guided by Reason, but misled by Passion and false Consequences, It will be necessary to arm a *Sovereign* with somewhat more than his own Innocence, and give him a Power sufficient to repress those Brutish and Irrationall Subjects.

Here then it will concern Us to inquire what are the Advantages of the *Sovereign* over his Subjects. It is manifest that these consist not in the personall strength of a *Monarch*, nor yet of a *Sovereign Assembly*; For the first is but the strength of one Man, and the other but of a few Men, who beare no Proportion to those who are to be governed by them: Therefore the Advantages of the *Sovereign Power* proceed from this, That their Subjects have given up their particular strengths to be imployed at the Discretion of the *Sovereign*, So that in the *Sovereign* the diffused strength of a Multitude is united in One Person, which in a *Monarchy* is a Naturall Person, in a *State* an Artificiall One procreated by a majority of Votes. The Desire in particular Men of retracting this Gift, or Reassuming the Power they had conferred upon the *Sovereign*, (which proceeds from some of the Causes already mentioned but most particularly from the third) is the beginning of all *Seditions*. This at first can be the De-

fire of but One Man, who upon discovery of Symptomes of like Inclinations may impart it to some Few, and they afterward Communicate it to more, so as at length to be able to form a Party sufficient to disturb the *Government with Sedition*. So that in Effect, the Advantage of the *Sovereign* over his Mutinous Subjects, is the same that an United strength has over a divided One, or an Army over a greater Multitude of dispersed and Scattered People. In consequence of which it may be inferred, That the Great Art of Governing (next to that of withdrawing the Causes and Matter of Sedition by the Virtue & Innocence of the *Sovereign's* Actions) consists in being vers'd in those Methods by which a Number of Discontented Persons may be hinderd from becoming a Party, that is framing such a Correspondence among themselves as to be able to Act with one Common Consent and Design.

To discourse of the Vigilance of the *Sovereign* in observing all the Motions of his Subjects, or of the Intelligence He ought to maintain for discovering all their *Cabals*, belongs not to this Place; These things are according to the different Complexions of Times and Affaires infinitely various, and depend every where upon the particular Sufficiency of the Ministers. Only I may observe, That where there are constant *Assemblies* of any considerable part of the People which depend not wholly upon the *Sovereign*, both as to the times of their Convention and Dissolution, and as to the Matter and Manner

Manner of their Consultations, such *Assemblies* do easily become the Cradles of *Sedition*, and are therefore very Dangerous, and scarce to be with Prudence permitted by the *Sovereign*.

Let Us therefore consider a *Sedition* as ready to go alone, and just fitted to walk abroad and take the Aire. The first Steps of it must necessarily be infirm and staggering, For They who first Discover themselves are sure to be immediately attacked by the United Force of the *Sovereign*, against which They can have little hope to prevail; For their own Party being unsettled and Raw, And that of the *Sovereign* formed beforehand the Oddes must needs be very Great; And therefore the Broachers of *Seditions*, are generally Men altogether Desperate, who despise the Certitude of those Dangers by which all Considering Men are deterred. This then is the Grand Security of all *Sovereigns*, whether single Persons or Assemblies, That the united Force of their Subjects with which They are invested, is sufficient to suppress the Beginnings of all *Seditions*, And beyond this No *Government* has any Amulets that can preserve it; For if some *Seditions* have been suppressed after they were broke out into actual Civill Wars, That has not been by any Virtue of the *Government*, but is to be attributed to the same Causes that serve to determine the Successes of Wars between distinct *Sovereign Powers*. And therefore No *Sovereign* ought to expect his safety from any Frame or Temper of the *Government*, or from the settled orders

of the Commonwealth, but from his own Virtue in withdrawing the Matter, his Prudence and Dexterity in preventing the Contrivance, And his Celerity and Resolution in suppressing the Beginnings of *Seditions*.

What then remaines is only to take a View of the particular Method which a *Monarch* is capacitated to observe, in order to his Security, And to Compare it with the Methods of other *Governments*. Seeing the first Compact of every Man to part with his private Power, upon which *Sovereignty* was founded, is by experience found too weak to support the *Government*, All *Monarchs* have found it necessary to communicate some Part of this Power with which themselves are vested, to some subordinate Ministers who by this have a more peculiar Interest in the safety of the *Monarch* than the rest of his Subjects, and therefore are more likely in any Danger to stand by him: This Power according to the severall Intentions of the *Monarch*, either upon the Death of the Person to whom it was committed reverts again to the *Monarch*, or is transmitted to his next Heire, as one from whom the *Monarch* has reason to expect the same Services; This last Case is the Generation of a *Nobility*, who use to be distinguish't from other Men by such Titles with which the *Monarch* has thought fit to adorn them. And because Riches (whether in Land or other Revenüe) are a principall Fountain of all such Power as is subordinate to the *Sovereign Power*, either the *Nobility* uses to have considerable

considerable Riches conferred upon them by the *Sovereign*, or else such Persons as by their own Industrie have attained considerable Riches are advanced to be of the *Nobility*. Thus has a *Monarch* attained the first Degree of his Security, That there are a considerable Number of Persons who being intrusted with some Portion of Power by him, have by that both an Ability and Interest to defend him against all such as go about to disturb the *Government* with *Sedition*; For some of these Persons being present in all Quarters of the Dominion, and injoying by the *Monarch's* Authority an united Power; can not be supposed to faile in suppressing the Weake and Disjoynted beginnings of all *Seditions*.

It has been and still is a Question, Whether it be most advantageous for a *Monarch* to communicate this Power only by Commission to such Persons as He finds most capable of doing him Service, and that without any Promissory Obligation upon himself either to continue it to their Posterity, or to themselves longer then his Good Pleasure, Or whether it be best for Him to transmit it to their Posterity, and by that to constitute a *Nobility*. But I think it will not be hard to determine the Question in favour of a *Nobility* out of these Considerations.

First, That there is more Safety in a *Nobility* then in the other way of temporary Commissions, against a Forreign Enemy; Seeing it is the Interest of the whole *Nobility* to defend

to the utmost Extremity that *Monarch*, from whom They and their Posterity injoy a greater share of Power than They have Reason to expect from a Conquerour.

Secondly, That even against his own People the Security a *Monarch* gains by a *Nobility* is greater than He can have the other Way; For there being a radicated Power in a *Nobility*, the Impressions of Awe and Reverence upon the People are greater from them, than they can be from any temporary Commander.

Thirdly, It being so naturall to all Men to desire the Welfare of their Posterity, a *Nobility* has greater Interests to preserve the *Monarch* by whose Favour both They and their Children are possesst of a considerable Power, than They can have who wanting a Promise from the *Monarch* for the Continuation of this Power, may justly look upon themselves as Tenants at Will, And so may have a Concernment to endeavour by some Innovation in the *Government*, to ascertain this Power to themselves.

Yet this is not to be taken Absolutely and without Restriction; For seeing a *Nobility*, is subject to the same Passions with other Men, a *Monarch* is not to make Account that the Greatness of the Benefits They injoy by Him, should be enough to keep his *Nobility* within the Bounds of Duty: Nay farther, That Ambition which We have Defined to be a Desire of Power sufficient to defend one from the *Sovereign Power*, is chiefly incident to the *Nobility*, because They possessing Much, are most
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apt to think themselves a Prey considerable enough to tempt the *Sovereign's* Avarice. And therefore as a *Nobility* is a *Monarch's* Guard against the *People*, so a *Monarch* may stand in need of another Guard against the *Nobility*, to secure him against such Dangers as otherwise He might incur from their Ambition.

These Dangers are of two kinds; For either They proceed from some particular Persons of the *Nobility*, excelling the rest of their Order in Power or Dignity, Or they arise from the whole Body of the *Nobility*. If a *Monarch* has out of the Consideration of nearness of Blood, or his own Affections, or Greatness of Merit, conferred a large share of Power upon one Person or Familie, with leave to transmit it to their Posterity, this Power may easily become Matter of Danger, if not to Him, at least to his successors. Thus the Successors of *Charles the Great* in *Germanie*, and this *Hugh Capet* in *France*, by conferring upon some of the *Nobility* an Hereditary Power over Provinces large enough to raise and maintain an Army, broke those two great *Monarchies* into a Multitude of little Ones, though the latter of them has had the Fortune to recover, and be again consolidated into one great Empire. At first, no doubt, there were some such Duties reserved by the supreme *Monarch* as served to manifest the Dependance of these lesser Ones upon him, But they easily degenerating into Matters of meere Forme and Ceremony, and the *People* wanting Eyes to look beyond the next Object, These

Dependant *Monarchs* were by their Subjects soone considered as Absolute Ones, and thought to shine by their own Native Light though it were at first derived to them from the great Luminary of the *Sovereign Power*. Where the Error of former *Monarchs* has thus deformed the Naturall shape of Empire, and rendered Government a Monster with more Heads then One, It is it vaine for the Prince to expect Security, or for the Subjects to hope for Peace and Tranquillity: For if the exorbitant Power of these Great On s among the *Nobility* can not be retrench't, the State can have no Assurance of Safety but that casuall One which is obtained from the Content and Satisfaction of these Great Persons; And that is not like to continue longer then they are taken up with some considerable Imployment abroad, they being in this like tame Lions, whose Keepers are no longer out of Danger of being torne in Pieces, then they maintain them full gorged.

The Dangers that arise from the whole Body of the *Nobility*, are when the Nobility is possessed of a Right to Assemble themselves for the Electing a Successour to the *Monarchy*, or for making of War and Peace, or for nominating the great Ministers of State, or for performing any other Act which by the Nature of it is inseparable from the *Sovereign Power*. This Happens either when the *Monarch* did at first, out of Covetousness of Reining, accept of the Kingdom with a less share of Power then was necessary for attaining the Ends of Government, or has
since

since parted with this power out of an erroneous believe, That *Sovereignty* could subsist without it. And if in these Cases the Government has been *Seditious*, this can be no Argument against a *Soverign Monarch*, because those Cases suppose the Prince to want that power which was requisite to make him *Sovereign*. Though even in these Cases, there want not examples of some able Princes who by their Artifice in Ballancing the severall Factions of the *Nobility*, have for a long time preserved themselves and People in safety.

Where neither some few persons of the *Nobility* are possess'd of excessive power and Command, nor where the whole body of the *Nobility* has a Right to assemble for the ends before mentioned, It is not imaginable how a *Nobility* should be dangerous to a *Monarch*; For though the *Nobility* are not so great a multitude as the *People*, yet they are a multitude, and by Consequence exposed, in proportion to the same Difficulties and Dangers in carrying on a Designe for disturbing the *Government*; & the same remedies are applicable against them, which were by them made use of against the *People*.

These Remedies are in generall two; First that the *Monarch* have continually in pay a sufficient *Militia* to be alwaies ready to march for suppressing the first motions or tendency toward a *Sedition*; Secondly that seing every Country has some places of strength where a few may be secure against a great number, these Places be kept at the *Monarch's* Devotion
by

by a convenient proportion of Souldiers, for in this case the *Nobility* wanting places of Defence to secure themselves at the beginning of their Attempt, And knowing assuredly that they shall be exposed to the danger of being cut in pieces by the *Militia* entertained by the *Monarch*, They cannot be supposed so Irrational as out of vain and uncertain Hopes of greater power to incur the forfeit of that of which they are already posselt.

To assign the number of this Souldiery can never be done, not only because Different *Monarchies* stand in need of Different Proportions, but the same *Monarchy* may require Different proportions at different times; Only in general, it may pass for a necessary Maxime, That this *Militia* ought not to amount to a compleat full Army; For besides that the Expence would devonr any *Monarch*, The experience of the *Roman* and *Turkish* Emperours and all other *Princes* who have kept great Armies as a guard to their Persons and Empire, teach us that this is to walke upon precipices, There being no possibility of preventing such an Army (especially if they lye still without Employment) from acquiring an Interest distinct from that of the Prince. Therefore this *Militia* must be so instituted as that it can have no Interest besides the Pay it receives from the *Monarch*, nor any hopes of being safe in their own strength if they should withdraw themselves from the Service and Obedience due to him.

This

This is that mixture of a Monarchy by a Nobility, and a Monarchy by Armes in which consists the perfection of Monarchicall Government. Nor do I enter into despaire of living to enjoy my share of the Felicities which will belong to the Subjects of such a Government, though Mr Harrington be positive in asserting, *That the wit of man never found, nor shall find this Monarchy, there being no such thing in Nature.* *H. pag. 72.* And his Reason for this most Tyrannous Confidence, is only this *That there is nothing in Nature that hath not had a naturall effect by some example.* I believe Mr Harrington would not think himself sincerely dealt with, if he should be told, There is no such thing in nature as an equall Commonwealth, because there is nothing in Nature that hath not had a Naturall Effect by some Example; But the Commonwealth of Oceana is (by his own Confession) *Oceana. p. 23.* the first example of a Commonwealth that is perfectly equall. It is his own Argument for a Commonwealth, and therefore I doe not understand how he can prohibit me the use of the same Logique in Defence of Monarchy, *That it is the Government which if it have been seditious, it hath not been from any Imperfection in the kind, but for want of this mixture in the particular Constitution; which where ever the like hath happened must have wanted this mixture.* *ibid.*

He is willing to suppose that I understand France as an instance of this mixture; But that France cannot be an Instance of it is manifest by this, That the Princes of the Blood do there possess

possess such an excessive power, as I have declared inconsistent with this mixture, a consequence of which power have been all the considerable seditions of *France* in this last age. In many other things I allow that *France* is not far remote from this mixture, much of which also may be discovered in the *Castilian Monarchy*, in the administration of the Duke of *Florence's Government*, and the *Pope's Temporal Dominiun in Italy*. But it must be remembered, That to make good the possibility of this mixture, I am not obliged to produce the Example of a *Monarchy* that has continued free from *Seditions*, since I have endeavoured to prove that it is impossible any *Government* should be altogether free from them: It is abundantly enough if the Reigns of able *Monarchs* have not been troubled with *Seditions*, or only with such as have been immediately suppressed, For the art of apprehending and preserving this mixture is not attainable by any universal Rules or Frame of Policy, but is a personall Effect of the Capacity and Experience of every *Monarch*: And therefore to expect that a weak Prince can long continue to Govern securely by the maxims and Constitutions of a wise predecessor, is all one as to imagine that the Tools of some excellent Artificer falling into the Hands of an ignorant person should serve to make good worke.

And this seems to be the only considerable objection against us, That this mixture cannot be durable, because the Nobility in this case would

not keep down the People, but fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their scale, that together they might weigh down the Army; which is the infallible Consequence of this mixture. Where the Nobility has already got too great Head, and where the Prince by the unseasonable application of an Army goes about to reduce them, I deny not but this may perhaps be the Consequence; But then this Case supposes the Nobility possess'd of a power from which They will be excluded by this mixture; And as this mixture takes from them the power so does it the Interest also, it being impossible for the Nobility to League with the People, or fetch them up into their scale, without loosing some part of that power which by the Monarch they enjoy'd over the People. This Case of the Nobility and People uniting against the Monarch can never happen unless the Monarch is at once become through his own Vices and Cruelty universally odious, and through his Imprudence and Irresolution universally contemptible; And I doe with much readinesse confesse, That such Princes are not to look for security, it being not in the Design of God or Nature, or in the power of Art to make those men Happy who will not cooperate toward the attaining their own Happiness.

This Temper of a Monarchy is the High-water Marke beyond which no Government can rise; That all other Government must needs fall a great deal short of it I am in the last place to make Evident. And that a popular Govern-
ment

ment or Commonwealth must doe so is apparent by the last Chapter, where it has been proved That this kind of Government is necessarily exposed not only to Sedition but totall Dissolution. For a Government by a Sovereign Assembly or Aristocracy, As it is exposed to all the same Originall Causes of Sedition with a Monarchy, so it wants the Remedies which consist in Secrecie and Celerity, that are the peculiar Advantages of a single person's Administration: Besides, this Inconvenience belongs particularly to a Sovereign Assembly, that one or more persons of it carrying on a secret Design to change the Government may have Credit enough in the Assembly to corrupt their Consultations, and so make the Assembly an Instrument to their own subversion. Lastly for a Monarchy either by *Armes* or a Nobility taken singly, This Mixture of both curing the Infirmities of each must necessarily have the Advantage of them.

If Mr *Harrington* be of Opinion that I ought to have laid down a particular Modell of this kind of Government, I must in this also acknowledge the Difference of my Judgement from his; For though a Generall Discourse concerning Government may fairly become any Gentleman, the proposing (or imposing rather) a particular Modell seems to relish too much of a Design, and wants that Modestie and submission that ought to be in all Private Men.

CHAP. X.

Whether a Commonwealth that was not first broken by her selfe, were ever conquered by the Armes of any Monarch.

IN this Chapter Mr Harrington is forced to be of the Considerer's mind, though to keep up his Credit, He seems to be upon high Contradictions with Him. For He tells Us that He is not to be argued against out of the little Cities in Asia, which having no considerable Army, if they should be subdued by some potent Monarch, concerns the Government no more then if they had been overwhelmed by some Inundation or swallowed up by some Earthquake. This is perfectly conformable to the Considerers sence, who has declared that He thinks the Inference Fallacious which is made from the successe of Arms to the perfection of Government. But it concerned Mr Harrington to have thought of this sooner, it being now too late to Retreat with Honor, or to clog that Proposition with Restrictions which had before been so positively and universally laid down by him, That a Commonwealth was never conquered by any Monarch from the beginning of the world unto this Day. H. pag. 75.

Yet that the Considerer may have no Temptation to be proud, Mr Harrington lets Him see how he lies at Mercy, and how his project of a Monarchy (whensoever it shall be thought

fit

H. p. 74.

fit to use so killing an Argument) may be totally ruined by the Example of the *King of Tvetot*: I acknowledg the great importance of that Argument, and am willing to come to termes with him about it; And so long as he will consent to suppress this Example of *Tvetot* in exchange of the kindness I promise him not to draw any Argument for the Advantage of Monarchy, from the Antient and Illustrious Reign of *King Oberon*.

H. p. 75.

But the Considerer must not seem to be left in the possession of any truth, And therefore the first generall Answer will not serve Mr *Harringtons* turn, but he goes on to deny that there is any truth in the instances which I brought to prove that *Commonwealths* have been conquered by *Monarchs*. The first of those was taken from the *Commonwealths* of the *Grecians* planted on the Coasts of *Asia*, concerning which I am chalenged to shew that they came under the power of the *Lydian* and *Persian Monarchs* by Conquest, or otherwise then by the purchase of *Croesus* his mony. I am ashamed that Mr *Harrington* should thus go on to oblige me; He has taught a new way by Me neer thought on, for the dissolution of a *Commonwealth*; Let a People be united into a Republique, Let their City be fortified with Walls, let them have Armes in their Hands, Nay let the Ballance be fixt by an *Agrarian Law*; To what purpose serves all this? There comes one with a little ready Mony in his purse, and He for twenty yeares
Purchase

Purchase or thereabouts) buyes Lands, Balance, Lawes, Liberty and all; And as Larks are caught with Daring, this People being dazled with a little Gold, are of Free Men content to become slaves to a Monarch. This is so pretty, that I am sorry I can not leave it thus, but am obliged to examine what *Herodotus* has said in Reference to the way by which *Cræsus* obtained the *Asiatick* Cities. *Herod. lib. i.*
 This *Cræsus* was the first Barbarian We know of who forced some of the *Græcians* to become his Tributaries, and made others of them his Friends; The *Jonians*, *Aeolians*, and *Dorians* which inhabit *Asia*, He forced to pay him Tribute, and the *Lacedæmonians* he made His friends But before the Reign of *Cræsus* all the *Græcians* were Free. This for their Subjugation by the *Lydian* Monarch, concerning the *Persian* We will once more trie our Fortune with a Testimony out of *Thucydides*; As others by other *Thucyd. lib. i.*
 means were kept back from growing great, so *Pag. 10.*
 also the *Jonians* by this, That the *Persian* Affairs prospering, *Cyrus* and the *Persian* Kingdome, after the Defeat of *Cræsus*, made War upon all that lieth from the River *Halys* to the Sea side, and so subdued all the Cities which they possessed in the Continent; And *Darius* afterward, when he had overcome the *Phænissian* Fleet did the like to them in the Islands. Both which Testimonies are summed up by *Strabo*, where He tels Us, That the *Persians* were the first who obtained Dominion over the *Græcians*, For though the *Lydians* had Com- *Strabo. l. 15*
 mand

mand of them, it was not through all Asia, but only of a small part of it which lies within the River Halys, and that only for a small time during the Reigns of Cræsus and Alyattes. But they being overcome by the Persians, lost to them whatsoever Glorie they had gained. For the Persians as soon as they had subdued the Medes, presently made themselves Masters of the Lydians, and brought into Subjection the Gracians in Asia. Upon the Defeat of Cræsus the Asiatick Republicques had, it seems, recovered their Liberty so far, as to be in a Condition to dispute it with Cyrus, which is clearly implied by Herodotus, when having related the Successes of that War, He saies *It was the second time those Gracians were brought into Servitude.* And though during the prosperous Fortune of the European Gracians many Attempts were made to free the Asiatick Ones from that Yoake, They were finally necessitated to submit to it, being by an expresse Article of the Peace concluded between Artaxerxes and the Gracians (which from the Lacedæmonian Envoyè who negotiated it was called the Peace of Antalcidas) left under the Power of the Persian Kings. With Permission then I say it, *This Example does more then presume.* It concludes as firmly as can be done by Historicall Proofs; And what Mr Harrington has so confidently assumed, *That these Cities can not be shewn to have had the Command of any Considerable Army* will not serve to enervate it. Of the Jonians were eleven or twelve Cities, of the

*Xenoph. Gr.
Hist. lib. 5.*

H. pag. 74.

the *Aeolians* as many, of the *Dorians* five, with their Territories, all united by Leagues and Confederacies; Now by granting that these had no considerable Army (which lies under a great Suspicion of Falseness, for they had one good enough to venture the hazard of a Battle with *Harpagus* one of *Cyrus* his Lieutenant Generals) He grants the Vanity of his own Conceit That military Virtue should be the necessary Effect of Popular Government, Or that Commonwealths have meerly by Virtue of their Policy been preserved from being conquered by Monarchs.

In the Example of the *Sicilian* Republics which I next made use of, Mr *Harrington* saies *H. pag. 75.* there is not so much as a Presumption in my Favour; But either his skill or his Fidelity in point of Historie is so slender, that We can not rely upon his Word. The Condition of *Sicilie*, in the Age We dispute about was not unlike that of *Greece*, the Seacoasts being planted with severall Populous and Opulent Cities, which injoying their Liberty, made so many distinct Commonwealths subsisting by themselves, and joyned only by Leagues not durable, but transient and changing according to the Exigence of Affaires. The chief and most considerable of these was *Syracuse*, which knew so ill how to conserve her Liberty, that for the greatest Part she lived under the Power of Absolute Princes, Whom the *Popular Grecians*, then the only Masters of Appellations, taught the World to call *Tyrants*, though some of them

are known to have been Princes of excellent Virtue and Goodness. That these were intrusted by the *Syracusians* themselves, and so can not be accounted to have come to their Power by Conquest I have no need to deny. For Mr *Harrington* erres very much if He thinks these are the Examples I at first intended; I shall only insist upon such Acquisitions as have been made by these absolute Princes of *Syracuse* over the *Sicilian* Republicques, in respect of whom their Arms were Foreign, and their Successes pure Conquests. It being only a piece of Ostentation to heape together a multitude of Examples, I will neglect such as the Reigns of *Gelon* and the first *Hiero* do furnish, and fix only upon those of *Dionysius* the Elder. This Prince, 'tis true, did from meane beginnings clime up to a great Fortune, and at length juggled himself into the Throne; But yet his Government was signalised by many great Actions, against the *Carthaginians* especially who had newly begun to settle in *Sicilie*: But that in which We are concerned, is the Advantage he obtained over some of the *Sicilian* Commonwealths, three of which, *Naxus*, *Catana*, and the *Leontines*, He reduced in one Expedition, destroyed their Cities, and transplanted the People into other Places. A while after the *Tauromeni-ans*, abandoned by the *Carthaginians*, did not run a much gentler Fortune. From thence let Us follow him into the Southern part of *Italie*, (which, though in the stile of a later Age,

Diod. Sic.
lib. 14.

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Age, is *Sicilie* too) and there We may observe him Defeating in a very great Battle, the *Crotoniates* with the Confederate Forces of all the *Græcian* Republics in *Italie*, the Ruine of one of which called *Calydonia*, was the first consequence of his Victorie. The year after, *Rhegium* a Commonwealth so powerfull as to have a Fleet of threescore and ten Gallies at Sea, was after an obstinate Siege of eleven Months forced to surrender to Him; and those Inhabitants which survived the War and Famine, were put to their Ransome, or sold for Slaves. These are the Instances by which the *Sicilian Commonwealths* are truly asserted to have been conquered by the Arms of a Monarch.

To these many other Examples out of ancient Historie might easily be added, but that Mr *Harrington* is not in a Disposition to profit by them. The severall Republics conquer'd by *Darius* might be enumerated, The Cities of *Cyprus* and *Phœnicia* that were subdued by *Euagoras* might be inquired into; The Commonwealths in *Asia* (One of which that of the *Sambestans* brought an Army of sixty thousand Foot and six thousand Horse into the Field) that stoop't to *Alexander's* Victorious Sword might be insisted on; But they shall be all let pass, since it is not the Number but Evidence of Arguments by which Truth is established.

The two Modern Examples of *Genova* and *Florence* remain; Concerning the first of which Mr *Harrington's* Confession that She was subdued saves Me the Pains of proving the Matter

H. pag. 76.
and 77.

of Fact: What He has to object is but this, First That though she has been under, being yet standing she can not be said to be conquered, but remaineth as she was before Doria was born: And then That there is nothing plainer then that this Commonwealth was subdued by her own Sedition. But if a Commonwealth has been subdued by a Forreign Prince, has by her Magistrates sworn Fealty to Him, has received a Governour and Garrison, and has lived under this Power many yeares, (all which things concurred in the case of *Genova*) Shall she still be said not to have been conquered; Because by the Assistance and Protection of another Forreign Prince she afterward happened to recover her Liberty? We may as well maintain that because the *Israelites* were restored to their Country and law by the *Medes* and *Persians*, They can not be said to have been conquer'd by the *Assyrians*. Nor does *Genoa* remain as she did before *Doria* was born, as will be apparent to him that will take the Pains to examine the Histories of those times and Actions. Of doing which there is the more need because Mr *Harrington* (I will not give him one of his own Compliments, and say he does it, as is usual with him, falsely and fraudulently) has confounded the Distinct and different Conditions of this Republique before and after the Restauration of it by *Doria*. To the next Point, That this Commonwealth was subdued by her own Sedition, I have no more to say, but That this Reply is fitted for all Arguments, and would serve for

H. pag. 6.

a Million of Instances (if so many could be produced) as well as for this, there being no vanquish't State which has not in some Measure cooperated to it's own Ruine. In the mean while I know not whether I should laugh at or Pity my self, for being put to deale with a Man, who thinks his own and a Commonwealth's Credit secured by such Answers.

The History of the *Florentines* and Familie of *Medici* is not so sincerely deduced by Mr *Harrington*, that We should abstain from making some Remarques upon it. Though *Cosimo* and *Laurence of Medici* had, for a Commonwealth, obtained a very extraordinary Power at *Florence*, And though *Peter* had indiscreetly stretcht, it farther then the other two had done, yet was that Familie far from being absolute Masters of *Florence*, their Power being all this while *Sotto nome, & con dimostrationi quasi civili*; The *Signorie*, the Supream Magistracy of the Commonwealth continued still on foot, which upon the first Discredit that *Peter's* Affaires were fallen into at the approach of the French Army, had Authority enough to proclaim him *Rebell*, and drive him out of the City. *Peter de Medici* being thus banished, *Florence* returned to a Popular Government, which had faire leisure to settle it self, meeting with no disturbance from the *Medici* except one little Conspiracy not well managed, whose Detection served only to confirm the Government by the Execution and Exile of *Peter's* best friends. But in the yeare 1512, and 18 yeares

Guicciard.
lib.1.

H. pag. 77.

Jovius.

after the expulsion of the *Medici*, yet before *Leo* was Pope or *Charles* Emperour, (for *Leo* was not made Pope till after the first Restoration of his Family to *Florence*, and was dead before the second, So that He could not be, as Mr *Harrington* has represented him Author of either) the *Medici* were restored to *Florence* by the Arms of the King of *Aragon* under the Conduct of the Viceroy of *Naples*: For it being perceived that there was no Possibility of withdrawing the *Florentines* from the Friendship of the *French* unless by altering the Government, the Viceroy suddenly fell with his Army into *Tuscany*, and having by the storming of *Prato*, made the *Florentines* despair of being able to defend themselves, the City came to an Accommodation with him; And He to secure his Master of their Affections for the Future, restored the *Medici* to the Power their Familie injoyed before the year 1494, yet still with an Appearance of a Commonwealth, a Counsell of about 50 Persons (some Authors make them more) being constituted in whom should reside the Power of the whole People. The succeeding Reigns of Pope *Leo* the tenth, and *Clement* the seventh, both of the Familie of *Medici*, conduced not a little to the Confirmation of their Power in *Florence*; Yet all was blown up againe in the year 1527, When the *Florentines* animated by the Sacking of *Rome* and Pope *Clement's* Imprisonment, revolted

revolted from the *Medici* and reestablished their *Commonwealth* which continued in being untill the Mysterious and unexpected Reconciliation of the Pope and Emperour; In consequence of which the Emperour having by a difficult War, brought the *Florentines* to submit upon Discretion gave the Command of the City to *Alexander de Medicis*, and his Heires for ever. It is now 127 years that they have continued in possession of this power, And if Mr *Harrington's* thoughts had not been wholly taken up on the other side the *Apennine* at *Venice*, he could not but have observed, That as the Authority of the Prince is scarce any where more absolute, so the Peace and Prosperity of the People is nowhere greater.

What does he mean then to tell us, That the purse of *Cosimo* had done that long before H. p. 75. which is here attributed to the *Armes* of the Pope and Emperour? To state the matter with the greatest advantage to him, We will imagine that those summes which *Machiavel* saies the Considerable Men of *Florence* had received from *Cosimo*, were still unpaid and might be demanded by his Heires; But this would have made it the Interest of all those particular Men to maintain the *Commonwealth*, and keep out the *Medici*, because by that Course they would also have avoided the payment of their own Debts: And in Effect, When after the Death of

Machiav.?
Hist. lib. 7.

no 155 411
no 155 411

Hist. lib. 8.

Guicc. lib. 2.

of *Cosimo*, his son *Peter* did by the advice of *Diegisalvi Neroni* call in those summes his Father had freely lent, It excited such a Tempest in *Florence* as came within a little of sinking him and his whole Familie. The mony that was borrowed of *Cosimo* having been thus repaid to his son *Peter* it must needs be impertinent to attribute to the purse of *Cosimo* such good Fortune as befell his Posterity fifty yeares after his Death; before which time the Riches he left behind him were so much dissipated, that *Machiavell* assures us, the Commonwealth was faine to assist his Grandchild *Lawrence* of *Medici* with a great summe of Mony. I doe not see how it can be avoided, but we must believe the Purse of *Cosimo* had besides the mony, an old Charme in it, which made the *Florentines* let fall their Armes, and suffer the *Medici* to reassume the Government: Without doubt there is somewhat of Witchcraft in it, For if the Purse had wrought it by any naturall virtue, It had been much more easy to have kept the *Medici* in their possession, then to restore them when they were fallen from it.

But is it not still more strange that *Florence* should not deserve the name of a Commonwealth? Had she not her private Councels debating, her Great Councell resolving, and her Magistrates Executing? Was not the Rotation too provided for by the Annual Election of her *Gonfalonere*? All these things which sound so big in *Westminster Hall*, in *Florence* are not to be counted such Orders as deserve the name of a

Com-

Commonwealth. Truly it is not generously done of Mr Harrington thus to adde to the Afflictions of a poore unfortunate Lady Republique. But to what purpose do we dispute any longer? If *Genova* be shewn to have been conquered by a Monarch, We are told *She was subdued by her own Seditious*; If *Florence* has run the same Fortune, *she had never attained such Orders as deserve the name of a Commonwealth.* What pity is it that a worthy Patriot should be forced to take Sanctuary in a Mousehole? In this posture I confesse I know not how to come at him, but must leave him as a fit imploiment for the formidable Rat-catcher of his own Erection.

H. in Epist.

After so liberall a taste of Mr Harrington's ingenuity in reference to these examples both Ancient and Modern, I am never to be perswaded He meanes Good Faith when he calls for Reason and Experience to decide the Question about the Fate of Empires. In Humane Actions the Dependance of Effects upon their Causes is so obscure, That the wisest Historians doe but make conjectures when they indeavour to penetrate into them; Nor can any Discourse of that Nature be so convincing from which so great a Master of Cavils as Mr Harrington may not find an Evasion. Yet if I were to convince any Rationall uninterested Person, That the Fate of Empires has not born a proportion to the Perfection of their Government, I need onely put him in mind that the Chinese and Persians did for perfection of Government very far excell the rude Tartarians, by whom they have been

H. p. 77.

108. q. 11

been more then once conquered ; That the Greek Emperours had a better Policy then the wild Arabians, to whom they lost so great a part of their Dominions ; That the very Roman Empire can not be thought to have been at such a decay of Policy and Government, but that it was still at a better passe then the Barbarous Nations by whom it was rent in pieces ; For by that time it was pretty well cured of its worst Maladie, the Insolence of the Souldiers, who were grown less dangerous after the Empire came to be in a manner Hereditary.

ibid.

But He proceeds to tell us, *That the Armes of Israel were alwaies victorious till the death of Josua, whereupon the Orders of that Commonwealth being neglected, they came afterwards to be seldome prosperous. Had it not first been fit (seing the state under Josua, Be it what it will from the first to the last was but of ten yeares) He should have torn the History of David's forty yeares succesfull Reign out of his Bible ? The Arms of Rome during the popular Government were at such a pitch as if Victorie had known no other Wings but those of her Eagles. How then came it about that Augustus and Trajan brought the Parthians to Reason, who had destroyed Crassus and the Commonwealth's Army ? Alexander with an handfull of freer men overcame the hugest Armie, the most vast and populous Empire in the world. But with what did he overcome the Thebans who were freer men than his ? Or why was He not overcome by those sever-*

H. p. 80.

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all thousands of freer Grecians who under Memon the Rhodian & Charedemus served Darius? I wonder that a man should take such pains to be ridiculous, and should not rather apprehend this easie distinction, That though success belongs to valour and Military discipline, Valour and Military Discipline belong not to one forme of Government or Policy, but are attainable in any,

What he observes out of Sr Francis Bacon about the *French* and *English*, comes to little more then this, that the one affecting to fight on horseback and the other on foot, the *French* have had a good Cavalry, and the *English*, a good Infantry; Though that too be now almost out of Date, for at present the *English* fight well enough on horseback and in *French* on foot. The successes of the *English* in *France* were never durable enough to have any thing of this Nature inferred from them; And we may observe they always followed the Person of the Prince: With us *Edward* the third, and *Henry* the fifth wise & valiant Princes gaining, *Richard* the second and *Henry* the sixth weak Princes loosing; With them *John* and *Charles* the sixth Men of no Ability loosing, *Charles* the fifth and *Charles* the seventh Brave Princes recovering. Nor does Mr Harrington now stand in need of being taught that during the Wars between the *English* and *French*, *France* was scarce half what she is now, We then alwaies finding a Duke of *Britain* or *Burgundy* to take our part.

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H. p. 97.

In one point Mr Harrington has dealt very discreetly, when putting off the Robe of Legislator, He takes to him the Mantle of Prophet, and with as little remorse as an Almanack-maker when he plays the interpreter to a Comete, predicts what shall befall Europe. For this not belonging to the present Age, will not be to be confuted but by our Great-Grandchildren. Yet I am not aware of any Reason he can have to enter into so Tragicall an Humour for if he be offended that the Wars of Europe are of no more Dispatch, *Parus's* Discourses would have furnisht him with severall Reasons for it, of which this is one, That Europe being parcelled out into severall States, all Armed and watchfull over their own and their Neighbour's Interest, the growth of any one State is presently ballanced by a League of some of the other; At which worke the Ministers of State are every where become so expert, that to keep Europe equally poised, is little more with them then to trim a London Wherry. If I were disposed to take my turne of Prediction, I might let Mr Harrington know that when by the Accession of some Marriage, or any great unthought of Revolution, the Houses of France and Austria cease to be a drawn Match, then will he see those great changes in Europe, which before it will be but in vain to expect. In the meane while he ought not to impute this to any Defect of Policy either in Germanie or Europe, more then of old in Greece, when being Can-

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ton'd into a multitude of Republicques she did from the Peloponesiac War to the Reign of *Alexander* fight so long time to so little Purpose.

For *Ragusa* and *San Marino*, Mr *Harrington* takes them by the wrong handle; They were not by Me made use of to shew that a *Commonwealth* has been conquer'd by the Arms of a *Monarch*, but only to prove that the Success of *Arms* has no necessary Dependance upon Perfection of *Government*, Seeing these *Commonwealths* have a good *Government*, yet never were successfull in Arms. Which part of the Argument is by Mr *Harrington* left untouch'd and in full Force.

There has been enough said to evince the Falsehood of Mr *Harrington's* first Assertion, That a *Commonwealth* was never Conquer'd by any *Monarch* from the beginning of the World to this Day; In discussing which, Occasion has been also given to manifest the Vanity of another of his Conceptions; That the Success of *Arms* depends upon the Perfection of the *Government* or Policy. His second Assertion was, That a *Commonwealth* was the *Government*, which hath frequently led mighty *Monarchs* in Triumph. This the Considerer replied was to run upon the Foile, it being only the Conversion of the First: Upon this Mr *Harrington* Triumphs too as well as his *Commonwealth*, and would have it thought that the Considerer took this for a Logically Conversion of the Terms. But where did the Considerer reveale this to Him? If

H. pag. 80.

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Mr Harrington had not been at such Enmity with *Mathematiques* and *Mathematicians*; He might have learn't there is a Conversion of Proportion, or of the Consequence of things; And that this is not such an one. He will never be able to shew till he has made new Lawes of Ratiocination as well as of Government.

If any Man should chance to wonder how Mr Harrington's last Paragraph comes to belong to this Chapter, He is to be advertised that the Coherence is both Elegant and Naturall, And consists in this, *Burning the fingers*, and *Blistring the tongue*, Blistring, You know, uses to follow Burning. This Blister forsooth, is raised upon the Considerers tongue for having intitled Mr Harrington to this Assertion, *That the Senate of Venice at the first institution took in the whole People*, Whereas he affirmed it not of the *Senate but Commonwealth of Venice*. But in doing this I wronged my selfe more then Mr Harrington, it being neither my intention nor concernment to disprove that Assertion to be true of the Senate, but of the *Grand Counsell* in which consists the *Commonwealth*. Now that *the Grand Counsell or Commonwealth did not, even at the first institution, take in the whole People of Venice*, will appeare to be more then Perhaps. *Gianotti* does by very many and those concluding Arguments make it out, That the first Institution of the *Grand Counsell* was in the Reign of *Sebastian Ciani*, which began Anno 1175, And the bringing of it to Perfection in *Gradenigo's* time who entred upon the Government

H. p. 81.

ernment Anno 1297. This Councell never consisted of more then 4500 Persons, And that these should be the whole People is repugnant to all Histories of the Increase and Power of the Commonwealth at that time. *Giannotti* also saies plainly, That it took in only such of the People as were considerable for Estate and Quality. Nor is it materiall that *Machiavel* whom Mr *Harrington* followes is of the contrary opinion, for his Discourse carries its own Refutation along with it, in as much as He supposes the *Grand Councell* or distinction of *Gentlemen* and *People* to have been made at the very Institution of the Commonwealth, whereas *Giannotti* has proved it to be of a later Originall by many hundred yeares. A great part of the *People* being then excluded from the Government, which in respect of them was unequal, The inquiry was how these were kept in Obedience, of which an account was given out of *Contarini*. This account Mr *Harrington* cannot accuse of any thing but an improper speech (for the intention plainly looks another way) whilst I attributed that to the *Senate* which belongs to the whole *Commonwealth*; For which also He saves Me the paines of making any Apologie, since He confesses it to be a way of Locution made use of by very good Authors.

*Mach. Disc.
lib. 1. cap. 6.*

CHAP. XI.

Whether there be an Agrarian, or some Law, or Lawes of that Nature to supply the Defect of it in every Commonwealth :: And whether the Agrarian as it is stated in Oceana, be equall and satisfactory to all Interests.

BECAUSE it concerned Mr Harrington to shew his utmost Activity in this Chapter; That the Reader might take the less notice of the Sights and Tricks that were to be put upon him, he first of all confounds the state of the Question, by complicating severall distinct Particulars; These I have untwisted & they resolve themselves into three Questions; Of the *Agrarian* in every Commonwealth, Of the Lawes supplying the Defect of it, Of the *Agrarian* as it is stated in *Oceana*. To each of which separately.

I do not intend to be so far carryed out of the way by keeping Mr Harrington Company, as in this place once more to repeat the Doctrine of the *Ballance*; It will be enough to reflect how in that Chapter it has been proved, First That Riches do put in part, & that dependantly upon the *Sovereign Power* wch constitutes Propriety, conduce to Empire; And secondly, That so far as Riches doe conduce to Empire, it is to be understood indifferently of all sorts of Riches and not to be restrained to Propriety
or

or the *Ballance* in Land unless in such places where there is no considerable Wealth but what arises immediately from the Revenue or Cultivation of Land. This I might justly plead as a Privilege to exempt Me from handling this Chapter, seeing Mr *Harrington's* Propositions about an *Agrarian* are no otherwise Materiall, then upon a supposition that his Doctrine of the *Ballance* remains firme and unconfuted.

Yet not to refuse any leap Mr *Harrington* sets Me, I will in the first place examine *Aristotle's* opinion of the *Ballance*, whom Mr *Harrington* does here pretend to bring to his side by helping the Translation a little. And that the Gentleman has indeed been a Translator of Poets is not unknown, but that he should in translating a Philosopher in Prose use a Liberty more then Poeticall seems not very allowable. He will have the words *ἀρετή*, and *δυναμις πολιτική* rendred by the Words *Politicall Ballance*, understood as He has stated the thing. Let him then produce one Interpreter of *Aristotle* or one Lexicographer who is of his mind, and I will yeild my share in the Question; Nay let him shew how it is possible this should be *Aristotle's* meaning, when He has directly condemned, not without Derision, *Phalens* the Chalcædonian for having introduced the *Ballance* and *Agrarian* into his Commonwealth. If He can do neither of these, He must give Me leave to tell Him, that He offers an Intollerable violence to the Text and Sence of *Aristotle*. This he does

H.p. 85

Arist. Polit.
lib. 2. c. 7.

as often as he cites *Aristotle* in this Chapter, but let one Instance serve for all. *Inequality* is the source of all sedition, as when the Riches of one or a few come to cause such overballance as draws the Commonwealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy; For preventing of which the *Ostracism* hath been of use in divers Places as at *Argos* and *Athens*, The words of *Aristotle* run thus; δι' ὑπερχλίω (the Verb *εασιδίζεσι* or the like must be understood) ὅταν τις ἢ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων, ἢ εἶς, ἢ πλείους, ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δυνάμιν τῆ πολιτείας. γίνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία. διὸ ἐνίαχ' ἐβόησεν ὀστρακίζειν, ὅσον ἐν Ἀργεὶ καὶ Ἀθῶναι. Here he renders τῇ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ κατὰ τὴν δυνάμιν τῆ πολιτείας, by *Riches that came to cause an Overballance*, though nothing can be more manifest then that *Aristotle* in this place is not to be understood of Riches only but of Interest, Reputation, Command, and all other things which may any way contribute to supreme Power. This will be put past all Contradiction if we observe that *Aristotle* in this place speaking of a Disease in a Commonwealth, gives an account also of the Cure, For by the Method of the Cure the Disease may be certainly known: And for this excessse of power, this δύναμις that was greater then suited with the δύναμις of the Commonwealth, We are told that at *Athens* the *Ostracism* was prescribed. Now the *Ostracism* both by the Institution and Practise of it is known not to have been levelled at the Riches of men only, but at any extraordinary

extraordinary Power, Credit, or Interest they had acquired in the Commonwealth; *Aristides* was banished by the *Ostracism* for having rendered himselfe Popular by his equity in arbitrating Law sutes, And when he dyed He was so poore that the City was faine to be at the Charges of his Funerall, and to give his Daughters Portions. Again, How could the *Ostracism* be a preservative against the Overballance in Riches, when notwithstanding the *Ostracism* a man retained the possession of his whole Estate? It is therefore evident to be against all Reason that Mr *Harrington* should render the words *δύναμις πολιτική* by the words *Politickall Ballance*, understood as He has stated the thing; And his own *Dilemma* recoiles upon him, For He will not have the more of Authority in this point of the *Ballance*, since *Aristotle* knew of it only to disapprove it, Nor yet the less of Competition in it, because it was so long since stumbled upon by *Phaleas* the *Chalcedonian*.

H. p. 89

Having thus traduced *Aristotle*, in the next place he does as much for the Considerer, whom he accuses for throwing onely at *Israel* *Lacedemon* and *Oceana*, when he had set him all the Commonwealths in the World. But is it faire play to say He set Me that which while now He kept in his sleeve? Are there in *Oceana* any examples of Commonwealths proposed that are pretended to be equall in their *Agrarian*, except *Israel* and *Lacedemon*? Is it not expressly said by him that *Athens* and *Rome*

ibid.

Ocena. p.26.

Rome were unequall as to their *Agrarian*, that of Athens being infirm, that of Rome none at all? For those new examples of *Venice*, *Germanie*, &c. which Mr *Harrington* does at present pretend to set Me, I may with great Reason refuse to throw at them, as being false mony; Not one of them amounting to an example of an *Agrarian*, but at most of such Lawes as have been instituted to supply the Defect of one.

I pass on then to make good what has in the Considerations been objected against the *Agrarian* of *Israel* taken in Mr *Harrington's* sence; And that is reducible to these Heads.

1. That the Division of the Land of *Canaan* was not a Politique Institution intended as the Basis of the Government, but was an Effect of Gods Promise to *Abraham*, that He would give that Land to his seed after him;
2. That this is manifested by the Law of the *Jubile*, which otherwise had been a weak provision, neare fifty yeares time being by that afforded for any man to multiply his Lot to that Height as would necessarily have subverted the Government;
3. That the Government of *Israel* had subsisted forty five yeares without the pretended *Agrarian*;
4. And finally, That in the Division the Lots must needs have been very unequall, it being else impossible there should on the one side have been hereditary Princes of the Tribes, and on the other side men so extreamly poore as to sell themselves for slaves.

The first of these propositions he playes with
very

very wantonly, and asks, *If the Right of an Oceaner unto his Land must derive from the Promise of God unto Abraham?* Now to aske him again, Who saies so? Is no toying, but very good earnest. And Mr Harrington, if he had intended to deale fairely, might perceive He was bound to shew, That the like division of the Lands in *Oceana* is necessary notwithstanding there be no such cause, as was the promise of God unto *Abraham* upon which the Division of *Canaan* inseperably depended. But he continues his gay Humour, and (as Tumblers divert the Company with an *Hoope*) frisks about this Circle, He proposes the Division of the Lands in *Israel* as an equall *Agrarian* on which their *Popular Government* was founded; He is told by Me, That this division of the Land look't not at the Government, but followed the promise of God unto *Abraham*, And that there is not any Footstep of the other Design in the whole Bible. He replies, *That God in ordaining the Ballance of Israel having ordained the Cause, ordained also the Effect which was Popular Government.* Thus supposing at all adventures that Government to be Popular, he will have the *Agrarian* (that he Fancies) to be the Cause & Foundation of it, And at the next step to shew that this *Agrarian* is the Cause. He supposes *Popular Government* to be the Effect. What can any Reasonable man desire more of a new Beginner? But he must pardon Me, I am still upon the same Ground, He must by some express place of Scripture (for that place *Num. 26. 53.* going no farther then

Tribes

H.p.87. ?

Gceanap. 26.

Tribes or at most then Families fals short of doing it as I have shewed Confid. pag. 57.) prove, That the division of the Lands by Lot was intended for the foundation of the Government, Or He must not think by such weak and precary Diductions from his own Notion of a *Ballance* to perswade us that God had any such Design in it.

What he answers about the *Jubile* is meere Cavilling; For it belongs not to Me to shew how in fifty yeares one Lot might be so increased as to subvert the *Government*, but to him to shew that the possibility of this was prevented by the *Agrarian* Law contained in the *Jubile*.

H. P. 86.

Yet a man may without giving occasion to be accused of boasting, own *Mathematiques* enough to demonstrate how if not one, yet a few men (which as to the present subject creates no Difference) might come to be owners of the whole Land of *Canaan* in the time between two *Jubiles*. For the *Israelites* being no where forbid Merchandise, let it be supposed that some few of them addicted themselves to Traffique, and by the success of it annually improved their estates twenty in the hundred, which among Merchants is not reputed an immoderate gain. The increase of 20 per *Cent.* in 50 yeares which is the distance of two *Jubiles*, multiplies an estate 7676 times, as will be manifest if in a Geometrical Progression of 50 Terms, according to the proportion of 100 to 120, or 5 to 6 the last Terme be found out. Now the whole Number of Lots in the Land of *Canaan* was

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600000, which being divided by 7676 gives Us 78 for the Number of Men who might in the time between two *Jubiles* acquire the Propriety of the whole Land. But it is enough to *H. p. 12.* possess three Parts in foure to cause an overballance, Wherefore Sixty Men might notwithstanding the *Jubile* come to overballance the rest of *Israel* and by that overthrow the *Popular Government*; By which it appears that the *Jubile* could not be intended for an *Agrarian Law*, to lie at the Foundation of the *Government*.

Nor is his Exception against the Argument drawn from that space of 45 yeares during which the *Government* of *Israel* subsisted without this pretended *Agrarian*, fraught with any honefter meaning: It is not to be doubted, that the *Israelites* received many Lawes in the Wilderness that were not to be put in Execution, till after their Settlement in the Land of *Canaan*, Of which that was one, *Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy Gates*. But *H. p. 88.* He has taught Us to put a Difference between the *Foundation* and the *Superstructures*: Therefore though the *Government* of *Israel* subsisted well enough in the Wilderness without an Order that depended totally upon their locall Distribution in the Land of *Canaan*, This is no Argument that it might do so without an Order which is represented as Necessary and Fundamentall to the *Government*. Before they had Gates, They neither could have nor needed Judges in them, but that does not make the Wonder cease how their *Government* could subsist 45 yeares

Ocean. p. 16.

yeares without an *Agrarian*, if that must be reputed the Basis of their Commonwealth. And whereas Mr *Harrington* saies, The *Israelites* under *Moses* were an Army, What is that to purpose unless this Army must be thought to have been governed by Him by Martial Law? Which can never be affirmed by Mr *Harrington*, who has made their Government beare Date, and exemplified in some of the most important Orders of it, so many yeares before.

H. pag. 90.

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But all the Considerer's Faults have been hitherto but *Peccadillos*, He is now accused of no less then *taking part with the Divell*, and that for having said He was not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the *Israelish* more then any other Republique. If any Man will take the Pains to look upon that Passage of the Considerations pag. 39. He will find two Advantages of Authority expressly there set down by Me, which the *Jewish* had above all other Commonwealths; If there be any more, Mr *Harrington* would have done Honestly to inform Us; But not having been able to do that, and yet to charge Me with the quite contrary of what I asserted, will leave it out of Dispute which of Us *takes part with the Divell*, who We know, *was a Lier from the Beginning*.

For as to his Distinction of the Power and Authority of a Commonwealth, it is in it self Insignificant, and as to this Place and Purpose, Impertinent; The whole Authority of the *Jewish* Republique is included in those two Points

by

by Me explained in the Considerations. And what if the *Romans* being resolved to erect a Popular Government, to save themselves the pains of contriving, were content to borrow their *Twelve Tables* of the *Athenians*? Must We therefore be enforced to have recourse to the *Jewes*, though We neither have Need of nor Roome for any of their Particular Constitutions? This may give just cause to suspect his Design is to introduce the *Judaicall Law*, And that there is nothing to choose between *James Harrington* Legislator, and *William Medley* Scribe. Concerning the *Jewish Agrarian* then, it is enough that Mr *Harrington's* Replies to the Considerer's Objections are thus manifested to be unsatisfactory.

All that is alledged in Opposition to the Considerer's Apprehensions of the *Lacedæmonian Agrarian* is so Insignificant, that I can have Nothing to reply; For of Nothing is produced Nothing. I will therefore make use of this Leisure Mr *Harrington* affords Me, to make out a little more fully, from the Historie of *Lacedæmon* my former Assertions about the *Agrarian* of that Republique.

Lycurgus when he had begun to new Modell the Commonwealth, finding the greater part of the People to be desperately Poore, and some few very Rich, out of a Design to banish on the one side Envy and Insidiation, on the other Insolence and Luxury, and together with these, Riches and Poverty, the Mother Diseases of a Commonwealth, He perswaded them to come

to

*ibid.**Plut. in
Solon.**Plut. in
Lyc.*

to a New and equall Division of Lands; And that for the future they should live upon equall Terms with one another, not aiming at Priority in any thing but Merit, and reputing there ought to be no difference between Man and Man, but what arises from the Praise of Virtue and Reproach of Vice. After He had accomplish't this, They say that passing through the Countrey in Harvest, and seeing the Shocks of Corne all of a size, He smiled and said the Countrey look't as if it belonged to Brothers who had newly parted their Inheritance. In setting out these Lots He seems to have look't only at fitting the People, by a bare and necessitous Life, for the Trade of War; without that He might have made their Lots as large againe, having Territory enough (*χώραν πολλοῖς πολλὰν, δις τοσοῖς δὲ πλείονα*) for twice as many People, the surpluse of which, perhaps, lay wast, or was enjoyed by their Slaves. Nor was it lawfull for any *Spartan* to improve this Lot to the best, by living upon it, for they were strictly prohibited all Occupations, even that of Agriculture, and their Hinds or *Helots* paid them only an Annuall Quantity of Corne, Wine and other Fruits. This Institution had served to little purpose, if it had been free for the *Lacedæmonians* to possess what Personall Estates they thought fit, and therefore *Lycurgus* (having failed in attempting a like Division in Moveables) first forbid the Use of Gold and Silver, and then by the extream debasing of their other Coine, cut off all possibility of Traffique with

with their Neighbours; So that No Man of any Art or Trade tending to Elegancy, Vanity, or Luxurie could have any hopes of gaining a Livelyhood at *Sparta*: And withall such Offences as are every where committed out of Desire of mony, did of themselves soon cease, Mony it self being become of so little worth. In all other Points also the Institution of the *Lacedæmonians* was very severe, and serving meerly to accustom them during Peace to the Incommodities of War. Therefore the Raillery of that *Italian* was sharp enough, who said *Plut. in the Lacedæmonians* did no great matter in being so daring in the Wars, if it were only to free themselves of a laborious and miserable Life. *Pelop.*

Though these things had been with so much Care provided for by *Lycurgus*, his Lawes were exposed to the same Fate with those of all other Legislators, and wanted a Power to make themselves be observed. It was very early, in *Cræsus* time, that the *Lacedæmonians* began to cast amorous Glances upon Gold, for being corrupted by him, they connived at the Slavery he brought upon the *Græcian* Republics in *Asia*. Their *Agrarian* also, so far was it from being the Immoveable Basis of the Commonwealth, was soon confounded as well as those of the *Argives* and *Messenians*, and that, as *Aristotle* intimates, by the defect of *Lycurgus* his own Lawes; For though *Polit. lib. 2. cap. 9.* he forbid Men to alienate their Lots by sale, He left it free for them to give and

*Arist. Polit.
lib. 5. c. 7.*

and bequeath what they thought fit. So that during the *Messenian* War, a sedition was raised of them who demanded a new Division of the Lands. I know that is generally held these innovations were of a much later Date, & *Plutarch* names *Epitadeus* one of the *Ephores* as author of them, But the obligation is Mr *Harrington's* not mine, to reconcile these Authors. However it is manifest, that this Breach in their Laws was soon taken, for they preserved themselves in the Integrity of their Manners and Institution, till after the taking of *Athens* by *Lysander*. But the Booty gained in that War being very great, *Lysander* prevailed, that the Gold and Silver might be brought to *Sparta* for the erecting a Publique Treasury, without which it would be impossible to carry on the Design of making themselves the Captaines and Leaders of all *Greece*. This was with some reluctancy consented to, yet not without this previous Caution, That the mony should serve only for Publique Uses, and that it should be Death for any private man to have Gold or Silver in his house, which Law was put in Execution upon the person of *Thorax*, But it was in vaine to forbid that in Private, which was allowed in Publique; For with the possession of mony immediately entered Covetousness, & after that an inclination to Ease and Luxurie which presently overthrew the sober and masculine temper of their Commonwealth. Instead of that Probity toward their Friends and Neighbours which accom-

Plut. in Agid.

*Plut. in
Lysand.*

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panied their Poverty, now Pride, Insolence and Avarice took Place. So that becoming weak & Effeminate at home, & Odious abroad, their Commonwealth soon fell from all its Virtue and Glory. And this shewed the Providence of *Lycurgus* who knowing that the equality of their scant Lots was not a sufficient Bar to the mischiefs produced by Riches, had at the beginning condemned the use of Gold and Silver; for these miseries befell the State a good while before they grew so expert at breaking of Lawes as to violate their *Agrarian*. At length that went after the Rest, and the Commonwealth being totally abandoned to Luxurie and Corruption (having first made a weak attempt or two to revert to her ancient Discipline) came to utter Ruine.

Thus have I given you a Crayon of the Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon* in reference to her *Agrarian*; Which appeares to have been instituted by *Lycurgus*: only as a necessary Provision for attaining that Poverty and Virility, which he intended to incorporate with his Commonwealth. Against this Mr *Harrington* will scarce have any more to object, then he has done already, which is in effect, just Nothing. He brings indeed *Aristotle* and *Plutarch* to a false Muster, but *Aristotle* has been already rescued from his Abuses, and the Place of *Plutarch* is the same (excepting only his want of sincerity in citing it) with that I first produced in this Discourse.

I am now delivered from this first Question of

of the *Agrarian*, and, according to the Method I propos'd, the second Question which belongs to Such Lawes as supply the Defect of an *Agrarian* in severall Commonwealth's, comes to be discuss'd; In doing which I shall not have occasion to spend much Time.

H. pag. 86.

The first Instance Mr *Harrington* gives, is of the *Ostracism* which suppli'd the Defect in the *Græcian Cities* of an *Agrarian*. That the *Ostracism* was not inflict'd upon Men for their excessive Riches, so much as for diminishing the Power and Credit which by their Virtue and Great Actions They had attained to in the Commonwealth, I have already made appear; And by Consequence Mr *Harrington's* Fancie that it suppli'd the Defect of an *Agrarian* taken in his Sense must needs be without Ground. To which it will only be needfull to adde, that when the *Athenians* thought of putting *Nicias* to the *Ostracism*, (then the Richest Subject of *Greece*, and most obnoxious to a Law that studi'd to prevent excess of Wealth) their Motives were, His reserved, stately, and unpopular Manner of Life, together with his Firmness in adhering to the Publique Good, and opposing the rash Desires of the People: And though his Riches also are mentioned by *Plutarch* among the rest, yet so as that they were the Object of their Envy rather than their Fear. I wonder why Mr *Harrington*, who goes off Fift after every Flie, did not mention the *Petalism* of *Syracuse* as well as the *Ostracism* of *Athens* in imitation of which it was invent'd:

But

But it is to be presumed he abstained from it because of the Success, which discovered how pernicious this Device was to the Publique. For upon the Institution of this Law, the *Syracusans* of better Quality (a People, it seems, not of so unquiet and enterprizing a Temper as the *Athenians*) who by their Wisdom and Experience were capacitated to have served the Commonwealth, retired themselves from all Publique Affaires, thereby to avoid the danger of Banishment. And so the Care of the Publique being abandoned to the most indigent and Impudent Persons, who took care of nothing but how to flatter the People in their Orations, the Commonwealth was plunged into so many Disorders and Seditions, that there was no hopes of her Recovery, unless by repealing the *Petalism*, to invite Men of worth to resume the Conduct of Affaires.

Diod. Sic.
lib. 11.

For what concerns the *Agrarian* of Rome, Mr *Harrington* has long since said it was none at all, and in effect saies now the same; For if They did but strive for it, it is evident they never obtained it..

Ocean. p. 26.

That at *Venice* the Officers of the *Pomp* should supply the Defect of an *Agrarian*, will scarce be believed by him, who knows how slightly the Accurate *Giannotti* passes over the Description of that Office. I think also it will not be easy to comprehend how a Law that preserves the Nobility from laying themselves out upon vain and Gawdy Apparencies should tend to the limiting

H. pag. 86. miting their Estates. But, he saies, a *Venetian* that should keep a Table or have his house furnisht with Retainers would be obnoxious. Does any *Italian* affect that expensive way of Popularity? Or how should a *Noble Venetian* need to do it, when he may notwithstanding entertain in Pension eight or ten *Bravos*?

Follow him to the *German Republicques*, and You will find they have no more to supply the Defect of this Law, then that Estates descending are divided among the Children: And grant this in *Oceana*, and You grant the whole *Agrarian*. By these *Republicques* sure We are not to understand *Nuremberg*, *Strasburg*, &c. but the Princely houses of *Austria*, *Saxonie*, the *Rhine*, &c. all which maintain this Custome: But these are all *Monarchies* by a *Nobility*, or at least Members of that Great one the Empire. Wherefore Mr *Harrington* commits a great Error in his Apprehension of the *German Agrarian*, or has incurred a far greater one in his Modell of a *Commonwealth*, in proposing that *Agrarian* as fit for an equall *Commonwealth*, which by his own Confession belongs to a *Monarchy* by *Nobility*.

And this brings Me to the third Question, concerning the *Agrarian* as it is stated in *Oceana*: Which as it has no community with that of *Israel* in the originall of its institution, so has it very little Resemblance with that of *Lacedæmon* in the aime and Method of its Establishment. This was acknowledged long since by the Considerer, and Mr *Harrington* could not but

ut see it, though He makes so pitifull an En-
 ceavour to mistake my Meaning. Bnt I am at a
 loss; The Dialect of the next Pages makes Me
 think I am fallen into the Company of Cheats,
 and that it is not *Aristotle* or *Plutarch* that can
 now bring Me off, but that the late Act of *Par-*
liament against Gaming must do it. This is at
 least made evident by it, That Mr *Harrington*
 is conversant in the Mysteries of other Boxes
 besides Ballotting Ones; and is no less Quali-
 fied for Secretary to the Comb-makers Ordina-
 ry, then to a Commonwealth. I envy not
 his high endowments, but I must soberly let
 him know, that though, while he maintains
 the Dignity of a Philosopher, and a Gentleman,
 I count my self obliged to return him a Serious
 answer, When he thinks fit to play the Buffoon,
 I can laugh as unconcernedly as any other Man.
 And to Laughter only (my Pity excepted)
 am I disposed by seeing how he disports himself
 in shaking the 15 false Dice he pretends to find
 in one of my Throwes: Gentlemen, (for it is
 necessary I should appeale to the Lookers on)
 the Dice I threw were all true, for which he
 was in taking them up, set down these False
 Ones; Not any one of those 15 Absurdities be-
 longs to Me, but are all framed by himself, ei-
 ther by a willing Mistake of my meaning, or
 by a childish Distortion of my Words. My first
 Argument therefore, That his Modell of an *A-*
grarian is unjust, remains unconfuted, and is
 not ever to be answered by any Man who, like
 Mr *Harrington*, makes Propriety the Ground

H.p.93.

of Government. He ventures indeed to say, that his *Agrarian* does not alter Propriety, but only obliges a great landed Man to divide it among his Children: But he ought to have remembered that the Liberty of disposing as a Man thinks fit of his own, is Essentiall to the Propriety We now Dispute of; And if it be the Piety of dividing the land among all the Children he is taken with, his Hypocrisie may be a little suspected, in regard he has made this Law only to concern the Surplusage of 2000l. p. an.

The second Argument which in the Considerations I made use of against the *Agrarian* of *Oceana* was this, That the Rate of 2000. l. p. an. at which it is stated can never be fixt, but that it will continually be in danger of being still brought lower, till at length it be so far debased, That the keeping it from going any lower will be the Concernment of a greater Number of Men, then They make up who have an Interest in the further debasing of it. This Argument Mr *Harrington* has thought fit to anticipate, by pretending to answer it in his eight Chapter. I must therefore go back to that Place, which I find to be not only dislocated, but so strangely shattered, that it will be very hard for Me to Splinter up the broken confused Pieces of it. But to make as much of his Answer as I can, He seems to say in the first Place, *That the People are naturally incapable of such a Design as Levelling or reducing the Standard of Estates to the lowest Rate, see-*

never any People (except a faint Attempt of the Romans) went about it; And if there be any thing familiar with the Nature of the People, why appeared it but once, and vanished without Effect? This Method of arguing *à non esse non posse*, or affirming because a Thing has not yet been it can never be, is peculiar to Mr Harrington; But there is some reason to doubt, whether men will not look upon this as sufficient Security, especially if They consider how the People are now taught Principles before unknown to them, That the Ballance of Dominion in Land is the Naturall Cause of Empire, and That the Ballance ought to be fixt by an Agrarian Law. For in Oceana every Man (who is not a Servant) above 18 yeares of age being obliged to have Armes, and every man above 30 being capable of Magistracy, the People finding the Empire in their own hands, must of necessity conclude the Ballance ought to be there too, and consequently must endeavour to take down the standard of the Agrarian so low as that the Land may come to be divided among the whole Body of the People. And if the People in other Governments, for example under the late Monarchy, did never so much as think of Levelling the Nobility, It was partly because They did not then apprehend it, as They will do now, to be a thing just and necessary; And partly because They wanted Power to do it, their Arms depending upon the Nobilitie, And their Vote in the Commons house being insignificant

H. pag. 44.

nificant without the Consent of the King and Lords. But in the *Commonwealth of Oceana* the People can not want Power and Interest to effect it, either by the way of Arms or Vote. By the way of Arms, the People amounting to 200000 armed Men, with Commanders and Officers chosen by themselves out of their own Body, and having a certain *Rendezvous* appointed in reference to their Musters, need but declare their Resolution to have the *Agrarian* taken down to a less Rate then 2000 l. p. an. And the whole Business is dispatch't. For They who can have an Interest to keep it up at that Rate, not being above 5000 Men, can not possibly resist so much a greater Multitude, that is already armed and formed into a Body. So that the People of *Oceana* ought not to be deterred from this Attempt by the Feare of a Civill War, and the Loss they may sustain by it, (Though, by the way, If that Reflection were enough to keep the People Quiet, there would be little need ever to feare their stirring) seeing the 5000 Men can not do otherwise then immediatly submit, as being apparently too weak to maintain themselves in the State of War. But if the People of *Oceana* chosse rather to manage this Design by the way of Vote, They may with more ease effect it; For the Elders or Men capable of Magistracy in *Oceana*, being 100000 in number, And they who possess 2000 l. p. an. being but 5000 in number, The same Proportion, according to an equal Calculation,

Calculation, must hold in the Deputies at the Prerogative Tribe; Wherefore in the Representative or Prerogative Tribe there will be twenty for one who will have an Interest to Vote the *Agrarian* down to a lower Standard. Yet I do not think that this will come to absolute Levelling, or giving to every Man (as Mr *Harrington* computes it) ten pounds a yeare; But I do not see how it is possible it should stay sooner then at about 200 pounds a yeare; But that being made the measure of the *Agrarian*, or the greatest Estate which any man can possess in Land, there can not be less then 50000 Persons concerned to keep it from going lower, which number will, it is likely, prove considerable enough to fix it at that Rate.

H. pag. 453

In his Answer to my third Argument, He takes Pleasure in straying out of a plain Way, and will understand Me as if I had said, The old *Jewes* during their being Inhabitants of *Canaan* were great Traders. I am not aware that any Ambiguity in my Words could give him an Occasion of this Thought; But howsoever, I am content to explaine my self better by declaring that I meant this of the Modern *Jewes*, who though dispossessed of *Canaan*, are every where so Rich, that unless perhaps in *Solomons* time, their Ancestours could never have compared Estates with them. And as They having no Land are all Merchants, so in *Oceana* the Possession of Land being limited, Men who aimed at farther Riches or

Power, would convert their stock into Traffique, by which *Emporium* would be increast beyond the Proportion consisting with the Security of the *Commonwealth*. These were the Considerer's thoughts, which Mr *Harrington* seems not to disallow of, but only in the last particular, that the greatness of *Emporium* can prove dangerous to the *Commonwealth* of *Oceana*. To make this Probable, I must begin a Good way off. Of *Commonwealths* both Antient and Modern, some have been founded upon one Great City, in which are Resident not only the *Magistrates* and *Senate*, but also the whole Body of the *People* which constitutes the *Commonwealth*; Such were of old, *Athens*, *Syracuse*, *Carthage*, *Rome*, at present *Venice* and *Genoa*. These Cities are both the Heart and Head of their severall *Commonwealths*, In them the Principall Actions of Life are performed, and from thence Bloud and Spirits are conveyed into all the Parts: Their Increase is the Augmentation of the whole, and as long as they continue in Health, the *Republicque* can not die. Hereupon have all wise Legislators contrived and encouraged the Increase of these Cities both in Population and Riches, for the whole *Commonwealth* being in a manner comprehended within their Walls, their enlargement can never cause any inequality or Danger to the Publique. If it be thought that I commit an Error in placing *Rome* in this Classis of *Commonwealths*, seeing her Rustick Tribes were the most considerable both

both for number and Reputation. My inducements to it were, First that at the Institution of the Rustick Tribes they were so neere adjacent to the City, that there was scarce any difference, as to the facility of Assembling together, between them and the Inhabitants of the City it self; And then secondly, That before Rome had attained any considerable Greatness, the Tribes were no longer to be taken in a Locall acceptation but only as so many divisions of the People, to some one of which every Citizen where-soever inhabiting must necessarily relate; As with us every freeman of London must be of some one of the old Companies. And it was in this sense that the *Patricians* chose to be of some Rustick Tribe, which is no more then that my Lord Major is a Skinner or a Merchant Taylor. But thirdly though Rome had her Rustick Tribes, and Athens her *Δῆμοι* or Populations in the Country, none of these had Right to assemble within their own precincts, for choosing Magistrates or nominating Deputies to represent them, nor had any capacity of dealing in Publique Affaires, unless They in person repaired to the Capitall City, so that this City still remained the Seat of the Commonwealth, all Publique Business being transacted within her Walls.

Other *Commonwealths* have not been raised upon the greatness of one City, but have consisted of the Confederacy or League of many, of which sort so many examples occur among the
Grecians

Grecians it is needlesse to name any; Of Modern ones the Union of the *Netherlandish* Provinces is of this Nature. And in this case no one City can acquire an extraordinary Greatness without danger to the Liberties of all the rest, or at least of Dissolution to the Union: Thus the City of *Thebes* being grown Powerfull, took away the Liberty of the *Bæotians* their Confederates: And thus the *Elians* being enrich'd by the Conflux of People to the *Olympian Games*, incroach'd upon the Privileges of the Neighbouring Towns. That *Amstredam* of late yeares hugely advanced by Traffique, is in a Condition to do as much for the United States, and has in part attempted it, was intimated by the Considerer: The Actions are fresh, and those Relations and Discourses which are Published, make every man a judge; If Mr *Harrington* be satisfi'd that *their actions resisted not the Interest of Liberty, but of a Lord*, He may deserve a pension in communicating this satisfaction to them of *Zealand, Frizeland and Overjfell*.

H. p. 98.

A third sort of Commonwealths are those which consist not of Leagues or Unions, neither are seated in some one great City, but are diffused through a whole Nation, and are not to be assembled but by the Mediation of a Representative Body: Of this kind you are not to expect many Examples; *Israel* (when it shall be evinced to have been a Commonwealth) must needs have been such an one, and such an one is the proposed Modell of a Commonwealth for
Oceana.

Oceana. In these the disproportionate Greatness of any one City, becomes still more dangerous, for now this City is no longer to be reputed the Head or Heart, but the Spleen or Liver, whose overgrowth brings the rest of the Body to Decay or Ruine. Any one City so overtopping the Rest constitutes *Rem-publicam* in *Re-publica*, and the Inhabitants of it will alwaies stand united in reference to their own Interest even when it looks a squint upon that of the *Commonwealth*. In *Israel* indeed they need not to feare this Inconvenience, for it does not appear that before the establishment of the *Monarchy*, any one City had so much advantage over the rest as to claim the Dignity of a *Metropolis*. But in *Monarchies* the Mischief has been frequent; *Paris* both formerly and in our time has been the Rise and Retreat of severall *Rebellions*, *Ghent* and *Liege* have more then once done as much for their Princes, In *Spain* the *War de las Comunidades* took its beginning from *Toledo*, *Valladolid*, *Valentia* and two or three more great Towns. And that the mischief should be multiplied in a *Commonwealth*, I have one reason more to think, wch is that a *Monarch* can by the Residence of his Court, that brings so ample profit to a City, lay an obligation upon them, which in a *Commonwealth* can amount to very little, or rather Nothing. To make an end, the City of *Emporium* is already so Potent That it may will be doubted whether she will be content with that portion Mr *Harrington* has allowed her in his *Commonwealth of Oceana*,
and

and whether when she looses the Honor of obeying a Prince, she will not think her *Common Councell* as good as the *Prerogative Tribe*, and her *Commander in Chiefe* as the *Strategus of Oceana*,

H. p. 100. Therefore those of the Nobility who have disposed of their Sons in the City may fairely expect to see them Princes, The rest may doe well to consider whether the Beare's skin will keep them warme while it is upon the Beares back, and whether they can live upon the reversion of those Estates Mr *Harrington* has promised them in the first Provinces his *Commonwealth* conquers.

H. p. 101. The fourth Argument was taken from the difficulty of making the *Agrarian* equall and stedy in reference to the inconstant value of mony: But this saies He, *was sufficiently provided for where it is said that a new survey at the present Rent being taken, the Agrarian should ordain that no man should thenceforth hold above so much Land as there is valued at the rate of 2000l. per an.* Though this was omitted in the Order, I deny not that it was hinted in one of the speeches; but this is to recompence one error by committing another that is greater, or to cure an Ague by a Feavour; The value of mony 'tis true is alwaies in motion, but not in so swift and irregular one, as the Improvement of Land I speak not of the improvement of Rent, or the advantage the Landlord makes upon the Farmer, but of that Naturall one which sometimes consist in the Meliorating of the soile

it self, as by derivation of Water; Sometimes in the Discovery of a profitable Minerall; And sometimes by imploying the ground to a new Husbandry as the planting Tabacco, Hops, and many other things which have already and may for the future be invented. By all these waies, the value of Land may come to be many times multiplyed, and consequently the *Agrarian* notwithstanding this Provision must soon recede from the first Design of its institution. He need not now have been put in mind of this, if he would have learn't this Lesson of *Aristotle*, That those Orders in a Commonwealth *Pol. lib. 5. which relate to the Census or Valuation of Estates, cap. 8. must be renewed and adapted continually to the Census through all its Shiftings and Changes, and this at furthest once in five yeares.*

That the *Agrarian* does not stem, but follow the Tide of Custome in this Nation, will scarce meet with Belief, notwithstanding Mr *Harrington's* undertaking, as long as We have before our eyes so many examples of Elder Brothers and great Purchasers. But I mean not to trouble him with any Discourses about keeping or breaking old Customes; That would be as to this subject but a Common place of talke, and if the *Agrarian* be a thing so customary, his paines in discovering of it, merit the less of thanks from the Publique; For though we usually give Mony to those who shew Us an Hare or Partridge, it has not been made a fashion to reward such as bring Us to a Crow or a Jack-Daw.

After

H. pag. 102.

After all this, that an *Agrarian* is necessary unto Government be it what it will, and as much to Kings as unto Commonwealths, I can not give my assent; The Reasons of my not doing so, have been made out abundantly, unless I have had the ill fortune to throw away all that has been said in this Chapter and that of the *Balance*. I doe not deny that these Notions are of good concernment, if taken in generall, and without this severe Restriction to Estates in Land. I lay it for a ground that Princes ought to consider Riches as one of the principall instruments of Governing; That in order to this They should not think a Crown worth wearing, unless provided with a Constant Revenue, (or at least a way of raising it) large enough for all Publique Occasions; That they wear the Key of their Treasury, with the same Jealousy as their Sword, permitting neither to be taken out of their own hands. For the rest, That they take care those men whose interest is dependant upon the Prince's may be possess of such estates as shall bring them a Returne of Respect and Power. The favour of the Prince, the Profit of Offices, the Advantages arising from Publique Employment both Military and of State, joyned with other Arts of Governing, will in a *Monarchy* put faire for attaining this, without the necessity of an *Agrarian* Law: Nor on the other side does a Prince stand in need of that help to abate the Power of any Subject that is grown dangerous, but is readily presented with some more silent way of effecting it. from
the

the present Juncture of Business. And indeed universally *Monarchies* have this advantage over *Commonwealths*, that *Commonwealths* are like Engines which being wound up can not in the greatest necessity vary from the Designation of the Artificer, but *Monarchies* are animate Bodies, moving and acting according to all exigencies by vertue of their own Soules: The former like the wooden Eagle which met the Emperour limited in her flight by the will of the Engineer, The other has Wings of her own, and when she sees the Quarry, failes not to make a gallant flight.

CHAP. XII.

Whether Courses or Rotation be necessary to a well ordered Commonwealth, &c.

IN this long Chapter the Considerer has very small share. It is intended against another sort of People who, though they are passionate Doters on a *Commonwealth*, profess to dislike the Introduction of a *Rotation*. This has proceeded so far as to cause a Schisme among the *Commonwealths-Men*, For whilst some of them think that without the *Rotation* a *Commonwealth* must (like *Pharaoh's Chariots*) clog and drive heavily; others suspect this continuall whirling would produce nothing but giddiness and a Danger of overturning. Yet there is some Reason

Reason to doubt this Difference is not rooted in their Judgements so much as in their Interests : They who expect to fill a place in a standing Counsell, are not pleased to think of resigning, after a certain Terme, their Cushions to new Commers ; But such who despaire of that advantage, rather then be wholly shut out would willingly take Turns, governing themselves by the Advice of our wise Ancestors, rather to be content with halfe a Loafe then have no Bread.

But this being matter of conjecture, I will let it pass, lest I happen to mistake their meaning as much as Mr Harrington does mine ; Who all along this Chapter treats me as one of those who maintain a *Commonwealth* while she is fixt upon standing Counsels and Armies, to be better ordered then when she goes upon *Rotation*. But this is manifest ; That I concede *Rotation* to have been the practise of Ancient *Republicques*, and I doe not any where discover that I think a *Commonwealth* can be safe without it. It is true that judging *Rotation* to be in it self not very just, and often prejudiciall to pnblique Affairs, I can not approve of that Government which stands in need of such an Order ; so that my Quarrell lyes not against *Rotation* where I find it in a *Commonwealth*, but against *Commonwealths* because they are by the necessary care of their Preservation, forced to embrace *Rotation*.

The Examples therefore of *Israel*, *Athens* and *Venice* do not any way concern Me : Though it were an easie matter to shew that the

the Proofs of a *Rotation* in *Israel* are very wild and unconcluding, if I had not an Obligation upon Me to abstain from inquiring any further into that Government. Concerning *Venice*, as He has brought forth nothing that's new to one who is not a stranger to *Giannotti*, so will his Riddle easily meet with a Solution out of that Author. If he would make 2 or 3 dozen of these Riddles, and put them into Rime, (which to him cannot be difficult) if they did not please the Counsell of State, they would at least be admirably usefull to the new *Junta* of Politicall Ladies, who by them would find Diversion for Winter Evenings, without descending from the Gravity of their new affected studies, *Lames* and *Government*.

All then that I need to do is to make good this Assertion, That *Commonwealths* have by the Observation of their *Rotation* been put upon great and Dangerous Inconveniences. To prove this the Examples of *Veturius*, *Varro*, *Mancinus* and other weak and passionate Commanders employed by the *Romans*, were insisted on by the Considerer: Which Mr *Harrington* interprets most extravagantly as if there were but three weak or unfortunate Generals in the whole course of *Rome*. He that names three, with the addition of a generall clause comprehending the rest, is not, I conceive, with any Honesty to be understood, as if he thought there were but three in all. If it be any pleasure to Mr *Harrington* to view a List of unfortunate *Roman* Generals, let him cast his eyes upon the *Fabii*,

H. pag. 122.

M

Sulpitius

Sulpitius Longus & *P. Servilius, Claudius Pulcher, Sempronius, C. Flaminius, Vitilius, Plautius, Popilius, Manilius, Lentulus, Piso, Hypsaus, L. Cassius, Scaurus, Cæpio, Rutilius*, and many more which might be reckoned up if it were my design to count the black daies in the *Roman* Calendar. I selected those three because by their want of Experience and Conduct *Rome* received the greatest and most ignominious defeats that ever befell Her.

Liv. lib. 9.

Veturius (or *Posthumius* if he will needs lay the miscarriage chiefly upon him) threw away himself and the *Roman* Army very ridiculously; For having taken no Care, by Spies or Intelligence of his own, to be informed of the Posture and Condition of the Enemy, He relied wholly upon the Report of Prisoners, which is alwaies uncertain and very often Suborned. Being thus put upon a long March with a thought to find that Enemy at *Luceria* who was then close by him, he engaged the Army in a deep Valley shut up on every side with steep Rocks and thick Forests, accessible only by two narrow and difficult Passages: And here he committed an Error far more gross and withall irreparable; For either he did omit, contrary to the known Maximes of War, to discover the Countrey through which his March lay, or knowing it (as is more probable) he neglected, by a strange Stupidity, to secure himself of either of the two Passes; So that finding the furthest guarded and barricadoed by the Enemy, before he could get back the other was surprized

surprized also, and the whole Roman Army caught in this Trap. Now it is evident that this loss befell the Romans, not by the Valour or Experience of their Enemies, but meerly by the Insufficiency of their own Commanders, who probably had never been imployed, but for the Orders of their Rotation; The Commonwealth had at that time *Fabius*, *Papyrius*, and many other brave Commanders, who in submitting to the Rotation, were fain to resign the Conduct of the Army to such raw Men as could Court the Suffrages of the People for the Consulship.

As for *Varro*, it is observable that his Election (like that of *Flaminius* the Consul of the former yeare who lost the great Battle at the Lake of *Thrasimene*) was carried meerly upon a Faction against the Nobility, without any other Merit in the Person, then his Sycophantry in accusing the Conduct of the Senate, and flattery to the People in promising them to put a sudden end to the War: In his yeare was that Stupendous defeat received at *Canna* which is by *Polybius* wholly imputed to his ill Manage. We may fairely take notice that the Dangers into which Rome was so often precipitated during the War with *Annibal*, took their Rise from the frequent Change of Commanders: For there is just ground in the Histories of those Actions of believing that if *Scipio* the elder, *Fabius*, or *Marcellus* had had the sole manage of the War, *Hannibal* could never have settled himself in *Italie*, but being consumed by want and

Liv. lib. 22.

Small Skirmishes must presently have abandoned the Countrey; Whilst on the other hand, the Commanders being changed every yeare, unexperienced Men came to be at the head of the Army, who hoping to get Honour, at the Charges of the *Commonwealth*, put things upon the hazardous Issue of set Battles And this is naturally and directly to be charged upon their Orders of Rotation.

Concerning *Hostilius Mancinus*, the foulness of his miscarriage appears in this, that having 30000 Men he was defeated by 4000. *Numantines*; And that the fault was only in the Generall, was the Judgment of the Romans themselves, who therefore committing the care of the War to *Scipio* (though expressely against their Lawes of Rotation) he made an end of it with the same Forces which had been so often beaten. But it can not scape our wonder, that Mr *Harrington* should think fit to communicate the Guilt of those Miscarriages to *Pompey the Great*, who had no being in the World till thirty yeare after: It is true that *G. Pompeius Rufus* received a foile from the *Numantines*, Anno U. C. 616. but by what secret Participation of Guilt can this concern *Cn. Pompeius Magnus* who was not born till about the yeare U. C. 647? We might with equall Justice make the Translator of *Virgill* be responsible for all the faults in the Translation of *Orlando Furioso*.

Having thus sufficiently proved that these three great Defeats befell the Romans meereley through

Florus & Brev. Livii.
lib. 55. &
57.

H.p.125.

through the weakness of their Commanders, as also that these weak Commanders could not, (in all Probability) ever have come into that Employment but through the Orders of *Rotation*; it would be altogether useless to accumulate any more Examples out of the *Roman Stories*. I may then go on to confirm the same Observation out of the *Athenian Historie*; Which Commonwealth besides the annuall *Rotation* of her Generals, was good at another Trick often made Use of by Republicques out of a Jealousy of trusting too much Power in one hand: This was to confer the Command, not upon any one Person, but to place it upon many, or in a Commission, so that They have frequently had at once in one Army ten Generals. At *Aegos-potamos* they were no fewer, and their Sottishness as well as their Number considered, I can not study out any Term to fit them so properly as that of a Rabble. *Conon* was indeed a brave Commander, but his single Vote could not prevaile against the Obstinacy of his Companions. At that time *Alcibiades* was the only Man who had credit and Ability enough to have saved the *Athenian State*; But He out of the Peoples Jealousy of him, and by the Orders of their *Rotation* being laid aside, *Tydeus*, *Philocrates*, and as many as served to make up the halfe Score of Generals, were intrusted with the whole Navall Power then remaining to the *Athenian Commonwealth*, which

Thucyd. l. 6.

*Plut. &
Xenoph.*

which they totally lost at *Aegos-potamos* by one of the most Palpable and wilfull Errors that perhaps, was ever committed in War. It is not to be expected I should bring another Example from the *Athenian* Historie, since this Error was one of those which can not be committed twice, and *Athens* it self being a while after taken in Consequence of this Defeat, They had not any more Fleets or Armies to throw away by their Rotation.

But, replies Mr Harrington, had there been formerly no Rotation in *Athens* how should there have been Men of Valour and Conduct to lie by the Walls? And if Rotation thenceforth should have ceased, how could those Men of Valour and Conduct have done other then lie by the Walls? So this unavoidably confesseth, that Rotation was the Means whereby *Athens* came to be stored with Persons of Valour and Conduct, and They to be capable of Employment. In Answer to this goodly Argument, let Me inquire of him, What Rotation was there in the Armies of the *Netherlands*? Yet we know there was a time when almost all the able Souldiers of Christendome came out of that Schoole. Or let him show Me the Orders of Rotation at present in *France*, which Crown notwithstanding abounds with more Persons capable of high Commands, then all *Europe* besides. In small Employments, it is not Rotation, or the passing through many hands, that can beget able Men, and in great Actions Men of great Abilities will grow up without the help of Rotation; So that if *Athens*

H. pag. 125.

thens or Rome have produced such Illustrious H. pag. 126.
Examples, it is very Impertinent to attribute this to *Rotation* or the *Integrity of Popular Suffrage*, but to the great *Impliments*, in which by reason of their continuall Wars, those *Commonwealths* brought up their Subjects.

Since He has mentioned the *Integrity of Popular Suffrage*, it must not be let pass without our Animadversion, where he saies *That the Ballot bars Canvassing, beyond all Possibility of any such thing.* No doubt the Secrecy introduced by the *Ballot*, is a faire Guardian of Liberty in Voting; but if We examine the matter more narrowly, We shall easily perceive that this hardly extends to more then a removing the Awe imposed upon Men by Feare, and that all the Engagements of Affection, Flattery, and Bribery are not in the least weakened by the *Ballot*. And therefore We may justly infer that the Orders of *Oceana* are in this point Defective, (for the Provision in the ninth order fals far short of a Cure) as were those of *Venice* before the Introduction of the *Censor's Office*: For till then, notwithstanding the *Ballot*, the *Gentlemen* held secret Correspondences for the mutuall gratifying one another's Ambition, and some directly sold their Votes; which makes *Giannotti* judge, That, without the *Censors* who have power given them to prevent it, This single Disorder had been enough to have everted the Commonwealth. And conformable to this is the Experience of the *Conclaves* held for

Ibid.

Relat. Ital.
M. S. delli
Conclavi.

Electing of the *Popes*, where since *Gregory* the 15, all waies of making the *Pope* are forbid, but that of secret Scrutiny which is so managed that in effect it is the same thing with the *Ballot*: And yet the Examples of succeeding *Conclaves* testify, That the Power and Influence of the Heads of Factions over their Creatures, is scarce at all diminished by this Course.

Brev. Liv.

Plut.
Xenoph.

To returne to *Rotation*, As the mischiefs by it derived upon a Commonwealth are apparent, in the next place I am to shew how it has not been counted so Sacred, but that it has often been sacrificed to the Publique Exigencies. *Machiavel* furnishes Me with the early Example of *Publius Philo* at *Palepolis*. When the *Numantines* had by the bravery of their Resistance provoked the Rage and Disdain of the *Roman* People, not to trifle out the War any longer under weake Commanders. The People gave *Scipio* the *Consulship*, though he were then incapable of it by the Law of *Rotation* which required a Vacation of ten yeares between two *Consulships*. The *Lacedemonians* indeed were more Hypocriticall, while out of scruple of violating their *Rotation* they cheated themselves with the Name and outside of things; The case I refer to was in *Lysander*, who had in the yeare of his Admiralty laid great Designs for carrying on the War against *Athens*, and rendered himselfe very acceptable to the *Lacedemonian* Confederates on the coasts of *Asia*; At *Sparta* there was a Law that no man should be twice Admirall, and yet it being highly expedient for their

their Affaires to give *Lysander* the Command again, They fell upon an expedient somewhat ridiculous in the hands of Wise men; *Aracus* an inconsiderable Person was made Admirall, and *Lysander* had the Commission of Viceadmirall with the whole Power and authority of Admirall. Such shifts are those States put to who think the supreme Publique interest can be regulated by any certain Lawes?

If then the Lawes of Rotation have so frequently veiled Bonnet to the Ambition or Desire of Acquisition in Commonwealths, it cannot seem strange they should doe so in case of necessary preservation. In all the course of the *Roman* Affaires We can scarce meet with a time more destitute of great Actions, and by consequence of great Commanders, then that immediately following the third *Punic* and *Numantine* Wars: Yet in that time the blackest and fiercest tempest broke upon the *Romans* that ever they were exposed to, except that which some hundreds of yeares after shipwrackt their Empire; The *Cimbres*, *Teutons*, and *Ambrons*, fierce Northern Nations, to the number of at least 300000 fighting men; besides an equall Company of Women and Children to supply them with Recruits, poured themselves down upon *Italy*; Four *Roman* Armies had been defeated by them, nor could the *Alpes* and Winter to boot, be any obstacle to their March; In this condition what should the *Romans* doe? They had but one Commander

Plut. in Mar.

C. Marius

G. Marius, to whom in the Publique Judgment the manage of the War could be with any safety committed, And he was at that time incapable by the Laws of *Rotation*: Should they violate the Law? Or suffer the Barbarous Nations to come up to *Rome* without Opposition? The grave Statists were for the observation of the Law, but here it was the *Peoples* turn to be wise, and their seares were their best Counsellors. They thought fit to make bold with the Law for the Publique Utility; and gave three Consulships together to *Marius*, in whose hands only they counted the Commonwealth secure.

*Brev. Liv.
Lib.3.cap.3.*

Actum erat, saies Florus, nisi Marius illi sæculo contigisset,

*Png. 126,
127, & 128.*

That this Prolongation of Empire to *Marius*, was the first step toward the Destruction of the Commonwealth is observed by Mr *Harrington* out of *Machiavel*; And yet it is the consent of Historians that without the help of *Marius* the Commonwealth had then been destroyed by the *Cimbres*; This does beyond all Exception fortify my Notion, That a Commonwealth is an Imperfect forme of Government, since she may be reduced to that Exigence as by either observing or violating her Lawes to plunge herself into a certain Ruine. If *Machiavel* has observed no other Dilemma in this, then That if a Commonwealth will not be so slow in her Acquisition as is required by *Rotation*, She will be less sure then is requisite to her Preservation, I am not responsible for his Inadvertency: But it was reasonable for me to expect that Mr *Harrington*, when I had

had presented him with a paire of Spectacles should have seen a little better and have taken notice that the prolongation of Empire to *C. Marius* was not in order to Conquest or Acquisition, but to the Preservation of *Italie*, and *Rome* it self.

We have all this while advanced very little, if this Flaw which in Reference to *Rotation*, has been discovered in *Commonwealths*, be no less discernable in *Monarchies*; For then it is not a weakness seated in one Limbe or Member, but a Disease that has seized upon the whole Body of Government: And this Mr Harrington insinuates when he tels Us, *That a Prince whose Providence supplies not the defect of Rotation with something of like Nature, exposeth Himself if not his Empire as much unto Danger as a Commonwealth.* Here I must put him in mind of the Difference, formerly observed by Me, between the Actions of a *Prince* and a *Commonwealth* even when they do the same Thing. A *Commonwealth* having no eies of her own is forced to resign her self to the Conduct of *Lawes*, which are blind too, though in a known Road they faithfully and without wandring performe the part of a Guide; But if a stone be laid, or a pit be digged in this Path, the Blind leading the Blind, they both fall, and then she runs a danger of her Neck. If in this Case a *Commonwealth* be beholding to some hand to lead her to avoid the Danger, it is oddes she will never be able to free herself of the new Guide, who carrying her through unknown *Waies* in the end ravi-
shes

shes or strangles her. But a *Prince* having his Eyes about him chuses his own Way, and though for the Generall he keeps on the High Way of *Lawes*, yet when that leads to a Precipice, he can see how to goe about, till having scaped the Danger, he may safely returne to the common Road. In disposing then of Publique Imployments a wise *Prince* observes no other *Rotation* but what is measured by the Ability and Integrity of the Person's imployed, the present Necessity and future security of his Affaires, from the due mixture of all which results the *Princes* behaviour as to the Placing, Displacing and Transplacing his Publique Ministers whether Military or Civill; And all this is performed without being lyable (unless by a particular error of the *Princes* Judgment) to mistake or Danger. Whereas a *Commonwealth* that is tyed up by the *Lawes* of *Rotation*, knows not how to refuse the service of her weakest Subjects, or to imbrace her most Able and Faithfull ones (even in her greatest Exigencies) during the time of their *Vacation*, unless at the same moment she open a Gap to the Ambition of such men who will of servants indeavour to become her Masters. And this befalls a *Commonwealth* as shee is a *Government* of *Lawes*, which being framed upon an universall prospect, can not possibly, be fitted to particular incident occasions; so that a *Government* making profession to regulate it self in all things by *Lawes*, must need be sometimes at a Loss, and is not unlike the great Land Crabs in some parts of *America* which

which walke alwaies in a strait Line, and will rather then vary from it, climb over an house or a Tree.

To what purpose then serves the Pompous Enumeration of such *Princes* as have been sup-
 planted by their Favourites, or deposed by the
 Generals of their Armies? Yet it must not pass
 without Animadversion, That this Tragickall
 List is in great Part made up of such Persons (as
Sejanus, *Perennis*, *Ruffinus* *Stilico*, *Walle-*
stein &c.) whose unsuccesfull Ambition serves
 for an excellent Lesson to keep great men with-
 in the bounds of Duty and Moderation. But at
 worst, if some weake and careless *Princes* by neg-
 lecting the Opportunities of their own Safety,
 have fallen by the hands of such as they trusted,
 this is no more an argument for *Rotation*, then
 it would be for going unarm'd because some
 men have been killed by their own swords. I ra-
 ther suspect that upon this occasion Mr *Har-*
rington intended a secret blow at the Head of
Monarchy, by shewing how lyable that Govern-
 ment is to be ruined by the Usurpation of such
 Persons to whom *Princes* commit any extraor-
 dinary Power either in Civill or Military Af-
 faires. But this he will find to be a common
 Calamity, not to be prevented by the Orders of
 any Government, but only by the particular
 Dexterity and Prudence of a Prince: I adde not,
 Or of the Chief Ministers of a Commonwealth,
 because the Cure in a Commonwealth is in a
 manner Desperate, it being scarce Possible that
 any Citizen should arrive at so much Power as

to become Dangerous, but that at the same time he will have Barricadoed all waies tending to the publique Preservation, since those Counsels where it is to be debated, will be filled with his Friends and Dependents. And therefore we may put in the other scale, a great Heap of Instances of such Commonwealths as have been oppress'd by those Persons to whom they had committed the conduct of their Affaires. Thus *Pisistratus* became Master of *Athens*, *Cypselus*, and after his Familie *Timophanes* of *Corinth*, *Dionysius* and *Agathocles* of *Syracuse*, *Panætius* and *Icetes* of *Leontium*, *Cleander* of *Gela*, *Anaxilaus* of *Rhegium*, *Theagenes* of *Megara*, *Abantidas* of *Sicyon*, *Aristomachus* of *Argos*, *Polyphron* of *Larissa*, *Machanidas* and *Nabis* of *Lacedæmon*. By this *Cæsar* was enabled to convert the *Roman Commonwealth* into a *Monarchy*. And after that out of the Ruines of this *Monarchy* (like some goodly Palace pulled down to build Tenements) severall *Republiques* had been erected, They almost all were exposed to the same Fortune. Thus *Pisa* came under the Power of *Uguccione della Faggiuola*, *Lucca* of *Castruccio Castracani*, *Sienna* of *Petrucchi*, *Florence* of the Duke of *Athens*, *Milan* of the Count *Francis Sforza*, to omit the Examples of all the smaller *Commonwealths*. If I can not follow Mr *Harrington* into the East, it is because that wiser Quarter of the World have not been known to own any other then *Monarchicall Government*.

But let other *Commonwealths* answer for their
own

own Follies or Misfortunes, the *Commonwealth* of *Oceana* is promised better success, and assured that she shall never want Men of Honesty and Ability to lead her to her true Interest at home and abroad. Nay more, Her Education for her Subjects is so excellent, that three yeares Experience will serve to make them all very able Leaders. Is this a wonder to you? It is a meer Cheat this pretended Depth and Difficulty in matter of State; The Business rests upon the skill in managing the Balloting Box, and if a man have but the the Wit to know the Difference between White and Black, & Red, What can hinder him from being a very expert Statesman? Though no man can continue longer then three yeares in any Magistracy, his going of the Stage will but make roome for one as able as himself, otherwise how came it about that in *Athens* and *Rome*, where every body pressed forward toward Magistracy, (which with them was annuall) the Magistrates were for illustrious Examples, more in weight and number then are to be found in all the rest of the World? Of this I have newly given an account, and will only adde, That at *Rome* the Senate (which bred the able men) was perpetuall, and both in *Athens* and *Rome* the Body of the People inhabiting within the walls of those Cities, they might continually be conversant in Business, and have a share in all Publique Transactions: Whereas in *England* the People being disperfed through the whole Nation, are incapable of Business unless by their Representatives, which being all limited to

Terms

H. p. 183.

P. 130.

Terms and Vacations, their Time of acquiring Experience may with very probable reason be thought too short. The only proper Judge of this Controversy is Experiment, and in that I think Mr Harrington, as well as the Nation, very Fortunate, that He is delivered from all Probability of seeing his Project reduced to Practice; For that would be more Terrible to Him, than a thousand Reames of Objections, and would easily detect those Errors and Defects in his Modell of Government, which at present are but lightly viewed in passing, or not at all discovered.

I N I S

A N

APPENDIX

*By way of reply to what Mr Harrington
cals A full Answer to all
Objections.*

IT is a pretty Artifice in Mr *Harrington* to insinuate that because no man has gone about to discover any Contradiction or Inequality in the Model of his *Commonwealth*; therefore it must be taken for granted his *Commonwealth* has not any such in it, and must consequently be void of all Internall causes of Dissolution. By this he indeavours to draw the world into an Opinion that his *Commonwealth* is Invulnerable, and at the same time to fix a Disreputation upon the Author of the *Considerations*, as if he had failed in making out what he undertook. For what concerns Me as Author of the *Considerations*, having at the beginning made profession to restrain them to the first Preliminaries of *Oceana*, Mr *Harrington* is injurious in accusing Me in neglecting that which was no part of my Business, and which I alwaies declared I did not intend to meddle with.

N

But

But before that other Men make a surrender of their Judgement to Mr *Harrington* and believe upon the credit of this Argument that his *Commonwealth* has attained unto full Perfection, It will be convenient They should reflect, That in a Modell of *Government* the Conformity of the severall Parts to one another is not a sufficient argument of the Perfection of the whole; For as in a Fiction, the severall Members may be so contrived as not to give one another the Lie, but be all contained within the limits of verisimilitude, and yet the whole remain without the least syllable of Truth; Or as for the Explication of any Motion in Nature, various Hypotheses may be excogitated including no Absurdity within themselves, and yet perhaps, not any one of them prove to be the true Method of Nature; so in *Government*, It is not difficult to invent variety of Formes, the parts of each of which taken separately, may maintain a faire Correspondence and Agreement among themselves, and yet the Whole be far enough from attaining to Perfection.

The Materials of *Government* are Mankind, and the Architect who disposes of these Materials is man also; so that *Government* is nothing else but an Art by which one part of Mankind disposes of the other for attaining the Common Utility of both, which consists in arriving at such a Degree of Plenty and Security as Mankind is capable of by society.

Society. This Art is not obliged to one solitary Method for attaining the End and Design proposed to it, but has sometimes made use of a *Monarchy*, sometimes of an *Aristocracy*, sometimes of a *Democracy*, and in all these of severall Frames and Models. But this art of Governing has a very disadvantageous Difference from all other Arts, for in them the Artificer makes choice only of such Materials as have the greatest aptitude for his worke but in *Government* the Artificer is obliged to his Materials, and must grapple with all the Stubborness and Reluctancy He meets with in them; And it is an Error very incident to Mankind, that every particular Man thinks *Government* was instituted for his peculiar Advantage, which if he meets not with in a degree sutable to his Desire in the *Government* He lives under, He presently endeavours to subvert that *Government* out of hopes to meet with it in the next: Which is just as if the Steele of which the Index of a Watch is composed should refuse to move out of a Discontent it was not imployed about the Spring or Ballance; and at this rate I believe the ablest Watch-maker would despair of giving us a true movement. So that though it should be allowed Mr Harrington that his *Commonwealth* has no Inequality in it, yet it would faile of attaining the perfection of *Government*, seeing there is an inequality in the Nature of Man, which is not rectified

by the Modell of his *Commonwealth*. What this Inequality consists in, how far it is capable of Cure, and how Mr *Harrington* has failed of performing it, was the subject of my 8th and 9th Chapters, and therefore is not now to be repeated.

Ocean. p. 25.

I doe not intend to imploy my selfe in picking the Feathers off Mr *Harrington's* Cloake, or going in search of the Inequalities or Contradictions in the orders of his Modell; but I would be glad to know, Whether He be not unequall to Himself as well as the *Nobility* in such orders as particularly concern them. Having by his *Agrarian* reduced the *Nobility* (under which name I also comprehend the Gentry of higher Quality) unto the Condition of clypt Mony, He notwithstanding appears very solicitous They should still be currant, and not be refused in the uses of the *Commonwealth*. To This purpose distinguishes the whole people into *Horse* and *Foot*, making the *Horse* to consist of such as have above one hundred pounds a yeare, and has provided that the *Horse* shall have diverse advantages as that (to omit the lesser ones) the *Senate* and *Great Magistrates* shall consist of Knights elected out of their Number. But this favour to them is all this while but an handsome piece of Dissimulation; For though there be care taken that at the Assembly of the *Hundred* and *Tribe* such and such *Magistrates* shall

shall be elected out of the *Horse*, there is no necessary provision there should be any *Horse* there, out of which to elect; For the Deputies at the *Hundred* and *Tribe* consisting of the Deputies elected at the *Parish*, It is a meer chance if in the *Parish* there were any *Horse* at all elected: The Elector or Proposer at the *Parish* are designed by the hap of drawing a Golden Ball out of the Urn, and these Electors or Proposer nominate the rest of the Deputies, to be proposed to the *Ballot*, so that unless one of the *Horse* chance to prove an Elector by drawing a Golden Ball, the nomination is wholly in the power of the *Foot*, who would be very senceless, by nominating any of the *Horse* to part with that power which Fortune has put into their Hands. Now what small probability there is that any of the *Horse* should chance to draw a Golden Ball, will appear by the great disparity in number between the whole Body of the People and such as may only be capable of being of the *Horse*; It is confest by Mr *Harrington* there is nothing in the Nature of the *Agrarian* to hinder, but that the whole Land in *Oceana* may come into the hands of 5000 Men; But the *Elders* or Men capable of Election are confest to be 100000 Men; Wherefore the 5000 Men or the *Horse* (though they should as is most unprobable, be all of 30 yeares of Age and so Capable of Election) are but a

twentieth part of Foot, and by Consequence it is twenty to one that at every Election of the *Parish* not any of the *Horse* come to be elected. By which it is evident there is a very great inequality in his *Commonwealth*, being by the orders of it Matters may with great Probability be reduced to that pass, That those men who have the whole Propriety in Land may be wholly excluded from having any share in the *Government*. It is appatent also, That the upper Roomes of his *Commonwealth*, such as are the *Hundred*, *Tribe*, *Senate* and *Prerogative*, are built upon a most ruinous Foundation, the Basis of the *Parishes* being too weake to support them, Thus having reduced the *Nobility* and *Gentry* to 2000l. per an. and having devided them of all the Advantages of Birth and Descent, He leaves them also after all at the discretion of their good Neighbours with the High shoon, in reference to their whole interest in the *Government*.

But for all this he has dealt more kindly with the *Nobility* and *Gentry*, then with the three Faculties of *Divines*, *Lawyers* and *Physitians*; For though the *Ballance of Land*, prove unprofitable to the *Nobility*, yet the *Ballance of Beef* remaies still with them, And if against an Election Day they Feast my *Lords of the People* handsomely, They may still have hopes to be nominated by some of them; But the other are beyond all Possibility

lity of retrieving it, excluded from having any share in the *Government*; And that for this generall Reason, *They who take upon them the Profession of Theologie, Physick or Law, are not at leisure for the Essays whereby the Youth commence for all Magistracies, Offices and Honours in a Commonwealth.* It seems that he who has under a stall imployed his Life in the Reparations of old shooes is qualified to fall to worke with the Breaches of the State; And he whose converse has been nothing but whistling to Horses, has a sufficient Capacity to give Law to Mankind; But if any mans Education has been laid out in Pursuit of Truth and in a Familiarity with such Universal Notions & Reasons of Things, as tend to the advancement of Humane Nature, If He has afterward addicted himself in particular to such Studies upon which depend the safety of every Man in private, and of society in Common, That man must be deposed from the Privelege of a Citizen, and forfeit that Liberty which is the Foundation of all *Popular Government*, That every Man should concur to the making those Lawes by which He is to be governed.

Ocean.p.224

The Clergy then or Divines will have Occasion to make use of all the Patience and Humility they preach to others, in reference to their submission to a *Government* which treats them as People incapable of the Common Privileges of Men; The Quality of
Embassadours

Embassadours from Heaven which is usually attributed to them seems to be understood literally by Mr *Harrington*, For He considers them as Aliens, and so denies them the Libertie due to all English Men; And he has made a little bold with the *Apostles* argument, by changing the Inference of it, That because *They serve at the Altar*, therefore they are to be used as Slaves and Helots.

For the poore *Physitians* I least of all understand why They should be shut out from the Government whilst their *Apothecaries* are admitted to it, And why the *Farrier* should be made a better man then the *Doctor*. But there is no Help, They must be content to swallow this Pill, unless They can out of hand find Hellebore enough for our new Legislator.

As to the *Lawyers*, there is a particular reason why they should have nothing to do with making of Lawes, because it is enough for them that they can understand them when they are made; Yet there may be some cause to doubt, whether the whole Bench, and all the Innes of Court could find the way to understand such Lawes as would be made by those men who are themselves obliged not to understand any. Howsoever Mr *Harrington* has that good perswasion of the whole profession of *Lawyers*, that He thinks they would betray the Publique good, to the profit of their own Practice, and there-

therefore resolves to banish them from all Interest in the *Government*; so that the *Lawyers* are in this, at least, highly obliged to Him, That he has given them faire leisure to turn their Books.

Though every branch of these Orders be fertile of very destructive Consequences, I do not intend to prosecute any of them, but am Content in generall to observe, that the *Commonwealth* of *Oceana* which pretends so much to Equality, does wholly shut out the Professions of *Divinity*, *Law*, and *Physick* from any share in the *Government*, and leaves the *Nobility* and *Gentry* in a great probability of being reduced to the same Condition.

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While a Government is under Dispute, the Liberty of proposing one's sence about it ought not to be denyed ; But if it come once to be settled, Private men have nothing left but obedience. Having through the whole Book acted by the first Branch of this Maxime, it is fit I should now shew how I can comply with the latter. And being conscious of a Disability in serving the Commonwealth of *Oceana* in any more important matter, I desire to shew a respect to the Gentlemen of the *Academy* of the *Provosts* by presenting them with these following Collections.

A Catalogue

Ocean. p. 130.

A Catalogue of such pieces of Wit in Mr Harrington's last Book which (though in themselves inimitable) may serve as a Pattern for the Gentlemen of the Academie.

THE Considerer hath doft his considering Cap. in *Præfat.* A pig of my own Sow. p. 13. Monti and Bankes, Mountebanking. p. 17. A man to be made of Gingerbread, and his veins to run Malmesby. p. 21. You tumble Dick upon Sis. p. 23. The Ostracism of Billingsgate. p. 26. Paralogism and Parakeetism. p. 28. My Hypothesis, his Hypothites. p. 30. Sons of the University, Brothers of the Colledg, Heads and Points, *ibid.* If she who should have some care of the Vineyard of Truth, should lie pigging of wide bores to grunt in this manner and feare with the Tush, and I happen to ring some of them, (as I have done this Marcastin for rooting) there is nothing in my faith why such tryall of their Noses should be sin. p. 76. Besides these a great number of choice Metaphores from Bowling, Carding, Dicing, and the like.

An

*An account of severall Formes of Complement
and Address used by Mr Harrington,
which may be serviceable to the great De-
sign of improving Civility and Conver-
sation, which is intrusted with the Aca-
demie.*

Ocean. p. 130

PRævaricator, Infidell, Wretch, Rude
fellow, Unlucky Boy, Tom Thumb,
Bestia, Parrat, Ape, Tinker, Neither
Honest Man nor good Bowler, Cheat, Blind
Bayard &c. these are applicable to a person.
For a Book such appellations as these may be
used. Most victorious Nonsense, Slanders,
Fopperies, Vagaries, Knavery, Tittle tattle,
Verjuice. A Doctor is to be saluted thus; You
are a Doctor of fine things, Your Cap is
squarer then your play, you have more in
your sleeves then the scarlet, &c. You are a
Bog, Informis limus, stygiæque Paludes, This
would do admirably to our neighbours of the
Low Countries. You jole your presumptuous
head not only against ancient prudence but
against God himself. You take part with the
Devill &c.

F I N I S.
